A republican jolt, a democratic tremor, a belated injection of prudence and wisdom. The descriptions of the historical and incredible result of the snap elections in France have been abundant. In just seven days, between the first and second rounds, the political majority shifted from the far right to the far left. The majority of the French, from a host of backgrounds, blocked the path of the National Rally, the party of Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, who went from euphoria to despair in the same breath.
French and foreign observers alike first tried to decipher the causes of an authoritarian, populist, xenophobic drift and immediately afterward, from the evening of July 7, pivoted to recounting an exceptional popular mobilization celebrating itself, with revolutionary songs and flags. And then they say it is the homeland of Descartes. Thanks to the exceptional mobilization of voters, the parties’ sense of responsibility, and the awareness of a leap into the void that a government led by the National Rally would have entailed (for the country and for Europe), France has thus opened its parachute on the edge of the abyss.
The French response somewhat redeems President Emmanuel Macron‘s gamble, which was heavily criticized for the risk of handing the government to the far right by calling snap elections. In the end, it was a calculated risk. The president had already lost his majority in the 2022 legislative elections. Continuing the legislature with a minority government, paralyzed by vetoes and contested by the public, would have only increased the anger of the French people and the support for the far right. Essentially, it would have handed Marine Le Pen the keys to the Élysée in 2027.
“If I had let things continue without dissolving the Assembly, I can’t imagine what could have happened. The president must act in the interest of the nation before worrying about the fate of his majority.” These were the words of Jacques Chirac when he decided to call snap elections in 1997, which ultimately handed France over to the left and the government to the socialist Lionel Jospin.
Certainly, these were Macron’s considerations when he reached his decision. Many observers deemed it impulsive, spurred by the setback in the European elections. In truth, it had been brewing for a while as a strategy to salvage what could still be salvaged. Was the bet successful? France faces a challenging couple of years ahead, potentially punctuated by unrest and the looming risk of an economic shock, given its public debt surpassing three trillion euros, ongoing European infringement proceedings, and downgrades by credit rating agencies.
The political and social landscape of the country remains intensely complex, with significant risks of instability. The “mobilizing fear” subdued the far right but handed a relative majority to a diverse Left Front. In essence, a parliament dominated by two opposing blocs is emerging (the United Left Front and the National Rally), while the center (President Macron’s former majority) is greatly weakened. The concern is governance may become difficult, unless there is a willingness to compromise, which is not typical in French tradition. Furthermore, the Left Front holds ideological ambiguities regarding economics and France’s international stance, whereas the National Rally maintains an illiberal, anti-European stance that is essentially xenophobic, in contrast with the societal model of France established during the Fifth Republic.
Macron clearly aimed to thwart Marine Le Pen, who is determined to succeed in what would be her third attempt to capture the Élysée. Over the next two and a half years, anything could happen, especially considering that much of the establishment, business leaders, the state apparatus, the united left, and remnants of pro-European France are fearful at the prospect of Marine Le Pen representing the country in Europe and globally.
Macron can also claim the feat of defeating Le Pen three times: twice in the race for the Élysée in 2017 and 2022, and now a third time in these early elections. These decisive victories would sideline anyone. Certainly, within the National Rally, a reckoning has swiftly begun. Under scrutiny is their young protege, Jordan Bardella, aged 28, a brilliant and adept communicator who, however, has recently made errors in candidate selection (including an impressive number of unsuitable choices) and communication strategy. Millions of fans who cheered for their national team in the European championship are not questioning the players’ true French identity, despite many having African (and some Spanish) origins. As Kylian Mbappé, the team’s symbol, stated just days before the vote, “We must uphold values of tolerance, respect, and diversity.”
