When President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak – under pressure from massive political demonstrations – was obliged on February 11th, 2011 to leave the presidential office which he had held for 29 years, the military were the only Egyptian institution that enjoyed the trust and respect of the majority of the people.
Their political prestige went back to the revolution of 1952, led by the Free Officers Movement and by colonel Gamal Abd el-Nasser, remained unblemished by the defeats in three wars against Israel, and was enhanced by the victorious, although short lived, occupation of the Sinai peninsula in 1973.
While Presidents Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak were all military leaders – who derived their legitimacy essentially from the backing of the Armed Forces – the military shied from an open direct role in Government (with the natural exception of the Minister of Defence, always a military officer).
Although the successive Egyptian Presidents, often resorted to violent repression (of communists, islamists, terrorist movements, and democratic opposition) the military were never involved, and the subsequent odium fell entirely on the police forces, in particular on the Directorate General for State Security. Only once the military were directly involved in activities of the kind when, in the 1980s, President Mubarak asked them to quell a revolt by the police. They responded to that call, but also made clear that it had to be the only and last occasion.
It is therefore not surprising that when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) reacted to popular pressure from Tahrir square by forcing the resignation of President Mubarak, the Egyptian military were seen by many as a benign and impartial force which would guarantee an orderly transition to democracy. The prevailing slogan at the time was “The military and the people are one hand”. This perception soon proved to be naive and short lived.
At that point the military, as represented by the SCAF, held most of the cards. They naturally had the monopoly of the use of force, as the police was discredited and, for all practical purposes, sidelined by the revolt. But, above all, the SCAF nowadays exercises the prerogatives of the Head of State in a presidential Republic where Parliament had been dissolved. That meant means that it can appoint a Government (up to now it has appointed three), exercise legislative functions, and determine the procedures and the timing of the political transition (electoral procedures and timing, discussion and approval of a new Constitution, election of a future President).
Up to January 2011 the Egyptian military had been a rather secretive organization. They were ruled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) whose members were not public figures and whose names were not even known to the general public. All this changed when the military entered in the political arena and the SCAF took direct responsibility for the transition to a new political equilibrium. The Head of SCAF, General Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, assumed the functions of Head of State, and many of its members – all top ranking officers – spoke on its behalf, becoming known to the citizen in the street.
From the very first weeks it began to be apparent that the SCAF was increasingly hostile to the reform movement and to the many organisations that occupied Tahrir square and demonstrated in favour of social justice, individual rights and democracy. Confronted with demonstrations, calls for immediate and radical reforms and trials of members of Mubarak’s regime – that certainly worried part of the Egyptian public opinion – the SCAF presented itself as a bastion of stability, taking a leaf from the book of the regime of the now deposed President Mubarak.
This growing tension between the SCAF and the Tahrir square demonstrators soon produced ugly results, in terms of a very high number of arrests, trials before military courts, assaults to the demonstrators (directly or by tolerating assaults by “beltageya”, thugs in civilian clothes), and an increasing number of casualties. While the repression was mainly directed against the forces that had started the revolt against the Mubarak regime, it also hit the Copt community, and demonstrations by women, which were themselves protesting against repression. Not to mention the intimidation of ONG’s and of the non governmental media. The list of these incidents is unfortunately very long, and getting longer by the week. For the first time the Army, and not only the police, are directly involved repressing Egyptian citizens.
From the political point of view we are witnessing now a polarization between the Egyptian military which are maneuvering the political process to ensure a constitution that protects their political and economic prerogatives, and the political parties (secular and islamist) who ask for a transition to a normal democratic state, in which the military would be subordinated to a elected government. Within the opposition we also see a distinction between the more progressive forces – who insist for an immediate return of the military to their barracks (and are ready to pay a high price for it) – and the Muslim Brothers who also oppose the military, but have been careful not to derail the electoral process, on which they count to obtain the necessary political legitimacy.
At this point we can say that the Egyptian military have become directly involved in the political game and that – while they have for the time being fully retained their political and military powers – they have in the process spent a lot of their political capital, and largely lost their former prestige.
To understand these developments, one must take into account the economic role that the military establishment has come to play in the Egyptian state, and how it developed through successive decades. The story is not widely known, as the military have always managed to maintain a low profile, and operate as a quite secretive organisation, with the easy justification of protecting the security of the State.
The story of the involvement of the Egyptian military in the economy began with the revolution in 1952 when Egypt chose the path of Arab socialism.
The newly nationalized industries were largely run by military officers and this state of affairs persisted until the 1970’s when President Sadat began privatizing Egyptian enterprises in the framework of a return to market economy. While for a time the influence of the military establishment in the economy was then reduced, the situation changed again after the Peace Treaty with Israel in 1979. The Armed Forces, less concentrated on their more pressing military duties, created the National Services Projects Organisation (NSPO) which proceeded to organise a growing number of enterprises run by military officers of the upper ranks. Besides industries dedicated to military production (very often for local coproduction of military assets provided by the United States) the holdings of the Egyptian military industrial complex are extremely varied and range from shipyards, to real estate and tourism development, gas stations, food production, sugar production, fishing, cafeterias, cattle raising and slaughterhouses, mineral water, and many others.
