On May 18, Polish voters will head to the polls for the first round of the presidential elections. A ballot, which is highly likely, is scheduled for June 1. After a year and a half in power, the center-liberal-progressive coalition—comprising the Civic Coalition, Third Way, and Lewica parties, and led by Donald Tusk—faces a true validation test. Depending on the outcome, this election could have significant repercussions for the legislature.
From a technical standpoint, the President of the Republic of Poland, in addition to having a representative role, is the head of the armed forces and has the power to veto laws passed by Parliament. This latter aspect has been a major challenge for the current government due to the way it has been used by outgoing President Andrzej Duda, a representative of the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, who has held office for two consecutive terms since 2015.
The Favorites
Until a couple of months ago, the outcome of these elections seemed little more than a formality in favor of Rafał Trzaskowski, the liberal-democratic Mayor of Warsaw and candidate of the Civic Coalition (KO), Donald Tusk’s party. Trzaskowski had already run in the 2020 presidential race, losing narrowly to Duda by just a few thousand votes. Between late November and early December, polls gave him a comfortable lead, allowing him to sleep soundly—but that is no longer the case. The latest polls see him at 35.9 percent. While his advancement to the ballots seems certain, the big question remains who his opponent will be in an increasingly uncertain scenario.
Currently, second place in the polls is held by Karol Nawrocki, the flagship candidate of Law and Justice (PiS), with 27.1 percent support. Nawrocki was a surprise choice, as he has no prior political experience. Since 2021, he has served as President of the Institute of National Remembrance, an institution that has come under heavy criticism during his tenure for being overly politicized. Previously, he had run the Museum of the Second World War, also in a controversial manner. Until a few weeks ago, he seemed confident about securing a spot in the second round, but now he must start looking over his shoulder.
The wild card in the race is Sławomir Mentzen, the candidate of Konfederacja, a nationalist and libertarian far-right party—essentially a Polish version of Germany’s AfD. Polls show his support steadily rising; he currently sits at 19.4 percent, but his growth rate is significantly higher than Nawrocki’s. Mentzen is particularly popular among young voters, those disillusioned with the old politics represented by Law and Justice and the Civic Coalition, as well as a small but notable segment of the population that is growing increasingly restless over Poland’s support for Ukraine. Konfederacja stands out as the only openly anti-Ukrainian—if not outright pro-Russian—party in the race.
The Ukrainian Question in the Election Campaign
The developments in the war in Ukraine and relations with the United States have become the dominant themes of the electoral campaign—far more so than in the 2023 parliamentary elections. The shift in the U.S. administration’s stance on the conflict risks reshaping the global order and Europe’s position on the international stage, a stage where Warsaw has so far played a central role.
Poland is well known as the cornerstone of NATO’s eastern flank defence, through which the vast majority of military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine has passed in recent years. The United States, to whom Poland feels a strong debt of gratitude for its role in the fight against communism, represents one thing above all else for Warsaw: the biggest security guarantee. This is not only due to the 10,000 U.S. troops stationed in the country, the military bases, and the weaponry, but also because of the commercial and political ties that have developed over the years.
For this reason, the growing tensions between the U.S. and Ukraine have become a highly sensitive political issue for Poland. On one side is its biggest and most historical ally; on the other, the country for which Poland has invested so much and which has been fighting for three years to repel the invasion of what Poland considers its historical enemy: Russia.
There was particular uncertainty over how Law and Justice (PiS)—arguably the most pro-Trump party in Europe—would explain to its voters that Trump had suddenly aligned himself with Moscow. The matter was ultimately settled by the notorious White House clash on February 28. Polish conservatives placed all the blame for the breakdown on Zelensky, calling his behavior in the Oval Office reckless and disrespectful. And in many ways, this stance was inevitable. Just days earlier, Duda had traveled to Washington, where he received strong reassurances about continued American support for Poland. Trump himself publicly called him “a dear friend.” Duda had even advised Zelensky to engage in constructive dialogue with the U.S. president. The prevailing belief is that the path to peace is the one outlined by Trump—and that it must not be hampered in any way.
Friction between Warsaw and Washington
The other front of attack was manifested when the presidential candidate Karol Nawrocki accused Tusk of anti-Americanism because of some of his criticism of Trump’s behavior in the past few weeks.
Indeed, the Polish Prime Minister does not find himself in an easy position. A few days ago he delivered a speech in Parliament characterized by sombre tones in which he envisioned difficult times if Ukraine should lose this war, also in light of the new American policies. His concern is over a possible U.S. disengagement in the region, which is why Tusk has announced that defense spending will continue to be around 5 percent of the GDP also in the coming years, and underscored the need to act firmly within the European framework.
Albeit aware of the importance of maintaining close transatlantic relations, Tusk is indeed one of the champions of that Europeanism that Trump and MAGA see as smoke in the eyes, and it is not hard to hypothesize that for this very reason Washington would far prefer to see a conservative candidate win rather than a liberal one.
The quarrel on X between Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and Elon Musk can also be interpreted from this perspective. The South African billionaire had just stated that if he had turned off the Starlink satellites over Ukraine, Kyiv’s defensive line would have collapsed immediately. Sikorski then pointed out, piqued, that Poland pays $50 million a year to ensure this essential communication system for the Ukrainians, adding that if the provider (SpaceX) proved unreliable, Warsaw would look elsewhere. Musk’s response was filled with spitefulness, to the point of calling the head of Polish diplomacy “little man.”
Equally disturbing was the response from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who stated that Poland should be grateful to Starlink, without which Russia would have won the war long ago and would already be at its borders—perhaps overlooking the fact that Poland already shares a border with Russia through the Kaliningrad Oblast.
Shortly thereafter, another point of tension emerged when Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski announced—apparently without consulting his allies—a levy on Big Tech profits, a particularly sensitive issue for the United States. The statement, likely made with poor timing amid the ongoing trade wars, immediately caught the attention of the incoming U.S. ambassador to Poland, Thomas Rose. “Withdraw the tax to avoid consequences! President Trump will respond with retaliations,” he too thundered on X.
No matter how you look at it, the two months leading up to the elections promise to be highly turbulent for Washington-Warsaw relations.
Cover photo: The two main candidates in the Polish presidential election. On the left, PiS candidate Karol Nawrocki (photo by Andrzej Iwanczuk / NurPhoto via AFP). On the right, Civic Coalition (KO) candidate Rafał Trzaskowski (photo by Klaudia Radecka / NurPhoto via AFP).
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