The fact that one of the longest conflicts in contemporary history, which has resulted in over 40,000 deaths, could soon come to an end is undoubtedly an event worth celebrating. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan has ordered the armed wing of the party he founded in 1978 to end the armed struggle and dissolve the organization. Is this the end of an era? It’s still too early to say. For now, these are just hopeful statements, or rather, they fuel the hope that after more than four decades, the conflict with Turkey may finally come to an end. However, many questions remain about the start of a “new Kurdish opening” – following the failed attempt from 2009-15 – centered around issues of democratization, respect for fundamental human rights, equal citizenship rights, and the right to language, culture, and administrative autonomy for over 15 million Turkish Kurds. Furthermore, the future of Kurdish politics in Syria and the broader Middle Eastern region remains uncertain.
However, if we consider that this “new opening” has come about through Ocalan’s call for disarmament because President Erdogan is seeking the Kurdish vote in Parliament to secure another presidential term, the hope and dreams of much of the population in southeastern Anatolia—who celebrated the message from their charismatic leader—quickly fade.
At the moment, Erdogan and his valuable ultranationalist ally, Devlet Bahçeli, are only discussing the end of the armed struggle, demonstrating that they still have a reductionist and instrumental approach to the Kurdish issue. For the Turkish leader, the Kurdish problem is seen as a matter of violence and national security. This purely security-driven perspective arises from the fact that, for Erdogan and Bahçeli, there is no Kurdish issue in Turkey—only a problem of weapons and violence.`
It is certainly crucial that violence ends, that the weapons fall silent, that they are laid down, and that the armed party disbands. However, to peacefully resolve the long-standing Kurdish issue, it is also necessary to initiate a process of democratization in the country. As long as Turkey remains autocratic, efforts to resolve the issue will be in vain and illusory. The major opposition parties in Turkey, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), argue that the Kurdish issue can only be resolved if both Turks and Kurds can live in a fully democratic environment that respects the rule of law.
In the meantime, the PKK has responded positively to Ocalan’s call for disarmament and the dissolution of the armed organization. However, caution is necessary when analyzing statements from Qandil, in northern Iraq, the PKK’s headquarters. The reason is clear: so far, the PKK has only announced a “ceasefire” – and even that is “conditional.”
Thus, while endorsing the message of its leader, who has been imprisoned since 1999, the PKK has not yet taken concrete steps toward disarmament or dissolution. Instead, it has set three conditions. First, any disarmament must occur in a “democratic environment” that is legally and politically appropriate. Second, disarmament and potential dissolution must be decided by a congress, with Ocalan presiding over it. Third, Ocalan must be granted full freedom, allowing him to communicate without restrictions with his comrades and others. These conditions, however, remain challenging to achieve.
The PKK has repeatedly stated its willingness to follow Ocalan’s orders. However, its top leaders have insisted on the need for direct communication with him and have emphasized the importance of Turkey respecting Kurdish rights.
But how can Ocalan take part in this process while serving a life sentence without parole? For now, he has already seen improved detention conditions with the end of his isolation. All signs suggest that he may soon be transferred from his cell in the İmralı island prison to a larger accommodation on the same island or even granted conditional release under the “Right to Hope” law, which applies to life-term prisoners.
A closer look at Ocalan’s appeal reveals some key omissions. The 75-year-old Kurdish rebel leader makes no mention of the de facto Kurdish-led autonomous region in northeastern Syria, where he is revered as an ideological figure.
His call for disarmament and the dissolution of the armed organization appears to apply only to the PKK in Turkey. However, his Syrian affiliate—the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the armed wing of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – is not mentioned. Notably, SDF commander Mazlum Abdi (Kobani) has clarified that Ocalan’s call for disarmament does not apply to the Syrian group.
The leader of the PYD, Salih Muslim, while agreeing with Ocalan’s statement, quickly responded that weapons would not be necessary if a political path were allowed. “If the reasons for taking up arms disappeared, we would abandon them,” Muslim clarified.
Ocalan’s full appeal can be divided into three parts: the conditions and reasons behind the founding of the PKK, self-criticism and his determination to “complete his life,” and the final, reasoned decision.
Ocalan justifies the founding of the PKK by citing several historical factors. He highlights the existence of the Soviet Union, which he describes as “real socialism,” noting its influence on and support for leftist organizations worldwide. He also points to the Cold War context, where Ankara aligned with the Western bloc and the United States to prevent Turkey from falling under Soviet influence.
Furthermore, he emphasizes the ban on the Kurdish language and the state’s propagandistic narrative that denied the very existence of the Kurds. This narrative was reinforced during the military coups of 1971 and 1980, when nationalist pan-Turanist ambitions from the early Republic resurfaced, envisioning a “Turkey without Kurds.”
Here, Ocalan engages in self-criticism, explicitly referencing the communist movement and “real socialism,” which, by the late 1980s, had been defeated by history.
He describes how, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the Kurdish movement distanced itself from that ideology. Meanwhile, in Turkey, Kurdish culture gradually reemerged during the presidency of Turgut Özal, thanks to his – albeit limited – reforms. These included the spread of Kurdish music and radio broadcasts. Later, during Tayyip Erdogan’s first “Kurdish opening,” a Kurdish-language television channel was launched on TRT, partly driven by Ankara’s push for European Union integration.
Ocalan recalls that after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the PKK abandoned its goal of an independent Kurdistan. Since the 1990s, it has no longer been an independence-seeking party but has instead advocated for administrative autonomy.
A few years later, while in prison, Ocalan developed a political and social platform based on libertarian municipalism and social ecology, concepts previously theorized by socialist libertarian philosopher Murray Bookchin. He describes this system as “a non-state political administration” or “democracy without a state,” also known as “democratic confederalism.”
