The victory of the Islamic party of ‘Justice and Development’ ( the PJD or al-Adadala wa Tanmiya in Arabic) in the recent Moroccan elections had been accredited by opinion polls backed by authoritative American research institutes, and indirectly supported by the satellite news channel Al-Jazeera. The results show, however, that the PJD did not achieve the crushing landslide that its own leaders were expecting (who had gone as far as to hope for 70 – 80% of the vote), but rather that its surge in popularity has come jolting to a halt, with just 4 extra seats added to the 42 won during the previous elections. According to the party’s leaders, this defeat is the result of a low turnout at the ballot box (only 37% of those eligible voted) and of the practice, on the part of certain political factions, of buying seats.

With respect to the elections, many observers had outlined an exportable version of the Turkish model, a kind of laboratory in which to experiment with democratic Islam in an Arab Islamic country. Saad Eddine Othmani himself, Secretary General of the PJD, seized every opportunity to announce his proximity and links to colleagues in the Turkish AKP, and to remind the public of the numerous bilateral meetings between the two parties in recent years. With respect to the recent landslide victory of Erdogan’s party in Turkey, for example, Othmani enthusiastically declared that “The Turkish elections have demonstrated the hidden potential of Islamic countries, which is expressed every time there is a healthy democracy and transparency which prompts the population to participate in strength, reaching the quota of 80% of the electorate.” (Swiss Info, 27-8-2007).

And so the question is this: why, despite the existence of shared visions and strategies, and of a political project inspired by Islam and based on a moralisation of politics, on the promotion of social solidarity and on a war against corruption, has the Moroccan PJD not achieved the same results as its Turkish colleagues and fallen short of the victory that was almost taken for granted in these elections? Are the AKP and the PJD really so similar? Is the Moroccan PJD ready to govern? And what are the principal obstacles which block its path towards government? Beyond the justifications put forward by the PJD to explain the apparent electoral defeat, which places Othmani’s party as the second most important political force in Morocco, and the most likely candidate to play the role of opposition over the next four years of legislature, it is interesting to consider the evolution of this party in the Moroccan socio-cultural context, its relationship with the other, secular and liberal political parties, and the strong competition of the rival Islamic group Justice and Piety (Adl wal Ihssan) – an unrecognised group, and the principal critic of the Moroccan King and the ‘false’ democratic manoeuvres he has promoted.

‘The Prince of the Believers’ and the Islamist paradox

The Moroccan constitution confers religious authority on the King in the title of Prince of the Believers (given his descent from the family of the Prophet Mohammed) and cites Islam as the principal source of law. It is no coincidence either that the national anthem of Morocco concludes with the three most important words for the Moroccan monarchy: Allah, Nation and King. In this context, the young King Mohammed VI represents the sole guarantor of territorial unity and of the centrality of Maliki Islam, the official religion of the monarchy. The centrality of religion in the constitution and the re-establishment of a debatable but certainly interesting balance between a judicial order which is fundamentally secular and civil and the respect of Islam as a superior source, and the source of inspiration for the legislator, represents an avant-garde stance within the spectrum of countries of a Muslim majority. This with the exceptions of Tunisia and Turkey, which have chosen the path of complete separation between the sacred and the secular.

This synthesis, which has produced a model of Islamic society which is pacifistic and reluctant in the face of extremist activity, has, paradoxically, become a difficult terrain for the proclamations of those parties which make reference to Islamic morality. In a certain sense the common people find their identity in the figure of the King as guardian of all religious heritage and protector of the foundations of Islam, and of its value and role within the monarchy. And this explains why, paradoxically, a modern, moderate, democratic, Islamic party such as the PJD did not succeed in clenching victory at the polls at the first attempt, five years ago, as happened in the neighbouring Algeria, and as would happen in other Islamic Arab countries from Jordan to Egypt. Within this context, a large part of the common people find themselves wondering why there is need for a political group of Islamic inspiration when Islam is directly protected by the Prince of the Believers Mohammed VI – especially in the wake of terrorist attacks and the popular mobilisation against religious extremism and the new D.I.Y. suicide attacks on the part of ‘Al Qaeda in the country of Islamic Maghreb’.

The risk of the Islamic ghetto and the mutual refusal of alliances

The second factor which makes the possibility of a PJD government less likely, if not impossible, is the difficulty that the leaders of the PJD – survivors of a history of bitter conflicts and sometimes physical clashes with the university socialist and liberal movements – have in freeing themselves from their anti-secular prejudice. ‘Secularism’ – a word which when translated into Arabic assumes the meaning ‘heavy’ – remains unbearable and is considered as almost blasphemous by the Islamist leaders of the PJD. This mutual antipathy in the political dialectic between the party of Islamic inspiration and the remainder of the Moroccan parties derives first and foremost from the moral force of the political discourse of the PJD, at times arrogant and presumptuous, which has induced the ‘secular’ parties to close themselves off, either because of worries concerning the strength of the political competition, or because they are ideally opposed to the proposals of the PJD.

The great rival: the movement of Abdessalam Yassin

Finally, in an analysis of the weaknesses which hinder the birth of a possible PJD government, the principal force of opposition facing not only the PJD but the entire Moroccan establishment – the movement of Justice and Charity (al Adl wal Ihssan) – cannot be ignored. Led by the Sheikh Addessalam Yassin, as a group it is both solid and young, and encompasses thousands of followers throughout the Moroccan universities and from amongst the youth who are dissatisfied with the social and economic conditions in the country. ‘Justice and Charity’, which has never been officially recognised, is the object of multiple police investigations, and which has been denounced by the major humanitarian organisations, is the only group to have directly criticised the King and to have openly denounced the hypocrisy and uselessness of the process of reforms instigated by Mohammed VI.

It is a group which places the PJD in serious difficulty, accusing it of siding with the ‘regime’ and betraying the principles if justice and truth. ‘Justice and Charity’ finally called upon its numerous followers to boycott the elections, judging them to be merely a fabricated stage for results which were preordained by the Makhzen (the Moroccan elite – Ed.) and by the Royal Palace. It is this last contest between ‘brothers’ which is, in reality, the greatest obstacle which lies between the PJD and the seat of government, because the militants of the PJD risk losing all credibility if they are forced to stoop to a compromise with the rest of the Moroccan political groups – who would be only too happy to witness the repression of Yassin’s group by the hand of their former brothers, now in jacket and tie.

Translation by Liz Longden