Mona Harb on Lebanon’s Fragile Ceasefire and the Road to a New President
Alessandra Tommasi 17 December 2024

On November 27, 2024, a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon began, announced by US President Joe Biden as “designed to be permanent.” However, strikes continue to devastate southern Lebanon. Just days ago, Tel Aviv declared a partial troop withdrawal but refrained from a full pullback as part of the truce. Amid this fragile peace, set against Lebanon’s severe economic and political crises, we reached out to Mona Harb, Professor of Urban Studies and Politics at the American University of Beirut.

 

Prof. Mona Harb at Reset DOC’s 2022 Venice Seminars

Prof. Harb, how do you assess this deal? Do you think it will hold? Some analysts argue that it is merely a pause, possibly awaiting a change in leadership with Donald Trump’s presidency.

In the first few days of the ceasefire, there was a strong fear that it might not hold. Now, over two weeks in, there is a bit more stability. From what I can observe, the Lebanese government has begun working on some reconstruction efforts, namely rubble removal, which suggests the agreement is holding. There have been many violations, true. The latest count shows more than 200 violations since the ceasefire began, including air raids and strikes, especially in southern Lebanon, which have resulted in casualties. So far, 24 people, including Lebanese soldiers, have been killed since the ceasefire was declared. We still hear drones flying overhead in different parts of Beirut.

 

Hezbollah has responded to these infractions…

Yes, but their actions have been minimal. So far, they don’t appear to be escalating the strikes, which remain concentrated in southern Lebanon. There, Israeli forces issued evacuation orders for more than 60 towns. Just a few days ago, they reconfirmed these evacuation warnings, asking people not to return. This suggests they remain cautious about the situation in the south. However, a few days ago, the Lebanese army also entered the town of Khiam, a major border town that saw heavy fighting. This is a positive sign; there’s cautious optimism that the ceasefire will hold and that the Lebanese army will continue to regain control of more border towns moving forward.

 

What’s Hezbollah’s current situation? It has suffered from its leader Nasrallah’s assassination, there’s been the incident with pagers and there was all the fighting. How has the group been affected militarily and politically? Is its grip still strong in Lebanon?

Just two days before the ceasefire and just after, we saw that Hezbollah was able to shoot its missiles very deep into Israel. This means that its military capacity has not been deterred as Israel was aiming to. It also has a current stock of weapons that seems to be still operational, which is why Israel is focusing on the routes through which Hezbollah can replenish its armaments – especially from Syria. At this level, the question is to what extent will Hezbollah be able to rearm? At the political level, Hezbollah’s leadership has been disrupted profoundly after the pagers’ attack and several assassinations of higher-level leaders including Nasrallah. However, Hezbollah is not only a political party; it is a large-scale institution with many nonprofit organizations, registered with the Lebanese government, that take care of many aspects of the social, cultural, leisure, and urban life of many Shia groups. And these institutions are still pretty much operational, like the Al-Qard al-Hasan, Hezbollah’s micro-credit organization that was a direct target of the war. Hezbollah also has elected representatives in Parliament, ministers in government, and leads many municipalities, and today on the ground, municipalities are the first responders to repair and reconstruction.

 

What are the divisions among the Lebanese people at this point? Many members of the Shia community believe that they won the war because Israel didn’t cross the Litani River, and they continue to use a rhetoric of “resistance” against Israel. How widespread is this sentiment, and how do other communities view this ceasefire?

Lebanon is in a predicament of deep divisions. On one hand, as you highlighted, a significant part of the Shia community – particularly those living in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and south Beirut’s Dahieh– feel threatened by Israel’s expansionist, settler agenda, which they currently see unfolding in southern Syria and the Golan Heights. For them, these developments confirm long-standing concerns about Zionist intentions. Having endured repeated Israeli aggressions since 1978 and lived under occupation for 22 years, they experience the Israeli threat as constant and believe that armed resistance is necessary to deter invasion and prevent the occupation of Lebanon’s southern territories. On the other hand, another narrative argues that these aggressions occur because Hezbollah exists – that Hezbollah poses a threat to Israel, and therefore it needs to be disarmed to stop Israeli attacks on Lebanon and ensure stability.

 

How has the recent conflict reshaped Lebanon?