This model has been implemented in Rojava, the de facto autonomous region in northern and northeastern Syria, governed by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and defended by its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG).
In 1993, just a few years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the first ceasefire process was initiated but was soon derailed by the “martyrdom” of 33 unarmed soldiers. Since then, Ocalan has advocated for administrative autonomy, calling for Kurdish to be recognized as the language of compulsory education in the Kurdish-majority southeastern Anatolia region and for the implementation of “culturalist solutions.”
These demands have shaped the PKK’s agenda for nearly half a century, pursued through armed struggle – a method that Ocalan himself now considers outdated. He also accuses the West of having spent the past 200 years trying to weaken Kurdish-Turkish relations, which, he claims, “have lasted for more than a thousand years.”
Ocalan’s statement appears more like an act of surrender, aimed at ensuring the Kurdish issue is not completely erased from history. The PKK has been militarily defeated by the Turkish state – it is now almost nonexistent in Turkey or, at the very least, severely isolated and weakened. It has also suffered heavy losses in northern Iraq, where it maintains hideouts and its headquarters. Since 2019, the Turkish military has established more than a hundred outposts in the region, relentlessly targeting it with drone and F-16 airstrikes.
Essentially, as in previous peace efforts, Ocalan is seizing the opportunity to offer an exit strategy for those still fighting a war that has already been lost. His call for fighters to come down from the mountains and lay down their arms acknowledges that the armed struggle has been definitively defeated.
Once again, Erdogan has presented Ocalan with an opportunity. This latest Kurdish opening, launched in October 2024, was paradoxically initiated by Turkey’s most anti-Kurdish party, led by Devlet Bahçeli, the ultranationalist pan-Turanist leader and a key ally in Erdogan’s ruling coalition. Bahçeli has historically opposed any recognition of Kurdish rights. He vehemently resisted the 2009–2015 Kurdish opening, which ultimately failed.
Now, however, Bahçeli appears to be a completely different political figure. It is said that Erdogan is pushing him forward while staying behind the scenes. This allows Erdogan to take credit if the initiative succeeds, but if it fails, he can distance himself, claiming he was never in favor of it.
But why are Bahçeli and Erdogan pursuing this reconciliation strategy with the Kurds?
What is driving Erdogan to launch a new Kurdish opening, especially after the failed attempt in 2015? Under the current Turkish Constitution, Erdogan cannot run in the next presidential elections due to the two-term limit. His goal is to amend the Constitution to secure a third term, but he lacks the qualified majority in Parliament needed to pass such a reform.
To achieve this, he needs to expand his parliamentary majority – and the most viable option is securing the support of Kurdish lawmakers, who hold enough seats to reach the required three-fourths majority for constitutional amendments.
Meanwhile, the rest of the opposition, particularly the Republican People’s Party (CHP), strongly opposes such a reform. Instead, the CHP is pushing to abolish the presidential system, which they see as a “one-man rule,” and restore a parliamentary system with the reintroduction of the prime minister’s office.
The only path for Erdogan to remain in power is to attract Kurdish support. This is why both Erdogan and his ultranationalist ally, Bahçeli, have proposed a new Kurdish opening, which includes granting Abdullah Ocalan’s release under the “Right to Hope” law for life-term prisoners.
However, for millions of Kurds in Turkey, a true “Kurdish peace process” should involve addressing their core democratic demands – such as the right to their language, culture, and administrative autonomy. Yet, this does not appear to be what Erdogan and Bahçeli have in mind. Their primary goal seems to be securing the support of the pro-Kurdish party in Parliament, ensuring that Erdogan stays in power.
To achieve his goal, Erdogan appears willing to make certain concessions, such as granting Ocalan’s release and ending the practice of appointing state trustees in Kurdish-administered municipalities, which has resulted in the removal of democratically elected Kurdish mayors.
These measures may appeal to a faction of the pro-Kurdish party’s supporters, particularly those ideologically aligned with Ocalan. However, they are not enough to achieve a lasting and peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue.
A key question remains: Can the Turkish government genuinely pursue peace while continuing mass arrests of Kurdish politicians and activists and removing democratically elected Kurdish mayors?
Some Kurdish militants may choose to join PEJAK (the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan), the PKK’s Iranian armed wing, rather than abandon the armed struggle. Unlike Iraq and Syria, Iran has not been involved in negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish state. This has fueled concerns about a potential Kurdish-Iranian alliance forming as an anti-Turkish front.
Erdogan is pursuing something unprecedented – not just an end to 41 years of insurgent violence within Turkey but also a broader regional transformation.
At home, this strategy could win him the Kurdish support needed to push through constitutional changes, potentially paving the way for him to remain president for life.
Ending the conflict with the Kurds—who are spread across Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey – would lift a significant burden from Ankara and its military. If the Kurds in Syria were to follow suit, this could help ease a long-standing regional conflict and contribute to stabilizing an emerging, allied government in Damascus, potentially led by former Syrian Prime Minister, Farouk al-Sharaa.
This is a historic appeal, influenced in part by growing geopolitical pressures in Turkey’s neighborhood, creating a sense of insecurity for both Turks and Kurds.
The chaotic start of the Trump administration, its plans to withdraw from the Middle East, and uncertainty over Syria’s future have made it increasingly urgent for Ankara to solidify its internal stability. And there may be no better way to achieve this than by reaching an agreement with the Kurds.
Cover photo: A demonstration in solidarity for Kurdistan takes place during the national demonstration in the center of Rome, called by the Ararat Cultural Centre – Kurdistan Network for Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) currently detained in Turkey, in Rome, Italy, on February 15, 2025. (Photo by Andrea Ronchini / NurPhoto / NurPhoto via AFP)
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