Which compromise are you alluding to? That of Austrian chancellor Grusenbauer’s, who proposed a solution in the style of South Tyrol’s, conceding even more autonomy to the Kosovo Serbs, the Taiwanese model recently cleared through customs by Belgrade, or the idea of a transitory federation on the (old) model of the union of Serbia and Montenegro?
The point is that it takes longer to reach a solution which is well thought-out, not rushed. The Italian option can no doubt be interesting. My philosophy, as far as negotiators are concerned, has never changed: one cannot impose what people do not want. Furthermore, I believe that one needs to start giving concrete prospects to the inhabitants of Kosovo. I would like to hear education and work being talked about, rather than negotiations. This word has become exasperating.
One continually hears talk of partition as a possible scenario after Kosovo’s independence, with the regions to the North of the river Ibar ready to unite with Serbia.
The partition could be devastating. One also needs to consider the fact that 60 per cent of the Serbs in Kosovo (100 thousand in all, ndr) live south of the river Ibar. What will become of these people? What is more, I believe that partition would also damage Serbian history and culture, for the fact that an extremely large majority of Orthodox monasteries are located south of the Ibar. Finally, I also think that the economy could suffer serious blows, considering the fact that the most important production is concentrated in the central part of Kosovo.
Many Serbs who live in the South-central enclaves of the country would, however, be ready to leave, after the independence of Pristina.
Not all of them. Certainly a part will leave, perhaps before June, when, in my opinion, the current uncertainties will finally have a definitive answer. Another segment, composed of people without a future and without work, who do not know where to go, will nevertheless remain. Lastly, there is a last current, composed of Serbians who await orders from Berlgrade. If Tadic and Kostunica tell them to leave, they will leave, otherwise they will stay. The politicians in Belgrade have extremely serious responsibilities towards their fellow citizens in Kosovo. I am talking about Tadic’s democrats, Vojislav Kostunica’s Serbian Democratic Party and Tomislav Nikolic and Vojislav Seselj’s radicals, who together make up 80 per cent of the preferences of the Kosovo Serbs; steering them like puppets, manipulating them with the sole aim of obtaining votes and making nationalism the extra weapon in terms of consensus.
Do you think it is possible there will be new tensions and clashes in Kosovo?
This possibility exists. I am thinking of what could happen after the Security Council’s decision or, in its absence, in the presence of the self-proclamation of independence of the parliament of Pristina. I am nevertheless convinced of the fact that if NATO (the 17 thousand military of the alliance will remain in Kosovo, ndr) works well, giving itself the aim of maintaining law and order, there should not be any problems. But KFOR (Kosovo Force, the NATO Mission and Pristina, ndr) has to show a clear and strict conduct.
The Orthodox Church and Belgrade, in the name of common cultural and religious roots, have asked Russia to exercise its right of veto at the heart of the Security Council, to delegitimise the Kosovan independence. In your opinion, what does Moscow intend to do?
Believe me, even if Moscow exercised its right of veto, it would not do it for the Serbs, but rather for itself. The veto is a way of defending oneself, to have free reign in Chechnya. Nevertheless, I believe that Moscow and Washington will come to an agreement over Kosovo. Finalised, however, not for the people of Kosovo, but rather for their own respective interests of power.
Translation by Sonia Ter Hovanessian