Even though he does not hold dual citizenship, Jordan Bardella should still explain his Italian origins and the fact that he has an Algerian great-grandfather. It is clear that the ideological shift would particularly impact hundreds of thousands of French citizens born in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, former sub-Saharan African colonies, or born in France to foreign parents, or those who have married French citizens — all fully French in every respect. Hundreds of professionals, intellectuals, artists, and public figures have felt offended and voiced a deep sense of injustice. In principle, the issue could also affect thousands of Italians, Germans, Americans with dual citizenship, and perhaps even some Jewish citizens. Bardella himself attempted to justify this by suggesting the analogy that a nuclear power plant could be managed by a Franco-Russian citizen.
Now begins an unprecedented phase of uncertainty, which many observers liken to Italy in recent decades. This reevaluation underscores our capacity to find solutions beyond traditional frameworks, which have either collapsed or been overshadowed by the fragmentation of political forces. There is talk of a “technocratic government,” backed by the broadest possible coalition (excluding the far right and far left). Meanwhile, commentators speculate on who might become the French equivalent of Mario Draghi to guide the country through the storm. Attention also turns to Germany, where historically opposing forces have joined to ensure governability. Will it be a “traffic light” coalition (involving socialists, conservatives, greens, and Macronists) or an “Ursula majority,” similar to the approach that secured von der Leyen’s re-election?
But the United Left Front, with the radical component led by Jean Luc Mélenchon predominating within it, demands more. The question is whether it will remain “united.”
For France, a coalition government would be a significant departure. Its institutions appear to resist coalition formation: the Constitution, the two-round majority electoral system, traditions, the taste for conflict, and a weak culture of compromise. Nevertheless, the results of the July 7 elections will force French political parties to unite. This is demanded by the country’s interests and public opinion, which will not tolerate prolonged deadlock.
As argued by political scientist Jean Dominique Giuliani, “A coalition to form or support a government marks the beginning of wisdom and sometimes guarantees effectiveness. Faced with the complexity of public issues, there are no longer absolute certainties, ideological outbursts, or singular truths. To resolve them, we must combine analyses, discuss solutions, and share strengths. By agreeing to set aside personal and partisan interests and accepting a minimal legislative program in the country’s interest, French politicians would join a nearly unanimous European practice. This approach respects citizens and democratic rules when it is transparent and presumed.”
If this is the political landscape that emerged from the vote, it is also necessary to delve deeper into the social dimension that shaped it. France is home to the largest Muslim population in Europe, about six million people. While the social divide has worsened and fed into the far-right’s voter base, it is also true that the suburbs, French people of foreign origin, and immigrants would not have welcomed a government born from xenophobic propaganda and populist slogans promoting national preference.
On the other hand, the National Rally is a party deeply rooted among the working class and the youth, gaining support in rural, angry France, and leading throughout the country except in Paris. The far right remains a significant negative factor for the country’s stability and cohesion. Their strategy for the coming months is clearly aimed at winning the Élysée, but perhaps Marine Le Pen’s path is permanently blocked.
The far right’s proclamations mix propaganda and demagoguery on complex issues that should be clearly distinguished. Restrictive immigration policies (which the government majority has also supported) are one thing, but promoting policies that would end up discriminating against citizens of different origins is another. Such policies would challenge the principle of universal rights and duties that underpins French society.
If it is true that the majority is always right in a democracy, it is not always the case that reason wins the majority of voters. This old saying applies perfectly to today’s France. Amidst strategic errors and “miscastings,” Macron has disrupted the French political landscape twice in recent years: first by creating a new center and then by letting it evaporate in favor of the extremes. While the left-wing front contains many ideological ambiguities about the economy and France’s international positioning, the National Rally, despite the apparent “melonization” of its leaders, remains an illiberal force with a strong xenophobic and anti-European component, as well as some embarrassing “Russian connections.”
This article was originally published in a shorter version on the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera on July 7, 2024.
Cover photo: French Rassemblement National (RN) far-right party’s president Jordan Bardella speaks during the party’s election night following the first results of the second round of France’s legislative election in Paris on July 7, 2024 (Photo by Dimitar Dilkoff / AFP.)
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