Ambassador Petritsch, some experts have focused on Bosnia’s future in the last weeks. They argue the country could collapse because of ethnic divisions and the lack of real reformist attitudes in the political elite. Lord Paddy Ashdown, a former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a position you held before him, also shares this kind of vision. But according to what you recently wrote in the Bosnian newspaper Dnevni Avaz (5 August 2008), it seems you are more optimist than he is…

Well, first of all I think Bosnia cannot be compared to a ‘normal’ country. If it was a normal country, the International Community would not have been there for so long. The lessons the ‘international community’ has learned are, first of all the complexity of the post-war transition and the democratization process; secondly that this is a process with ups und downs, and thirdly, that ownership is the key to the success – because democracy cannot be exported, it must be created from within – and this takes time! The ongoing transition of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) into the Office of the EU Special Representative precisely illustrates this. While major progress has been made recently in this regard, it is true that much remains to be done in order to consolidate state-level institutions (notably in the field of the apportionment of property between State and other levels of government, Defence Property; not forgetting the adoption of the Law on the National Fiscal Council and a National War Crimes Strategy). Thus, much must still be done; nevertheless I am convinced that Bosnia can succeed in reforming itself. We must also not forget that the EU has its own problems when it comes to constitutional reforms!

There are two overall conditions that must be respected so as to stay on this track. The first condition is the development of stronger cooperation relations with neighbouring countries and the second is integration into the EU. The first process is already ongoing: Bosnia is strongly involved in the ongoing regional cooperation process. For example, since February 2008 Sarajevo has hosted the Secretariat of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) – successor to the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Moreover, there are synergies in the energy field (the Treaty establishing the Energy Community was signed in Athens on October 25th 2005) as well as in the economic sector (the so-called ‘new CEFTA’). The second process is also moving forward: Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU on June 16th 2008 – and this is of course a major step in the right direction.

On the subject of the second condition, integration in the EU. You have always said that enlarging the European community to the Balkans is not as difficult as some European leaders argue. Do you still support this thesis?

Yes, I definitely think that the EU must open its doors to the Balkans. This is the most important step the EU must take in the near future. Of course it will take some time – because the Balkan countries must fulfil EU conditions and also because the EU must renew its commitment (first issued in Thessaloniki on June 21st 2001); and this must be explained to the citizens of the countries involved. But the European community must not dramatize this effort; it’s easier than it seems. In a way, for the Balkan countries, regional cooperation process is the first step needed to join the EU: implementation in this field is quite impressive and should convince EU countries to proceed with the EU enlargement process.

Don’t you think the EU should solve the Lisbon Treaty issue before thinking of any further enlargements?

Bringing the Balkans into Europe will take longer than Lisbon Treaty ratification, but I believe that if we debate the Lisbon Treaty for other ten years, not only the Balkans, but the EU as it is will be in danger. We need to move faster. The strategy for overcoming the problems connected to the Lisbon Treaty cannot stop the enlargement process. Europe must help the Balkans countries to get closer to Brussels now. But the Balkan countries must be proactive. It is true, they have to be patient, but they must carry on with reforms and strengthen relations with the EU; they have also to show the EU – but also their own citizens – what the European perspectives have to offer ‘former Yugoslavia’.

Could culture play an important role as a means for regional integration?

Yes, for sure. First of all culture helps people living in different countries build relations; it also helps overcome ethnic and political divisions. Secondly, it contributes to bring the Balkans closer to Europe. Thirdly, culture is important for the young. I saw this in my position at the European Cultural Foundation; young artists are very open and they do not have nationalistic approaches. I think that members of governments and diplomats very unfortunately underestimate the value of culture as a powerful political – but also economic – tool. Thus, we should resolutely focus more on culture. We must think of how we can promote culture in the region, and, more specifically, of how we can encourage young artists in the Balkans. Moreover, culture is not so expensive, it costs much less than other tools and strategies we have used in the Balkans in the last decade.

Many analysts say that Dayton Constitution does not work anymore. Does Bosnia need an institutional change?

The Dayton Constitution reflects the end of the war in 1995. On one hand, you have divisions running along ethnic lines, on the other hand, Dayton also imposes a unified state. We have been working on encouraging institutional change for years, and now this need is stronger than ever. Brussels must send a very significant message to the Bosnian leadership. The EU must say: “If you want to join Europe, you must have a government at state level”. Bosnia can have local administrations, this is not the problem. The problem is that a country cannot function if it does not have an efficient central executive body. And, as mentioned before, Bosnia does not have one yet. Thus, the country needs a strong government in Sarajevo where all the political parties cooperate, where the main political issues the parties must address are social and economic ones. As a matter of fact Brussels is not interested in which ethnicity a person belongs to, Brussels thinks “inside or outside Europe”. Compared to the rest of the Balkans, Bosnia is behind due to the legacy of civil war. The Bosnian leadership should focus on its national interests and not on Serbian, Muslim or Croatian ethnic interests. That is the point.

Could Milorad Dodik, the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, bring the Republika Srpska to independence?

I do not believe he can. What could Republika Srpska (RS) become with independence? It would become an undeveloped region, just a province of Serbia, and Dodik would become a provincial politician. I believe that Dodik knows that if he engages in splitting-up Bosnia and Herzegovina, this would mean he would have no chance to develop what he considers his ‘country’. Thus, there are pragmatic reasons advising him not to implement this challenge. However, the RS should have the chance to cooperate with Serbia. Why not? Serbia is a neighbour, the Bosnian-Serbs and the Serbs speak the same language, they share the same culture. Of course they look to Belgrade as their cultural centre because Belgrade is the historical centre for the Serbs. There is nothing wrong with this. But Dodik should not push for independence, because the Republika Srpska has nothing to gain from this option. Moreover, there is another very serious risk. The RS is internationally recognized by the Dayton agreements. If one said “Dayton is dead”, one would no longer have international recognition. Dodik would have to face pragmatic and constitutional obstacles. The RS cannot exist without Dayton and the same applies to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This means that Serbs and the Bosnians must live under the same roof. It is a compromise. Maybe some do not agree with this mechanism, but that was the deal signed in Dayton. No one would benefit from changing it.