The last two events, in particular, have highlighted a growing contrast between the high handed use of his very extended powers by President Morsi (and of the controlling majority the Islamist parties have in the Constitutional Assembly), and a political base which is not very wide, and may be less solid that it seems.

The political base of President Mohamed Morsi is narrower than it seems

Mohamed Morsi has been elected President of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the 16th and 17th June 2012,  in the run off of the election with  a meagre majority of 51,73 % of the popular vote. His opponent. Ahmed Shafiq, was an ex Air Force officer – Minister under Mubarak, and appointed Prime Minister during the transition period by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – hardly a figure likely to attract votes from liberal and progressive voters.

But in the first round of the same Presidential Elections Morsi had obtained only 25% of the vote, and, another more moderate, Islamist candidate, Abd el Moneim Abd el Foutouh another 18%. The three main secular candidates (Shafiq, Sabbahi and Amr Mussa) had obtained between them 57% of he votes.

These few figures lead to the conclusion that while Mohamed Mursi – having prevailed in the second round of the election – has legally won the Presidency of Egypt, his personal political base among the actual voters is narrow (only 25% in the first round!); it is even narrower in the electorate as large, as only 43,4% of the electors bothered to vote (compared with 54 % in the preceding parliamentary elections which were held in November 2011 and January 2012).

The political base of Islamist political movements is shrinking

In the parliamentary elections the three main Islamist movements (the FJP, inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist Bloc, representing mainly the Salafists, and the more moderate el Wasat) obtained between them a whopping 69 % of the votes. This impressive result certainly reflects the fact that the Egyptian population is considered to be one of the more religious in the world [1].

The undeniable success of Islamist parties at the first free elections was also due to the divisions and lack of leadership among the secular parties, versus the good organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood and the external financial support it seems to have  received from the outside, together with the Salafist movements. But it does not necessarily mean that political Islam does represent a majority among the voters, and even less among the electorate and society at large.

As a matter of fact, in the first round of the Presidential elections the two Islamist candidates (Morsi for the FJP and the more moderate Abd el Foutouh) obtained only 43% of the votes: a loss of  more than five million votes, compared to the Parliamentary elections held six months before.

According to a study released by the Pew Research Center in May 2012, while a majority of Egyptians affirms that religion plays an important part in the politics of their country, the number of those who think that its role is negative has increased from 2% in 2010 to 25% in 2012.

The dangerous consequences of a political contradiction

The contradiction between the assertiveness of the Islamist President and the limits of the electoral support received by himself and by the two main Islamic parties (the FJP and the Salafist Nour Party) are beginning to emerge, and they look potentially dangerous, not only to the rule of the President, but to the stability of the country.

Tahrir Square – that had seen in the last two years so many demonstrations against President Mubarak, and after that against the SCAF – is now witnessing large demonstrations against the first democratically elected President. But, what is more worrying, we are now seeing clashes between Islamists and secular groups in various parts of the country, assaults to offices of the Muslim Brotherhood and the inevitable reprisals. While these new phenomena have been until today relatively contained, it is undeniable that the actions of President Morsi have divided and polarized the country.

It is difficult to believe that the approval of the new Constitution, if it takes place, can defuse these rising tensions. The legitimacy of the Constitutional Assembly has been in doubt since its inception, its meetings have been deserted by over a quarter of its members as a protest against Islamic dominance, its discussions have been for many weeks desultory, until the final approval of the text which has been rushed during an all night session. Moreover the referendum is widely perceived as a “devil’s  alternative” between the approval of the draft text as it is now, or the indefinite continuation of the exceptional powers President Morsi has “provisionally” claimed for himself with his latest Constitutional Declaration.

On the other hand, a repeal of the Constitution in the referendum would not allay the tensions but would leave Egypt in a double void. An institutional void,  due to the lack of a Constitution, a Constitutional Assembly and a Parliament. And a political void because it would mean a severe defeat for the Presidency, the only extant political institution remaining in Egypt.

The other consequence of President’s Morsi recent initiatives is what seems to be the beginning of a cooperation between the opposition forces. The first days of December have witnessed the creation of a National Front between tens of opposition movements and parties, large and small. Its main leaders are Mohamed el Baradei, Hamdeen Sabbahi and Amr Mussa. The Front includes representatives of very diverse political tendencies: reformers and conservatives, liberals and socialists/nasserites, secular, moderate Islamists and Christian Copts. As such it epitomizes the difficulty for the opposition(s) to construct today a political alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood. But it represents a very large proportion of Egyptian public opinion, perhaps a majority, and may still have the power to derail the Brotherhood’s unilateral bid for supremacy.

Is Islam the solution (for Egypt)?

The first few months of the Morsi Presidency have proven to be a political failure, which goes well beyond the lack of economic competence that affects the Brotherhood and its lack of experience in the managing of a modern State. The very important, and often constructive, role that the Muslim Brothers have always played in Egyptian society, has proven difficult to transfer to the political level.

This should not have been entirely surprising, given that each time the Muslim Brothers have reached the halls of power (as happened in the Sudan, in Morocco, in Jordan) their political tenure has ended in failure. The Tunisian Islamic Leader al Gannuchi has warned: “For the Islamists the main danger is to be loved before they come to power, and hated afterwards”. This prediction has come to pass in Egypt, an its results are not going to be forgotten soon.

But the damage to the image of the Brothers may reverberate well outside Egypt. First of all other Arab Countries that share partly similar situations: Tunisia, Jordan, even Syria, come to mind.

In a wider regional context, Egypt, and its Muslim Brothers, are important players in the competition between Sunni and Shia Islam and are seen – first of all by the United States – as one of the main building blocks for the political stability of the area.

They are also part of the ongoing struggle – inside Sunni Islam itself – for the right to represent the true religion. The Brotherhood competes in this very political field with the various Salafi movements, supported by the Gulf monarchies, and both sides seem intent in taking control of the religious University of el Azhar.

The confirmation of the failure of the political experiment conducted by the, very conservative, present leadership of Egyptian Muslim Brothers could therefore have far reaching consequences. One can only hope that the lesson be learnt, and that a more rational and prudent approach can be developed by other more reasonable components that exist within the Brotherhood, and not only in its Youth Movement.

At the present moment there seem to be few grounds for optimism. A move towards democracy would require an inclusive political approach that took into consideration the interests and aspirations of all the main players on the Egyptian scene. And that political approach would have to be guaranteed by a balance of powers and by he rule of law.

None of these seem to be available, and signs of worry are beginning to be heard from the military establishment which fears to find itself again in the position of being the ultimate guarantor a discredited political authority.

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[1] Egypt was found to be “the most religious country in the world” by a Gallup poll conducted in 2008. 100% of the persons interviewed affirmed that “religion played a relevant role in their lives”.

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Francesco Aloisi de Larderel has served as Italy’s ambassador to Egypt

Cover photo: Tahrir Square, by Gigi Ibrahim (cc)