Rebuilding Iraq Amid Regional and Domestic Crises

Since the end of the war of liberation against ISIS in 2017, Iraq has experienced a situation of relative stability, meaning the absence of open conflict, regularly undermined by internal and regional crises. Involved in the tensions between Iran and Israel since the beginning of the war in Gaza, due to the ties of Iraqi Shiite militias with Tehran, the country has also worsened its relations with the United States, which still maintains military outposts on its territory: dozens of attacks have been launched by the militias against US bases, and by the Americans toward the militants’ positions. In this tense context, on February 7th, Wissam Muhammad Sabir Al-Saadi, known as Abu Baqir Al-Saad, the leader of Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the Shiite paramilitary groups that are part of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, a network consisting of 67 factions formed during the war against the Islamic State and later integrated into the armed forces, was killed in Baghdad.

Regional tensions have progressively risen since then, first with Iran’s attack on Israel on April 13, in response to the Israeli attack in Damascus against the Iranian consulate, and even more in recent days, after the Israeli attack in Beirut on July 30 that killed Fuad Shukur, a high-ranking member of Hezbollah, and the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran the following day.

Relations with the USA

The Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, during a conversation with the U.S. Secretary of State, confirmed Iraq’s mediating role in the region, but also reiterated that the only way to prevent an escalation involving everyone is to stop the Israeli aggression in Gaza and keep it from spreading to Lebanon.

In any case, the hostilities have increased tensions between the two governments during a very delicate phase in U.S.-Iraq bilateral relations. Washington and Baghdad are currently redefining their relationship, particularly regarding the presence and the future withdrawal of American troops still deployed as part of the Combined Joint Task Force of Operation Inherent Resolve, tasked with assisting and advising local forces. The issue is that the resources the United States has in Iraq and the Gulf area have recently been used to respond to threats from Iraqi factions allied with Iran, with no authorization from the Baghdad government, thus violating national sovereignty.

Iraqi public opinion has long been calling for the coalition’s withdrawal, but a definitive step in this direction could further complicate Iraq’s position in view of the effort to deal with the Islamic State and, from the American perspective, could further reinforce the country’s ties with Tehran.

Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council has accepted Iraq’s request to end the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which has been active since 2003 and is set to terminate in December 2025. However, Baghdad’s desire to present itself as a country capable of taking care of itself could be undermined at any moment by becoming involved, even indirectly, in the Gaza conflict.

Domestic Equilibriums and the Role of Turkey

In the current phase, relations between the Iraqi federal government and the regional government of Kurdistan also move via Turkey.

From a financial perspective, Baghdad has increased the budget allocation for the autonomous region, using the funds to begin paying the overdue salaries of Kurdish public employees. In return, Erbil has started to hand over its non-oil revenues, as stipulated by the Iraqi Supreme Court, since crude oil exports to Turkey were halted in March 2023 and have not yet restarted.

The blockade was decided by Turkey following an order from the International Chamber of Commerce to make Ankara pay Baghdad $1.4 billion for importing oil from Kurdistan since 2014, bypassing the federal government.

Turkey’s central role in Iraqi internal affairs also extends to the presence of PKK resistance pockets along the border. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party is considered a national security threat by Ankara, leading Turkey to conduct numerous attacks in the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan in recent months, raising fears of a potential large-scale operation, similar to what happened in northern Syria, where the Turks have occupied some areas of what is now Rojava.

The Electoral Stalemate in Kurdistan and the Question of the Minorities

The autonomous region of Kurdistan is, in the meantime, waiting to hold elections to renew its Parliament, originally scheduled for October 2022. The elections were postponed to June 10 but were again delayed following the Federal Court’s decision to annul the electoral law that reserved 11 seats for ethno-religious minorities in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The ruling also transferred the authority to supervise the vote from the Kurdish regional commission to the federal one, and divided the territory into four electoral constituencies.

The Court’s ruling came after a lawsuit filed by two members of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), who argued that the seats reserved for minorities were actually under the control of the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

The elections have now been rescheduled for October 20, after the Iraqi Judicial Council reached a compromise, allocating five out of one hundred seats to minorities.

What Has Happened to ISIS

In some rural areas of Iraq, there are still Daesh cells capable of attacking military positions; this happened on May 13 in the Salahuddin area, where five soldiers of the Federal Army were killed. According to data from the United States Central Command published last January, there are at least 2,500 militants affiliated with ISIS in Iraq, facilitated by connections with other affiliated groups operating and proliferating across the border in a Syria now split up into different areas of influence.

Periodically, security forces continue to engage in anti-terrorism campaigns throughout the country, and since 2017, dozens of people have been arrested and tried on charges of being part of the organization. Amnesty International has recently raised concerns about the management of trials and prison conditions, warning of the poor detention conditions and the high number of death sentences handed down following trials lacking evidence against the defendants or where the individuals who made forced confessions showed evident signs of torture.

In addition to those detained in Iraq related to Daesh or suspected of being so, there are those held in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, along with their families, in detention camps where mothers and their children live with no prospects or any kind of services. From January 2021 to the present time, Iraqi authorities have repatriated about 10,000 people, half of whom are women and children transferred directly to the so-called “rehabilitation camp” Jeddah 1 in Nineveh province.

Refugees, Evacuees and “Returnees”

According to UNHCR data, Iraq still hosts 300,000 refugees, over 90 percent of whom are Syrian citizens who fled the civil war. Most of them come from the north-eastern area and have no prospect of returning in the short or medium term. Ninety-one percent of all refugees in the country are in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region, while the remaining 9 per cent live between Baghdad and Basra.

Of the refugees in Kurdistan, 34 percent are still in the nine refugee camps in the region, while 66 per cent have found accommodation in Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah.

The conquest of territories in the Nineveh plain and Anbar by ISIS in 2014 also led to the internal migration of over six million Iraqis, five million of whom have returned to their places of origin. However, 1.14 million remain displaced due to lack of opportunities, living in fear of belonging to a minority, or enduring the stigma of being considered suspected supporters or affiliates of the Islamic State.

Even the so-called “returnees,” i.e. those who have returned home after the end of the war, face significant hardship due to the lack of real prospects for economic recovery and reconstruction, which should include services, industries, and private homes as well as sites of high historical and artistic value, for which international community aid has also come through.

According to the International Labour Organization, the unemployment rate in Iraq is 22 per cent for men and 66 per cent for women. Of the total workforce, 66 per cent of the population, 54.8 per cent are employed in informal sectors, including children, who are often forced to leave school to help their families. In cities particularly affected by the recent conflict, such as Mosul, there are people who still live among the ruins of their homes, without access to electricity and water, and cannot permit themselves anything more than survival. They are the first victims of an increasing phenomenon, that of a second migration, where those who have been trying to return have found it almost impossible to stay.

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