A reformist has become the new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a scenario unthinkable just two months ago. This unexpected outcome follows the political crisis triggered by the sudden death of former President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19, 2024.
Masoud Pezeshkian, a cardiologist and surgeon, served as the Minister of Health in the early 2000s under reformist President Mohamad Khatami, who introduced the first radical political and cultural reforms in Iranian society. Since then, however, the reformist front has been increasingly marginalized, reduced to a weak opposition with many of its members imprisoned or banned. This context makes it unsurprising that many, both in Iran and internationally, were taken aback by the election results, and especially by those of the run-off on July 7, which saw Pezeshkian elected with 53.6 percent of the vote, defeating the ultra-conservative Saeed Jalili. Surprising from the outset was that Pezeshkian, an avowed reformist, had passed the scrutiny of the Guardian Council, the body of Islamic jurists with veto power over candidates for public office.
This marks a stark reversal from the 2021 presidential elections when Raisi was elected unopposed after the Guardians vetoed all significant political opponents, including moderate figures like the then-parliament speaker Ali Larijani, a former spokesman of the National Security Council and nuclear negotiator, a conservative but close to moderate former president Hassan Rohani.
In other words, three years ago the supervisory body had sought to ensure the smooth election of the only candidate favored by the system, Ebrahim Raisi, then head of the judiciary and head of the wealthy religious foundation Astan-e Qods-e Razavi of Mashad, one of the Islamic Republic’s informal power centers (Raisi’s career had begun in 1988 when he was part of the committee of magistrates who approved the summary execution of thousands of political prisoners).
Raisi’s meteoric rise and protected election had led many to see him as the most likely successor to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is now 85. According to many, the Leader wanted direct control over all branches of power within the Islamic Republic’s unique constitutional framework – made of elective and non-elective institutions. Never mind that Raisi was elected with a 48.8 percent voter turnout, an all-time low (but since then it has fallen again: 41 percent in last February’s parliamentary elections, the lowest turnout in the history of republican Iran; just under 40 percent in the first round on 28 June).
This time, however, a reformist was allowed into the contest and won. Many speculate whether this is a cosmetic maneuver to restore legitimacy to a discredited system. The disconnect between citizens and the political system has never been more evident, with confidence in the future at an all-time low and voter turnout continuing to plummet. And desertion from the ballot box worries the leadership of the Islamic Republic, which has always flaunted citizen participation as a sign of legitimacy.
Raisi’s Disastrous Balance Sheet
Raisi’s presidency exacerbated the country’s discontent. With rare political insipience, he launched moralizing campaigns and gave free rein to the “moral police,” against what had become common sense: until the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in police custody in September 2022 triggered the most widespread and generalized protests ever seen. The state responded to the “Woman Life Freedom” movement with repression, sparking criticism even within the system itself. It has also repressed the ethnic and social protests in Baluchistan and Iranian Kurdistan, as well as the waves of strikes and workers’ protests that have been going on in Iran for years (already under the Rohani administration, to be honest), albeit under the radar of the international media: from teachers to truck drivers, from precarious workers in the oil industry to public employees, from the working classes to the petty bourgeoisie impoverished by sanctions and the economic crisis.
In short, Raisi was a disaster: for the well-being of Iranians, but also the stability of the system. After his sudden death, the Leader and his close allies must have thought that neither the extremist current (the “Principlists”) nor the more extreme “endurance front” (jebheh-ye paidari) of the defeated Jalili could handle such a deep internal crisis.
Therefore, in order to ensure the survival of the system, the leadership of the Islamic Republic has decided to correct its course and reopen the internal political game (in fact, this is not the first time this has happened). “To our surprise, this time for the Islamic Republic a high turnout is more important than knowing who gets elected,” noted reformist commentator Saeed Leylaz (speaking to the Financial Times). Of course, the succession to Khamenei remains crucial, and it is a game in which the military apparatus is expected to play a prominent role: only, according to historian and political scientist Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdim, this game has been decoupled from that of the government.
Nevertheless, the election of Masoud Pezeshkian is a far from irrelevant, as at least two facts show. One is that the turnout in the second round increased by about 10 percentage points: a sign that many Iranians saw a glimmer of hope in the mild-mannered reformist cardiologist. The second is that the value of the Iranian rial at the open market has recovered a few points (on July 26, it traded at 586,500 to the dollar, a value 6 percent higher than on the eve of the elections): economic actors are also expressing some optimism.
Masoud Pezeshkian is not a radical and certainly does not promise to change the system of the Islamic Republic – nor could he. He is loyal to the system. However, he was one of the few Iranian MPs who immediately condemned the death in custody of Mahsa Jina Amini, and the subsequent repression. He knows what the (limited) powers and prerogatives of a president of the republic are in the Iranian system: hence his talk of “constructive dialogue” with the whole system. Yet, a president can make a big difference in the political, social, and cultural climate of the country – much of course depends on his personality and on those around him.