One may see that there are two Lebanon: one that was attacked by Israel and one that was not. This war was very specific in that sense; Israel waged collective punishment on the Shia communities, targeting them where they are the most concentrated – scorching their lands, killing civilians, and striking civilian facilities in their neighborhoods, given Hezbollah is embedded within these communities. South Beirut (Dahiya) now resembles a patchwork, with neighborhoods that function normally next to those that are completely destroyed and unlivable. The amount of destruction makes it very difficult to live an ordinary life in this built environment, even if one’s home has not been destroyed.

The situation in the south is even worse. The scale of destruction – the annihilation of urban and rural life, the devastation of the earth through white phosphorus and cluster bombs, and the dense strikes targeting hospitals, schools and critical infrastructure – has also made many localities and towns unlivable, at least in the short term. Today, even after the ceasefire, there are members of the Shia community who remain displaced because their neighborhoods are no longer fit for life, but many have returned to live closer to their neighborhoods.

 

Has there been some form of solidarity?

There has been significant solidarity during the war, with a remarkable sense of collective unity, even in Christian neighborhoods that you would expect to oppose the war. For instance, towns and villages in Mount Lebanon and Bekaa, governed by the Lebanese Forces, were very hospitable to displaced people from Baalbek or southern Beirut. These communities hosted them in public schools that were designated for this purpose and even rented homes to them. Of course, there are stories of people who refused to do this. Overall, however, generosity was very strong and much stronger than the divides. And a lot of people were saying, we will discuss the role of Hezbollah after the end of the war. We will resolve this politically in the parliament and the government. But now we are one country that is being attacked by one enemy, and we come together.

 

Lebanon has been without a president of the republic since October 2022, with parliament paralyzed by deep divisions also. However, right after the ceasefire, there was the announcement that the legislative body would meet on January 9 to elect one – which according to the Lebanese sectarian political system should be a Maronite Christian. What are so far the names circulating?

The discussion about the next Lebanese president has begun, and it’s being debated among the sectarian leaders in charge. As is often the case, the brokering of the next president does not happen through institutional processes but is negotiated “under the table,” as is commonly said in Arabic. Among reformists, the name of Ziyad Baroud, a lawyer and former minister, circulates. He is known for his more secular views, but many believe he won’t make it.

On the other hand, there are sectarian leaders’ names in the mix. One of the figures often discussed is Sleiman Frangieh, who has been close to Hezbollah. However, he seems to be off the table now, because of the war and also because of his strong ties to Bashar al-Assad. Another divisive name is Samir Geagea, the head of the Christian party, the Lebanese Forces. Also circulating is Neemat Frem, a parliamentarian, industrialist, and entrepreneur, who has put himself forward for election. There’s also General Joseph Aoun, the head of the Lebanese Army. However, at this stage, these are mostly rumors rather than confirmed candidacies. The process is expected to pick up momentum likely after the holidays.

 

What could help Lebanon reclaim itself, its full sovereignty, and break free from being better ground for external powers?

For this to happen, a strong political opposition would need to assert its strength and authority on the ground, but we are far from that reality. Efforts to build a political opposition have been systematically disrupted throughout the years, and especially after the repression of the 2019 uprisings. The emigration of many activists and organizers due to the economic collapse did not help. Ideally, we would have an organized opposition capable of running in elections and offering a viable alternative to the current political landscape. Unfortunately, the existing scenarios are deeply polarizing. On one side, you have the armed resistance led by Hezbollah, which would maintain Lebanon’s position in the resistance axis you mentioned. On the other side, you have the scenario of normalization with Israel, where Lebanon would disarm and potentially move toward brokering agreements with Israel, much like other Arab states have done in recent years, such as Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, and possibly Saudi Arabia in the near future.

 

What are the main issues with these two scenarios?

Both are problematic. In the normalization scenario, Lebanon would essentially be at the mercy of Israel’s expansionist agenda and ambitions, which are already evident in Jordan and Egypt, particularly through energy projects and green colonialism. On the other hand, the neoliberal Islamist scenario is equally troubling. Both scenarios are driven by geopolitical interests that primarily serve their foreign patrons, rather than the needs of the Lebanese people, who are trying to survive and build dignified lives for them and their families. What is needed instead is a political project focused on people’s collective interests, a project that can establish inclusive democracy, ensure accountability, and advance social and environmental justice.

 

 

 

Cover photo: Aerial picture taken a day after a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah took hold shows a destroyed building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre on November 28, 2024. (Photo by AFP)


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