The June 1st elections for the partial renewal of the Members of the Shura Council were marked by violence and accusations of ballot-rigging.
This election is an opportunity for focusing attention on Egypt, even if the Shura Council does not have the same power as the People’s Assembly [the Lower House] and its renewal is not of great interest to analysts or the people. Turnout was only 30%. The results reflected expectations with a win for Mubarak’s National Democratic Party. It is instead interesting to observe that none of the 15 candidates representing the Muslim Brotherhood were elected. The Islamic movement then emphasised the urgent need for political reform immediately announcing its support for the movement led by El Baradei (the National Front for Change which he founded in February 2010, Editor’s Note).
The real difference between the 2005 elections and the current ones is the presence in Egypt of Mohamed El Baradei. Will the former IAEA secretary make a difference?
He needs to first overcome the phase of dissent within the movement that supports him, especially from its spokesman Hassan Nafaa, who has criticised him for spending weeks away from the country. It appears that El Baradei wants to be sure he has external support before deciding to run. If he is protected by an international community that decides that this eternal transition to Egyptian democracy needs a candidate that is not a Mubarak, then he may be able to lead the country to change. Egyptian internal opposition, whether from the Muslim Brotherhood or the liberals led by Kifaya, has been too weak to make a difference. Let us say that El Baradei has been a bolt from the blue that might turn out to be a possible option.
Let us address the Muslim Brotherhood. Until recently the party portrayed itself as the only alternative to the National Democratic Party. It was supported by the poorer classes, but disliked by the United States, which is the main “sponsor” of the Egyptian regime. Nowadays this party is overwhelmed by internal disputes. Control over its leadership changes from the more reformist wing to the most radical, isolationist and conservative one.
The Muslim Brotherhood was unable to obtain the visibility needed for an election campaign and instead suffered continuous repression by the police. In the years to come it will continue to be the majority movement for Egyptian political Islam. To its right, however, there are and will continue to be, significant demands that if not jihadist, are, to say the least, Salafite. We will regret the lack of a decision in 2005 to bring this party officially within the Egyptian parliament’s institutional framework (when as independents they won about 1/5 of the seats in the Lower House, Editor’s Note), separating the political wing and transforming it into a political party as happened in Jordan. The authorities in Cairo preferred instead to imprison even its most pragmatic representatives such as Essam El Aryan and Abdel Munim Abu Al Futuh.
The Freedom Flottilla’s attempt to bring humanitarian aid by sea to the people of Gaza ended in bloodshed and the result was that Egypt reopened the Rafah border crossing with the Gaza Strip.
Mubarak’s foreign policy regarding Israel has always been to remain loyal to the 1979 peace agreement, albeit not enthusiastically. Egypt however lacks a strategy for the Palestinians, although it has assumed the task of mediating in talks between factions, but these talks are currently stalemated. One must add that this also greatly influences the international community’s position. However, returning to your question, Gaza worries Israel as much as it worries Egypt and for very different reasons. Egypt and Israel share a common enemy, Hamas. One should not forget that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Egyptian Islamic movement was at the origin of and inspired the Palestinian Islamic resistance movement. If the Rafah border crossing remains closed it is to check Islamist shifts, but also because Cairo does not wish to take back the Gaza Strip which was its protectorate between 1948 and 1967. However, in excessively enforcing the border crossing’s closure, Egypt fears a revolt similar to the one that took place in 2008.
Translated by Francesca Simmons