The President’s Men (and Women)
Pezeshkian’s campaign, after a muted start, has taken off with the help of two figures: former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, the architect of the negotiations that led to the nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers in 2014-15 (which made him one of the most popular politicians in Iran and the most disliked by the extremists); and Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, former Minister of Information and Telecommunications in 2017-2021. Both come from the government of the moderate and “pragmatic” Hassan Rohani, rather than from the reformist ranks.
Recurring story: the defeated candidate, Saeed Jalili, a former nuclear negotiator (during the time of former president Ahmadi Nejad), was one the biggest opponents of the agreement signed in 2015. He later supported a law passed by the Iranian parliament in 2020 (against the wishes of the then-incumbent Rohani administration) that committed the government to expand the nuclear program. At the time, negotiations were underway with the Biden administration to relaunch the agreement, from which predecessor Donald Trump had withdrawn. Zarif later revealed that the negotiations broke down in part because of that clearly hostile law, which also scuppered the prospect of sanctions relief for the Iranian economy. And the former foreign minister recalled this at length during the campaign for Pezeshkian: “Behind every sanction is this man. Every missed opportunity for negotiation is due to this man,” he repeated (referring to Jalili) in dozens of speeches across the country (Zarif revealed himself to be a political activist of great verve, as well as an experienced diplomat.) The polarization between proponents of the deal and sanctions extremists was central to his campaign. According to early analyses of the vote, this led many moderates, frightened by Jalili’s extremism, to vote for Pezeshkian.
The president, who has sworn in on July 30, has 15 days to present his government. The head of his transition team, Javad Zarif, has already announced that it will include more young faces, women, and members of religious minorities, especially Sunnis. In an op-ed published by the Tehran Times, a semi-official English-language daily, President-elect Pezeshkian says he ran for office “on a platform of reform, national unity, and constructive engagement with the world.”
The obvious question is what room for maneuver President Pezeshkian will have with a parliament dominated by conservatives and extremists. The only positive sign is that the Leader, the first authority in the state, urged the parliament to vote confidence in the future government without delay.
Pezeshkian’s Political Agenda
During his campaign, the president promised commitments in three areas: civil liberties, international dialogue, and measures to revive the economy. On the first point, the expectations are obvious. Limiting censorship, reopening cultural life, easing the pressure of the regulatory state (after all, the “moral squads” have disappeared from the streets for several weeks now). Easing control over the Internet. Azari Jahromi will have his weight in this: as a minister, he opposed the shutdown of Instagram, the last Western social platform still functioning, which the conservatives have since effectively censored – along with Google Play, dealing a blow to all Iranian start-ups. Even if all this will be a constant object of confrontation with the hardliners, as it has been the case for forty years.
In terms of international policy, Pezeshkian has stated that he wants to restore dialogue on the nuclear issue, reduce tensions with the United States and Europe, seek the lifting of the economic sanctions that are suffocating the country, and cultivate good relations with all its neighbors. However, strategic foreign policy guidelines are not the prerogative of the president, but of the Leader’s office, in coordination with the National Security Council; the name of the foreign minister is usually agreed upon with Ayatollah Khamenei. In short, we should not expect fundamental changes, nor should we expect the national defense strategy (based on the so-called “axis of resistance”) to be challenged. A diplomacy of dialogue, however, could indeed reduce tensions – although predictably not much will happen before we know who will be the next president of the United States.
Finally, the economy. Sanctions have impoverished the vast majority of Iranian citizens and created a few large fortunes. Containing inflation (which, according to official statistics, has reached almost 50 percent year-on-year,), curbing the collapse of citizens’ purchasing power, creating jobs, improving living conditions: what government would not make these promises? In his transition team, President Pezeshkian appointed the former economy minister of the Rohani government, along with the heads of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and several former ministers and experienced officials. In this area too, the president-elect promises consultation. While waiting to know his cabinet and future economic policies, one has to wonder if the consultation will be extended to workers’ organizations (the reformist ones and the independent ones, which have been criminalized so far) and how the new administration will respond to the foreseeable future waves of social demands.
Today there are is a sense of expectation surrounding the new president. Not the enthusiasm that greeted Khatami, nor the sigh of relief that had greeted Rohani – but an expectation of change nonetheless. Something that would belie the prevailing disillusionment and allow Iranians to imagine a future again.
Cover photo: Newly-elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian gestures during a visit to the shrine of the Islamic Republic’s founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran on July 6, 2024. – Pezeshkian, who advocates improved ties with the West, on July 6 won a runoff presidential election against ultraconservative Saeed Jalili, the interior ministry said. (Photo by Atta Kenare / AFP)
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