As someone who is not a student of American politics, I tend to relate American political developments to experiences and places that I am more familiar with. From this perspective, I’ll try to make four simple points. For a foreigner, particularly an Eastern European, who carries a significant political history in their personal biography, one of the most striking things that began to unfold in the United States—long before these most recent elections—was the intense conversation about the “last elections.” Specifically, the question of whether these could be the “last elections” in the sense of the political system being in peril. This debate became especially prominent around 2020, when the idea was first articulated.
This concept of the “last elections” took on different forms depending on the political perspective. From the Left, it was framed as the idea that these could be the “last elections” because an autocratic leader would be elected, who would then eliminate future elections altogether. On the other hand, the Republican version of the “last elections” narrative centered around the belief that, due to changes in migration and citizenship policies, future elections would no longer reflect the will of the broader electorate, as governments would essentially be able to elect their own people. This was tied to concerns about undocumented voting and the potential manipulation of the electoral process.
This is critically important because, as a result, what many observe is a crisis in American democracy. There’s much discussion about political community, yet for various reasons, such as demographic migrations, the boundaries of that community are no longer self-evident. In my view, one of the key messages coming from Donald Trump’s campaign was the exclusive nature of democracy. The underlying idea here is that the central boundary in any democracy is the one between citizens and non-citizens, and this distinction plays a significant role in shaping political discourse.
The second shift, in my view, not only affecting America but many other places as well, is our changing perception of the future. I would argue that democracy relies on a certain understanding of the future—a future that is open, changeable, with both a positive, utopian dimension and the ability to address immediate problems while postponing others. Jonathan White, in his insightful book, discusses the crucial role of the future as a political institution. However, for various reasons, both on the left and right, there has been a shift toward a more apocalyptic view of the future. People began fearing the future. It’s no longer seen as a project to shape, but as a series of projections. On the left, especially due to concerns about climate change, young people have started to see themselves as the “last generation.” On the right, demographic fears have led many to feel they are witnessing the decline of their nations, seeing themselves as the “last” of their people—whether the last Bulgarians, Hungarians, or Germans. As a result, the future feels closed off, and the sense that major decisions can be postponed has diminished. This closing of the future, in my view, is a significant part of the current political story.
This also helps explain another aspect of the situation from the perspective of someone who is not deeply immersed in American politics. While I believe elections are important for what they represent—interests, values—they are also crucial for what they do not represent: intensity. For example, you and I, with differing levels of passion for certain issues, both get one vote, and those votes are treated equally. This non-representation of intensity was once a fundamental way societies could reconcile differences on election night. However, in the new media environment, especially with social media, intensity has become critical. If you look at political parties through this lens, they’ve traded consistency for intensity. No one is really advocating for political programs anymore; it’s all about intensity—about showing how important an issue is. I’m highlighting this because I want to conclude with three brief points, especially as everyone now is focusing on the victory of Donald Trump and attempting to explain why people voted for him.
For me, what’s much more interesting in understanding the crisis of American democracy, especially from the perspective of the culture wars, is why the Biden project didn’t work. In a certain way, Biden was defined as having a transformative project. There were three key aspects that I believe characterized this. First, it wasn’t primarily focused on the culture wars. Instead, it was about transformation—a new Roosevelt moment. It was about the Green Deal as a New Deal.
There was significant spending, and Biden seemed to feel that, due to Covid, people had once again recognized the important role of government. My main argument, however, is that part of the failure of the Biden project lies in a slight misinterpretation of the political effects of Covid. On one hand, Covid initially created a demand for government intervention, but in the long term, it also strengthened libertarian impulses. People began to say, “I don’t want to be told how to live.” This placed politicians in a difficult situation, as voters told them, “I’m giving you a mandate to change the world, but don’t touch my way of life.” This is a crucial moment, because many of the voters who turned to Trump did so because they rejected not only the long lockdowns but also, on the cultural front, the way they were being told how to speak, behave, and think. This aspect is central to understanding the current political landscape.
The second key pillar of the Biden project was the idea of normality. The narrative was that “we are normal, they are weird, there is a sense of normalcy.” However, when normality is perceived primarily as defending the status quo, it can become a self-defeating strategy. While the Left, particularly the Democratic Party, emphasized normality, the Right’s attack was that what the Left was advocating for was not simply abnormal but unnatural. This conflict played out in policy debates, with the right framing the left’s agenda as a challenge to the natural order. In my view, this framing worked in certain ways, particularly with some groups that Biden’s strategists didn’t expect. For example, when Biden reached out to unions and emphasized support for blue-collar workers, it became clear that the educational divide was so significant that the language of the Democrats didn’t resonate with the lived experiences of many voters. Additionally, we see growing generational divides contributing to this disconnect.
The last point I want to make is about how the Biden project was largely built on the historically tested idea that an external threat would foster national unity. After Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, there was an assumption that this war would unite the nation, as Americans, with their Cold War legacy, knew how to respond to such challenges. The Roosevelt moment was often cited as a model for how external threats could galvanize unity. However, I believe we are now facing a new reality, both in the U.S. and beyond. External threats no longer seem to produce the same national unity. In democratic societies, even when both sides acknowledge the threat as real, such as in Poland, we see government and opposition recognizing the danger without moving toward greater cooperation. This suggests a shift in dynamics that raises important questions about the future of American politics and whether the traditional assumption about external threats uniting the nation still holds.
What I see in these elections is the end of American exceptionalism. Suddenly, many of the issues and dynamics playing out in America are not so unique, and I find myself seeing parallels in countries far from America, with histories very different from its own. When we talk about the crisis of liberal democracies, it’s clear that this is a much broader phenomenon than simply the crisis of democratization within the American political cycle.
Cover photo: Pro-Trump stickers are placed on a table during New York Young Republican Club’s 6th annual rooftop MAGAWEEN party in New York, October 26, 2024. (Photo by Kena Betancur / AFP)
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