Mrs. Freizer, what outlooks do you foresee in case Kosovo decides to unilaterally declare its independence, considering that the European commission’s Kosovo chapter raises serious questions on the viability of the province: corruption is endemic, institutions are weak, the rate of unemployment is almost 60% of the population?
It is quite clear that Kosovo will make a unilateral declaration of independence some time next year. Kosovo already declared itself independent a decade or so ago. In fact, since 1999 it has been functioning under UN administration, so it has not really had full sovereignty of Serbia exerting its powers over it. The points you mentioned that it will be quite a weak State are concerns. First of all, the economic situation is a serious problem. But what the UN process makes quite clear is that Kosovo should be allowed to develop its institutions and, as we saw with the Ahtisaari plan, Mr. Ahtisaari recommended that Kosovo receive unconditional independence. (Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish President, now UN Special Envoy, presented his plan to the Secretary-General in mid-March 2007: it is a compromise that offers Kosovo Albanians the prospect of independence). So, it does seem quite evident that the UN system is moving towards seeing Kosovo as a State entity, in the sense that the Ahtisaari plan does recommend its unconditional independence.
Experts consider the Ahtisaari’s plan ambiguous, in the sense that it is not clear if Kosovo will gain full independence.
In the Ahtisaari’s plan there are two different sections: in the recommendations there is no ambiguity because unconditional independence for Kosovo is clearly enounced. In the broader text, certainly a more technical text, where Mr. Ahtisaari talks about what kind of rights would exist for the minority and what kind of institutions would be set up, it is very clear that Kosovo would have its own government, its own Constitution, its own laws, and this will no longer be directed from Belgrade.
Why does Russia not want to back Kosovo independence?
Russia has various different motives for taking such a line. On the one hand, there are historical ties between Russia and Serbia. Russia is trying to help its historical, political, social, and economic clients in the Balkans. On the other hand, Russia would like to make sure that in the debate between the right to self-determination and territorial integrity, the latter becomes the most important, which she considers essential to avoid risking its own influence on regions in the North of the Caucasus. Finally, I think, it is also an opportunity for Russia to re-exert itself and re-exert its influence in front of the US and Europe. These are the main reasons why it is taking such a hard line.
EU could play a decisive role. But up till now, its Member States have seemed quite hesitant. Spain, for example, will probably not support Kosovo independence in order to turn down any kind of independence request coming from the Basques.
I would like to underline one thing: Kosovo’s case is unique. I believe that there is no reason for Spain or any other European country to fear that there would be a kind of Kosovo example which other separatists would want to use in Europe: the way Milosevic treated the Kosovo Albanians in 1999 it is absolutely incomparable to anything Madrid has ever done towards the Basques or the Catalans or any other group in Spain. So what happened to Kosovo or what would happen to any other atomist-seeking groups in Western Europe are two different issues. In general, I think that yes, there is some hesitancy to address this State issue and that is why most European Member States are more comfortable with talking about deploying a UN mission to Kosovo sometime next year, in which case it would be a rule of law mission. There might be another mission which is called the ICO, the International Civilian Office, which will also be strongly backed by the European Union. But, when push comes to shove, I do believe that the majority of the European Member States will recognize an independent Kosovo. Some countries might not find this an ideal situation but European unity is very important and I also believe, even with Spain, that there is a sense that this whole issue has been put off too long and it is not very beneficial to leave some conflicts in the Balkans.
What is your opinion on the proposal of a partition plan for North Kosovo, populated by 50,000 Serbs?
This is probably the main problem. The Serbs who live there are threatening not to accept Pristina’s declaration of independence and, perhaps, to split off in partition, either to join Serbia or just remain a floating entity in the area. If this were to happen, it would be a very negative thing. First of all because there are more Serbs living in the South than there are currently in the North, so this would put those Serbs in a very delicate position. I think that the International Community has to be very clear and very strong on both sides: there should not be a partition of Kosovo and that, on the one hand, the Kosovo Albanians should give full protection to the Serbs both in the North and in the South. But, at the same time, Belgrade should not be trying to foment more division, like it already is, for example, in elections that happened this weekend (November 18th) when it told the Serbs to boycott them. That was a very negative move.
So what should we expect will happen on December 10th?
The 10th December is the deadline for the Troika (U.S., Russia, EU) to report to the Secretary-General; they might even do that before. I think that the Kosovo Albanians are aware of the fact that they can proclaim independence but that this will make sense only when the country is recognized. By that I mean that if they declare independence they need to feel pretty confident that they are going to be recognized by others. In Brussels the hope is that the International community will somehow be able to manage the process and be able to work with Pristina to really find the opportune moment for the declaration to occur.