In 1992 President Mubarak embarked on a second round of privatisations and of liberalisation of the economy, but military owned industries remained untouched. As a matter of fact a number of high ranking officers were allowed to benefit of the privatisation of public enterprises, participating in the network of business alliances and partnerships centred around Gamal Mubarak and his associates. But tensions remained between the military establishment and the business community that was benefiting from the new economic policy.
The same pattern is reproduced in the provinces where 21 of the 29 Governors (appointed by the President) are retired generals. It has been common practice for them to appoint other military officers to the management of the many public enterprises and administrative posts existing in the respective Governatorates.
The Egyptian industrial/military complex is known to be very large: estimates range from 25% to 40% of the total economy. The vagueness of these figures reflects the fact that information about industries held by the military is considered a State secret, to be protected for reasons of security, and excessive curiosity by the media can be pursued with the charge of treason.
Needless to say, this large sector of the economy, that enjoys many privileges and tax exemptions, and is run on the basis of the political connections that high officers enjoy, does certainly not contribute to the economic modernisation and social development of the country. But this is another story.
One could therefore say that the Egyptian military have always been a “state within the State”, exercising “de facto” a political and economic power not subject to political review of any kind. This explains largely the stand that they are taking in the face of the “Egyptian spring”.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was instrumental in putting an end to the tenure of President Mubarak because its apparent intention to promote his son Gamal as his successor threatened what has been up to now a purely military line of presidential succession, and also because his recent policy of liberalising the economy – actively promoted by Gamal itself – was in the end a menace to the economic power of the Egyptian military.
But a transition to a substantially democratic State, in which the military are subordinated to a civilian elected power, would also threaten the both political and economic preserves of the military establishment.
In the tug of war – which we have witnessed during the whole year 2011 – between the military leadership, the progressive movements and the Muslim Brothers, the SCAF has at times appeared to be hesitant, using at times excessive force, then reversing partially its positions. It is difficult, from the outside, to understand if this behaviour reflects the limited political culture of the military officers or possible divisions inside the SCAF itself.
But it appears more and more clear that the SCAF aims to protect its political and economic supremacy operating in two directions. The first is to ensure that the new constitution recognises to the military a role of “protector of the democracy”, allowing them to intervene in the political process when considered suitable, but also shielding the military budget from any supervision from either Parliament or civilian Government. Their role would be apparently quite similar of that of the Turkish military, after Ataturk. This aim of the military has been very clear for some time and will be central to the discussion of the new Constitution which should begin early next spring (the timetables keep shifting).
The second apparent aim of the military, for the time being less clearly affirmed, appears to be to control the election of the President who, given for granted that Egypt will continue to be a Presidential Republic, would be the ultimate guarantor of their prerogatives. Up to now the military establishment has not endorsed a presidential candidate, but rumors and “ballons d’essai” about possible military candidates for the Presidency are rife.
Given the results of the elections, it appears that during the discussion of the Constitution the only serious counterpart of the military will be represented by the Muslim Brothers. The Brotherhood rejects a position of supremacy recognized to the military by the new constitution, because it fears that the military will oppose the islamisation of the State and of Egyptian law. And this allows the military to pose as defenders of a civil democratic state, for the benefit of the (small) progressive component of Egyptian political life, and, above all, of political opinion in the West.
To this we must add that the Armed Forces receive a very high amount of military aid from the United States (around 1,3 billion yearly) which, in principle, would make them vulnerable to political pressure from Washington. But, in the same time, there are limits to possible interference in the internal affairs of an ally who plays an essential role in regional security, is an important client of American military industries, and could probably find alternative financial resources in the Gulf.
It is difficult to think that either the military establishment or the Muslim Brothers can entirely prevail. Some sort of compromise will probably have to be attained.
During the elections the Muslim Brothers have repeatedly stated that they intend to ally themselves with the liberal Egyptian Bloc, rather than with the salafi Nour Party, and oppose the constitutional project of the SCAF. It is difficult to say in which measure they will remain faithful to this position, which was certainly useful, during the electoral campaign, to allay the fears of an islamist takeover.
Otherwise the Muslim Brothers could seek an alliance with the Salafi Nour Party to strengthen their hand in the People’s Assembly. But this move would certainly be political disruptive and, anyway, the negotiations for the new constitution will not take place in the People’s Assembly, but in a Constitutional Assembly whose composition is still not known and, in the end, will be determined by the SCAF itself.
The position of the military is that the Assembly should not reflect that of the People’s Assembly (where the Islamic parties will have a strong majority) but represent in a balanced way all Egyptian political forces. But many fear that the SCAF itself aims to have a controlling stake in the Constitutional Assembly.
In the last sixty years the Army has reigned in Egypt, without governing. Since the fall of President Mubarak it is also governing. It is difficult to imagine how in the future it can abandon its role and accept civilian control. This remains the key point, but surprises are always possible.