Will it be Bosnia, multiple Bosnias or will Bosnia cease to exist? This Balkan country, the theatre of a bloody conflict (1992-1995) that shocked consciences in the West, is currently experiencing an extremely delicate moment. No, there will not be another war. But the country is imploding and has reached a point from which there is the risk of no return. Ethnic divisions, the continuous crossed-vetoes between ethnic groups and slow-moving reforms risk condemning the country to eternal inaction. And the undefined profile of a state that is “one, dual and trine” could become even stronger to the extent of consuming the remaining margin available for creating a different future. A future as a normal state.

Let us be clearer. Bosnia, with an institutional structure that is the result of the Dayton agreements dated December 1995, which marked the end of the conflict, is a federal state, with a central government (situated in Sarajevo) with not very incisive power, and two ethnic groups – the Srpska Republic (SR) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) – boasting rather significant functions and competences. One and dual, is understandable. More dual than one, to tell the truth. But why trine? The point is that within the Federation, better known as the Muslim-Croatian Federation, Croatians and Bosnian Muslims do not get along all that well, and although in vain, the Croatians have often requested the creation of their own institutions.

From the end of the war to today, Bosnia has embarked on a complex and winding path, and currently there is no end in sight, in the sense that the status quo now plays the leading role. The current situation sees the ethnic political parties dominating the stage and the political class, mainly children of the war and used to reasoning following ethnic patterns and mistrustful of one another, leaving no room – as so well explained by Christophe Solioz in the interview published by Resetdoc – to the new generations who tend to think in more modern terms and are not conditioned by the war. The excessive power of the political dinosaurs, added to the inflexibility of the Dayton agreements, results in a cocktail that is devastating for Bosnia. While at the time the peace treaty was signed “cantonalisation” seemed to be the right solution for normalising the country, now it has become a sort of Alcatraz from which it appears to be extremely hard to escape. There was one important opportunity to escape in 2000, when the political parties of change – the Social-Democrats and the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina – came to power. But the experience only lasted two years and was overwhelmed by an inability to seriously reform the country and increasing pressure from ethnic political parties. These returned to the centre-stage in 2002, imposing their totally incompatible respective orthodoxies. The Bosnian Muslims supported the cause of a state without entity. The Serbs reacted by embracing the Dayton agreements and preventing constitutional amendments to protect the existence of the SR, Radovan Karadzic’s creature.

Two police forces are better than one

In Bosnia reforms are not implemented. For the ethnic political parties it is imperative to cultivate personal interests, as proved by the infinite discussions on the unification of Serb and Muslim-Croatian Police Forces, which the EU has posed as a condition for signing the Association and Stabilisation Agreement (AAS), the first step for aspiring to future membership. The SR and the Muslim-Croatian Federation have reached an agreement and the EU has signed an understanding regards to the AAS. And yet, many still emphasise that the police force reform was only a cosmetic operation and that Brussels unwillingly approved the ASS because it had no choice and needed to provide Bosnia with a line of credit, to avoid increased frustration in Sarajevo.

Banja Luka wants to leave

Experts and diplomats see only one exit strategy for Bosnia: increased power to the central government and hence limitations to power of institutions and the ten districts into which the Muslin-Croatian Federation is subdivided – some dominated by Bosnian Muslims, others by Croatians and others still by a paralysing mixed majority. But the situation has not evolved. Firstly because the international community does not wish to run risks, especially now that the USA has other problems to address and the EU is suffering from over-enlargement syndrome. All this helps the SR’s ambitious Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, leader of the Independent Social Democrat Alliance (SNSD), who sees this as an opportunity to accelerate his own independence orientated temptations.

On more than one occasion Dodik has mentioned the idea of calling a national referendum to secede from Bosnia and provide the Serbs with their own homeland, ending the awkward coexistence with Muslims and Croatians. Will he pull it off? According to William Montgomery, former Ambassador to Belgrade, it may be possible that step by step Dodik may achieve this objective. Montgomery recently wrote on the B92 website (www.b92.net), a Belgrade station, that the Serb-Bosniak Premier wished to follow in the footsteps of his Montenegrin colleague Milo Djukanovic, whose independence related ambitions were initially greeted with strong hostility in Serbia – and obviously – within the EU. Then, once Milosevic’s regime had fallen and the EU had been persuaded that separation from Serbia was inevitable, Djukanovic completed his long journey towards full sovereignty, decreed by the referendum held on May 21st 2006. Internal hostility (from the Bosniaks) and external criticism (from Brussels) create an analogy with the SR and Montenegro, where Dodik has sent his emissaries to learn the secret of Djukanovic’s success. And yet the Dayton structure, which acknowledges the Serb-Bosnian Republic, binding its existence however to accepting the 1995 constitution, is apparently an insurmountable obstacle for Banja Luka (capital of the SR).

Divided Muslims

But Dodik could be helped by the Muslims, whose political elite has experienced a tough battle during the past two years. On one hand the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), led by the heirs of Alija Izetbegovic, the man who led the inhabitants of Sarajevo as they resisted the long siege laid by the Serbs. On the other, the Party for Bosnia Herzegovina led my former Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic, now President of the three-party Federal Presidency (which has three members, a Croatian, a Bosniak and a Serb who take turns as president). The battle between the two factions has significantly weakened the Bosniaks, also obliged to address a serious financial crisis within the FBIH, which is in the red due to increased pensions for war veterans. This decision was approved in 2006 on the eve of the elections to gain votes from former soldiers.

And what side are the Croatians on? In private they support Dodik’s plans, but do not have the courage to support him publicly. Generally speaking they stand on the sidelines. And they wait. The situation was well summarised by the international community’s High Representative for Bosnia, Lord Paddy Ashdown, who wrote as follows in the Guardian: “the Bosniaks (Muslims) squabble among themselves. Their leaders …need to start putting the public’s interest before their own…The Croats wait and see…Dodik is the only man with a plan”. A separatist plan, that is however pursued astutely and pragmatically. The RS, in fact, is experiencing a period of growth thanks to a series of reforms and privatisations. Dodik fa l’anfibio: he is tough when national interests are involved and flexible regards to the economy. Will he manage to implement his plans? This will depend on how the intra-Bosniak battle develops and what the Croats will do, if anything. It also depends on whether Europe will act and try and draft a “Plan B” for Bosnia. This before the singular (Bosnia) is definitively replaced by the plural (Bosnias). Before disaster hits, with the disappearance of Bosnia.

Translation by Francesca Simmons