One piece is still missing in the tragic Middle East conflict. After the August 25 clash between Israel and Hezbollah – of which both sides have only provided partial accounts tailored to their internal and external propaganda – an anticipated Iranian retaliation remains pending, announced but postponed to a “timely moment.”
On the side of Israel’s adversaries, it is clear that neither the Party of God nor the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks a large-scale conflict. Khamenei and Nasrallah understand well that if the situation were to truly escalate, it would open the gates of hell. At that point, what would be at stake is not just a potential defeat, but the very existence of their regime and movement. Although it is unlikely that distant skirmishes involving missiles, rockets, artillery fire, and covert operations – however devastating – would bring these regimes to their knees.
Excluding economic and energy blockades aimed at inciting internal unrest, only the presence of enemy troops on the ground would radically alter the situation. And it is precisely this “boots on the ground” scenario that poses a significant challenge for Israel.
The Shiite Majority
A potential war against Hezbollah, which is possible within the framework of the new security doctrine established after October 7, based on the imperative “no enemy at the border,” would not be a conflict with a small, though determined, Islamic nationalist group, but an open confrontation with a party-militia that is better armed and trained than Hamas. Also, something not to be underestimated in an invasion that aims to push deeper inside: it is deeply rooted in society.
Hezbollah, in fact, is the party-community of the Shiite sectarian segment, which is also numerically the majority in Lebanon. Of course, not officially, since the last census in a country that allocates institutional positions based on the numbers of sectarian groups dates back to 1932. However, in reality, it is as demographers and intelligence services know.
If that census – used here as a political tool rather than a statistical one – were conducted, Shiites would be shown as the majority within the already majority Muslim Lebanese population, which makes up 60 percent of the total population, while Christians are under 40 percent. Emigration, immigration, refugees, civil war, secularization and lifestyles, economic booms and busts have drastically changed the face of the Land of the Cedars over the past eighty years.
Yet the dominant narrative in the West is that, due to its historical ties with France and, after 1958, with the United States, Lebanon is fundamentally a Christian country.
This political myopia is difficult to correct and carries significant consequences, especially in the case of war scenarios.
Nasrallah
It is true that Lebanese Sunnis do not align with the dominance of the local heirs of Khomeinism and their Amal allies, but the Christians are also politically divided. They are torn between the anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian stances of Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces, and the opportunistic pragmatism that drives prominent community leaders to form alliances with Hezbollah in order to maintain their power.
In this complex landscape of political maneuvering, the reality is that, despite challenges and weariness, Nasrallah remains the true master of Lebanon. The ongoing institutional deadlock – nearly two years now – over the election of the president of the Republic, a position reserved for Christians in the sectarian power-sharing system, further fuels a political vacuum. This vacuum, paradoxically, is overwhelmingly filled by the substantial influence of Hezbollah.
To neutralize such a well-armed enemy with a politically and ideologically cohesive base – the axis stretching from Tehran to Beirut via Damascus is no invention of abstract cartographers or armchair geopolitical enthusiasts – firing deadly missiles, launching artillery strikes, or deploying naval guns is not enough.
An invasion would be necessary, much like Begin once did when he sent the Merkava tanks to the hills overlooking Beirut to forcibly expel the PLO from the country. But the “King of Kings” Begin, along with his Defense Minister Sharon, faced no force as structured as Hezbollah. Arafat’s PLO was despised by almost all Lebanese for having turned into a “parallel state,” and Israel could rely on the ruthless Phalangist militias.
Today, Hezbollah is the only armed militia. Israel has already faced off against Hezbollah in 2006 and knows it is a daunting adversary. That grueling conflict ended in a military stalemate. Even if Israel were to push Hezbollah’s yellow flag beyond the Litani River, it would only secure peace for a limited time. Without effective and friendly governments in place, and with continued Iranian support, those forces would regroup, and the rockets would once again rain down on Upper Galilee.
Epochal Agreement or War
This is the great, and unspoken, paradox of modern warfare. While formalizing it contains the conflict, it does not resolve it, instead turning it into a factor of cyclical instability. The conflict can truly end in only two scenarios. The first is through a major diplomatic agreement that goes beyond the Gaza negotiations – focused on the political exchange of a truce for hostages – and establishes a regional accord, for which the conditions are not currently present. The second is through a decisive military victory by one of the contenders that dramatically alters the existing strategic balance, incapacitating the enemy, much like Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six-Day War.
Israel’s military leadership is well aware of this reality. They understand that fighting on two fronts – on the northern border with Lebanon and the southern border with Gaza – achieves little if they cannot secure irreversible gains and if the international political conditions are not in place to solidify those gains.
The Temptation of Bibi
Yet, this seems to be the temptation of the Israeli right: to push forward with a policy of faits accomplis. The idea is to act first and manage the consequences later, even if it means resisting pressure from allies, particularly the US. While this is not always feasible, and despite Bibi’s frequent defiance, the constraints imposed by the Biden administration have been significant. However, if Trump were to return to the White House, Netanyahu might see an opportunity to tackle the Lebanese issue.
He would not do this by patiently unraveling its complex entanglements but rather by cutting through them with a decisive stroke. This approach would aim to resolve the contradictions left by the ongoing conflict – a war constantly subject to directives, mediations, calibrations, and pressures that have so far prevented the long-desired military triumph. “That’s politics, baby!” to paraphrase Ed Hutcheson, as played by Humphrey Bogart in Deadline – U.S.A.
It is this very politics that Bibi, in a Clausewitzian manner, wishes to transform into a shapeless war, one capable of truly eliminating what he perceives as the ultimate threat: the Axis of Evil represented by the turbans of Nasrallah and Khamenei.
This article was originally published on the Italian newspaper Domani, on August 27, 2024.
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