Did the headscarf matter have a symbolic role in this recent Turkish crisis between the authoritarian secularists and modern democratic Islamists?
The headscarf has been one of the main issues in the public debate since the end of 1980s. The Turkish Republicanism defined the public sphere as a secular sphere; inspired by the French “laicite”. The candidacy of the Islamic party’s Foreign Affairs minister for the presidential elections provoked indeed a political crisis. The tensions between authoritarianism and secularism, between democracy and islam came to forefront. The fact that his wife wears the veil, and the idea that the wife of the President would be covered, provoked a deep anxiety among the members of the secular public, especially among women. It meant symbolically “islamisation from the head”, from the highest position of the Secular Republic. The military expressed their anxiety and call for vigilance against several threats to secularism by a declaration that used the means of the internet; it was called an electronic ultimatum, or “e-coup”! But what is new is the street demonstrations of people, middle classes that started in Ankara, reached one million people in Istanbul and spread to other Anatolian streets in the name of defense of secularism and the Republican state. These demonstrations showed the existence of secular middle classes, formation of a secular actor, especially leaded by women’s associations. The very idea that secularism is imposed by above and therefore restricted to a minority is challenged and flawed by these very demonstrations. This shows that secularism does not necessarily need military power to defend itself anymore, as secularists are not a minority anymore. Secularism became an indigenous force, created its Turkish version.
The demonstrations brought out the tension between authoritarian secularism and extreme Islam. At the same time a Turkish form of rooted secularism seems to have been confirmed by the people?
The demonstrations were a means for these secular middle classes to show publicly their force and their conviction and surpass their fear of islam as well. Some were expressing openly their opposition both to Islam and to military intervention. Turkey crystallizes in a more dramatic fashion the tensions between secularism, islam and democracy, but we have similar problems in Europe as well. The question of how to open up secularism to a more pluralistic, to a more liberal understanding in particular to religious requests, is being discussed.
Women in this opening process have insisted on the freedom to be secular and wear the veil at the same time. Is that right?
Indeed. They are wearing the veil, but at the same time participating to political and public life, entering into secular modern experiences of life. The headscarf is not just a symbol but also the agency of Muslim women; women carry personal faith into the public sphere and make religion publicly visible and thereby challenge secular imaginaries related with liberal politics and women’s emancipation. The veil is very often considered as imposed by Islamic militants or by male members of the community. But the personal part, the decision of women to adopt the veil is dismissed, denied. They are transforming the frontiers between private and public and they leave the traditional religious roles that assign women to the private realm and fight on the other hand against segregation from the public sphere because of their headscarves. They create trouble both to secular feminists and to religious male members of the society.
Did Nicolas Sarkozy’s recent decision to stop Turkish membership to the EU had a backlash on Turkeys internal politics?
Yes, but the effects on Turkey started before Sarkozy’s coming to power. French society has been questioning the legitimacy of the Turkish membership for EU. In this discussion Turkey became a kind of catalyst to define European identity, in excluding Turkey. The tacit equation between Christianity and Europe became more and more explicitly outspoken, as it was the case of the Pope Ratzinger. Sarkozy did nothing else than to build up his political position on this debate. So one can say that the Turkish membership became an agenda setting issue both for European public opinion and politics. The exclusionary identity-politics of Europe had of course has a very negative effect in Turkish publics and politics. It was like taking off the carpet below Turkish society; a carpet that people thought was theirs for centuries. Nationalism is increasing and it is not restricted to lower middle classes or marginalized uneducated sectors of society; even the most pro-European members of society turn towards nationalism. The capacity to solve the tensions between secularism and Islam is weakened as well as the European project no longer provides a frame for democratic politics and consensus in Turkish politics.
The refusal has not triggered an Islamic or extremist Islamic reaction but a growing disappointment and anger amongst secular nationalists?
The irony is that the political party in power, the AK party (Party of Justice and Development), coming from the Islamist movement of the 80’s has shown more moderation and a higher reformist ability. The development of this so called Islamist party from a more marginal, radical position to the moderate centre right tradition is the most important thing that happened here in the last 10 years. Today it is much more reformist and democratic. I believe it is wrong to call it Islamic Party, because they don’t even refer to religion in their campaign or politics. Of course the elements of Islam are present. In contrast to mainstream political parties, both from Republican and conservative democratic traditions, who failed to renew themselves, the AK party became to stand for reforms and represent a pro-European position. The European refusal provoked a nationalist anger and reaction.
So the fear of a military intervention to stop a power accumulation by the Islamic Party is not banned?
The crisis is not over. The threat of secularism and the hidden agenda of Islam are very rooted among the people. Europe became a deceitful politics. And the neighbour countries, especially the frontier with Iraq are another source of instability. The question is to find stability through political means, that is the coming elections will be decisive. And here again the weakness of secular parties is a problem.
Turkey is a kind of laboratory where Islam and secularism find themselves in a constant meet-and-clash situation, where new aims and limits are defined, and where as the demonstrations show a secular middle class has grown, which is religious and not.
The positive thing to point is that for the last twenty years the wall between secular and religious turkey became more porous, they started to speak to each other, exchange among intellectuals and a new “in-between-space” grow. It is important to preserve this space and not fall back to polarizations. The recent demonstrations for secularism were an outcome of secular civil society, were democratic in their mode of action and forms of expression, but paradoxically might serve as legitimation or a call for authoritarian secularism. “Societal” movements are not always “civil”.
How important is Europe today for Turkey?
We should also ask the question the other way round. For the moment European rejection plays a rather negative role in Turkey. Are there any signs in European politics to change this? The French Sarkozy politics overtly expresses that Turkey does not have the “vocation” to make part of European Union. Turkey became today the marker of European identity. But what is this identity about? It means Europe not with a Muslim majority country even if it is in harmony with secular, democratic principles? Distancing Turkey, making Turkey the “other” of Europe, will mean not only drawing the frontiers of Europe but dressing a new wall within Europe. And this will be another Europe. Not the Europe that made us dream for a new space of habitation where given national, religious, ethnic identities will be surpassed.
Nilüfer Göle is a professor of sociology at “Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales” (EHESS), Centre d’Analyse et d’Intervention Sociologiques (CADIS). Among her works are Musulmanes et Modernes. Voile et Civilisation en Turquie, Parigi 1993 e 2003; Les frontieres en question / Jean Louise Cohen, Kemal Dervis, Nilufer Göle, Parigi 2004, Nilüfer Göle, Nuovi musulmani e sphera publica europea in Europa laica e puzzle religioso, libri di Reset/Marsilio 2005, ed K. Michalsky e Nina zu Fürstenberg, Postfazione di Romano Prodi.