The general elections in Iran have shed light on profound conflicts within the establishment. What is the current scenario?
One can divide the power élites into various groups. The pragmatists led by former President Rafsanjani, the extremists who rotate around Larijani (Speaker of the Iranian Parliament) and other representatives of the Islamic Republic’s first generation, and Ahmedinejad’s radicals. One can define as reformists those close to Karroubi and Khatami, while Moussavi is in a hybrid position somewhere between the fundamentalists and the reformists.
How does the position assumed by reformists differ from that of other groups on nuclear issues?
The only difference is that reformists want negotiations to be out in the open, in compliance with international law and with the West. Ahmedinejad instead plays an ambiguous game. He makes statements that are then contradicted by facts. It is obvious that nuclear issues are for him a means for applying pressure and ensuring internal legitimisation.
On what else is the Iranian President challenged?
His totalitarian management of power. The “coup d’état” carried out by Ahmedinejad, who in the opinion of his opponents did not respect the election’s results. Furthermore, Moussavi and other members of the opposition accuse the president of transforming the country into a praetorian system as in Egypt, or a military dictatorship, in which little or nothing of an Islamic Republic will remain.
Who are the “Green Wave” people? What social classes do they belong to?
The strange thing is that we are seeing a back to front revolution, in which the upper-middle classes and especially reasonably well-educated and well-off young people protest against the current management of power by the less wealthy and less-educated proletariat, who use arrogance and repression as a means of exercising power. The basiji, for example, come from the countryside and the poorer districts in the city, while the protesters are mainly young people from the middle and upper-middle classes and come from Teheran’s better-off areas.
What are their demands and their prospects?
This is a generation that has only experienced and known the Islamic Republic, so much so that if one analyses their demands, one notes only opposition to the election results. However, a part from a few groups, there is no alternative organised plan to the Islamic Republic, whether a democratic system following the western models or a liberal government. This is also a protest with no leader, because while Moussavi and Karroubi may be their reference points, they are certainly not their leaders.
What role did the Ayatollah Montazeri play within the opposition?
Montazeri has become an icon for the opposition only because in the past he opposed Khomeini’s policies. This too proves the lack of reference points in the reformist camp.
So how should one consider appeals made by Western countries in the name of the salvation and freedom of the Iranian people?
Obviously there is a degree of western demagogy that tends to categorise people as “good” or “bad.” In particular, that is what the Americans do. Perceiving reformists as “good” is a lapse in the analysis of the country’s social and political dynamics. One should ask oneself what the reformists wish to reform. Some have said they wish to transform the Islamic Republic into a full democracy, but many others have never said anything of the sort. There are also people considered “bad” with whom it is possible instead to reason and negotiate. I believe that one cannot say that this is a situation in which the people are against the regime. It may be that an escalation of the violence could lead to that, also because if things continue along this line, Iran will become a military dictatorship in which there will be little or nothing left of the Islamic Republic.
What would new sanctions achieve? They did not work well during the Bush administration.
Sanctions are a political statement that says to the world “We will not stand by and watch you, we are reacting and we have you cornered.”
So, these are statements and not real strategies?
The real strategy needs to be implemented behind the scenes. One should, for example take the ten people closest to Ahmedinejad and attack them, specifically regarding their bank accounts, the money they spend and the places they travel to, etc.
There is talk of bombing their nuclear sites. Is that a feasible strategy?
It might be politically feasible, but not technically. There is not really any need to block the country’s capability to build an atomic weapon, but rather a need to prove to the world that Iran cannot be permitted to announce progress in its nuclear programme without there being a reaction. I do not consider armed intervention a feasible strategy. I think that over the next few months the United States will try and increase sanctions, hoping that protests in the streets will increase and that the regime will implode. I also do not believe that the Iranians are close to creating an atomic weapon, much less on the verge of doing so.
Does Iran really want the bomb?
More than the atomic bomb itself, Iranians are interesting in being able to have one. They are looking for the status and role of a nuclear power. They would be content if everyone acknowledged that they had an atomic weapon. Really having the bomb would be too complicated and too risky, especially in terms of managing all that.
What role is Europe playing in this match?
Europe, if it really exists, has presented inconclusive proposals. If Europe really were united, if it did look after the interest of European countries as a whole, then it could become a player in negotiations. This applies not only to Iran, but to the entire Middle East.
How is the White House now managing relations with Iran, compared to the Bush Administration?
The rhetoric at least is very different. I am not sure what results this will achieve. However, the fact that Washington has now opened up to Iran by saying that the United States is ready to negotiate, if Iran is ready to listen, has already thrown the Iranian government of balance and caused them problems as far as portraying Americans as ‘bad’ is concerned. This should not be underestimated, because in a world in which rhetoric is of the utmost importance, having a different attitude, even if only in the use of language, puts them off balance. In spite of the regime’s anti-Americanism, Iranians are the most pro-American people in the world.
Translated by Francesca Simmons