Postponed Elections in Rojava 2024: Kurdish Autonomy Under Turkish Threat
Ilaria Romano 1 October 2024

Elections have been postponed indefinitely in autonomous Northeastern Syria, also known as Rojava. Initially scheduled for May 30th, they were first delayed to June 11th and then to August 8th, but the timetable was never confirmed. Officially, this was attributed to insufficient time for electoral campaigning, but more realistically, it was due to genuine concerns over a potential new Turkish escalation in the area. This concern arises after increased drone attacks in recent months targeting Kurds of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in northern Iraq, and affiliated organizations such as the PYD, Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, (Democratic Union Party), which directly governs the autonomous administration in Syria.

The PYD itself, regarding the decision to set a new date for the vote, has decided to take more time, as it has not received any political support to confirm it: neither from the Damascus regime, nor from the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf), nor from the United States. Just a few days ago, the U.S. asked local authorities not to proceed, given the inability to ensure free and fair conditions for the elections.

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), established in 2012 in the wake of the civil war to achieve autonomous governance within a federal Syria, has not held elections since 2017. That year, elections were held in the Rojava cantons of Afrin, Jazeera, and Kobane.

In recent years, the part of the country governed by a Kurdish-majority coalition has continued to face not only the consequences of the civil war, including inflation, unemployment, and growing poverty, but also two active fronts of conflict: the pockets of Islamic State resistance in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, and Turkish military incursions along the northern border.

 

Turkish military operations in Syria

 

In January 2018, Turkey launched Operation “Olive Branch” in the Afrin enclave, located in the northwestern part of the country, supported by Arab and Turkmen militias aligned with the Syrian National Army (SNA), taking control in just two months. The administration of the canton was subsequently handed over to the SNA after the dissolution of the Kurdish administrations. Since then, according to the 2024 report by Yasa, the Kurdish Centre for Studies & Legal Consultancy, the incidence of arbitrary detentions, torture, and forced disappearances in the area has increased, particularly targeting the Kurdish population.

The following year, in 2019, Ankara launched a new offensive in northeastern Syria, called “Peace Spring.” Turkish armed forces conducted the operation along with the Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an alliance of militias composed of Arab and Assyrian-Syriac Christian groups, but primarily Kurdish forces from the YPG (People’s Protection Units) and its female counterpart, the YPJ (Women’s Protection Units). The YPG and YPJ, founded in 2011 at the start of the Syrian civil war as the military wing of the Kurdish Supreme Committee—composed of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council—first fought against the Damascus regime and later against Islamic State militants to defend Syrian Kurdistan. Today, they represent the primary military force in the region.

This new conflict with Turkey in northern Syria caused around a hundred deaths and at least 300,000 displaced people, in a country where the number of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) exceeds 7 million, and another 5 million refugees are in neighboring states.

Turkish President Erdoğan’s objective was to expel the SDF from the border area with Turkey, as they are considered a terrorist organization due to their links with the PKK, against which Turkey is also waging a campaign in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. During this offensive, human rights violations were reported, including summary executions and military actions that harmed civilians. Despite these violations, Turkey managed to reach an agreement with the United States for the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces from a strip of territory about 30 kilometers from the border, as well as from Tal Rifaat and Manbij.

In total, the areas in northern Syria currently controlled by Turkey cover nearly 9,000 square kilometers and include over a thousand settlements, including the cities of Al-Bab, Azaz, Jarablus, Rajo, Tal Abyad, and Ras al-Ayn. Most of these urban centers were once under the control of the Islamic State, later liberated by the SDF. Others, like Azaz, were administered by the Syrian opposition before being occupied by Turkey.

Today’s Syria appears fragmented into zones of influence and control, with new and fragile borders shaped by the civil war, opposition to the Damascus regime, the rise of ISIS, the subsequent liberation war led by the Kurds with American support, and, finally, Turkey’s presence.

 

Forced repatriations of Syrian refugees

 

The Kurdish-majority forces in northeastern Syria, with their de facto self-government, have raised a diplomatic issue within NATO, as they are considered to have terrorist affiliations by Turkey but are, at the same time, allies of the United States in Operation “Inherent Resolve,” aimed at countering the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

Hence, Ankara’s decision to justify the occupation of foreign territory with the intent of creating a so-called safe zone to accommodate, more or less forcibly, a portion of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey.

The resettlement plan, which began at the end of 2019, has been repeatedly condemned by Human Rights Watch. On one hand, it aims to alter the demography of the area, originally primarily Kurdish, by forcibly settling Arab families, and on the other, it pushes for the relocation of individuals who are under temporary humanitarian protection and, therefore, should not be repatriated. In 2023 alone, according to data collected by Human Rights Watch at the border crossing, over 57,000 Syrians crossed from Turkey into Turkish-occupied northern Syria, all recorded as voluntary returns. However, investigations by Human Rights Watch reveal that, since 2019, Turkish forces have arrested, arbitrarily detained, and expelled thousands of Syrians in the country, often forcing them to sign documents for voluntary repatriation. Moreover, testimonies collected indicate that the so-called “safe zone” has proven to be uninhabitable, forcing repatriated refugees to continue their journey under even more precarious conditions to move away from the border, thereby increasing the number of internally displaced persons.

 

A rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus?

 

Last July, the Turkish president expressed his willingness to reopen dialogue with the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, who had already shown openness to a thaw in relations, provided it was based on the sovereignty of his state, and thus on the withdrawal of Turkish forces from the northern border. A month later, Ankara’s Defense Minister Yaşar Güler also confirmed the desire to normalize relations with Damascus and suggested that a withdrawal from Turkish-occupied territories could only happen if the Assad government adopted a new constitution and secured its borders.

In 2011, Erdoğan was among the first to advocate for the overthrow of Assad, including through support for the opposition forces against the regime. However, since the end of 2022, a slow process of rapprochement has begun, involving Russia, which has a strong presence in the Assad government, and Iran, which is present in the country through pro-Shiite militias and has a strategic base in Deir ez-Zor. This base serves as a connection point for Iranian-affiliated forces in both Syria and Iraq.

Turkey aims to rebuild a strong relationship with Damascus to avoid being sidelined in the area, especially in light of the war in Gaza and the resulting regional instabilities. Assad, who has previously been reluctant to endorse the Turkish presence in Syria, now appears more motivated to reach an agreement for the same reason, as well as the risk of an escalation of the conflict on a regional scale, which would ultimately weaken his position as well.

 

The consequences for the Kurds of Northeast Syria

 

Any reconciliation will have direct consequences for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and, consequently, for the Autonomous Civil Administration of North and East Syria, as any potential agreement would legitimize the Damascus regime as the only recognized government in Syria. Additionally, an understanding with Turkey, while it could lead to the signing of a withdrawal plan from the occupied Syrian territories, would allow for renewed attacks against SDF-administered areas in the name of a revived common security policy. As already announced for the next round of negotiations, the initial measures on the agenda will focus on identifying “terrorists” and cooperation for their dismantling between the two states. In this specific case, it could coincide with the end of the de facto autonomous government and the resurgence of a new front of internal conflict.

 

 

Cover photo: Raqqa, Mogamaa St., picture shot by Ilaria Romano. All rights are reserved.


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