Cultural Fractures and the Far Right’s Rise in Europe
Editorial Board 10 August 2024

The images of numerous UK cities set ablaze by riots involving extremist, xenophobic, and Islamophobic groups are a stark warning of the risks posed by increasing polarization: the eruption of violence fueled by intolerance and fake news. Following the murder of three girls by a 17-year-old born in Cardiff to Rwandan parents, false reports circulated that he was a recently arrived Muslim migrant. These lies spread across social media, originating from far-right profiles, groups, and trolls, and ultimately triggered violent attacks. While this specific incident may not be directly linked to any single British political party, 14 years of conservative rhetoric have cultivated a socio-cultural environment increasingly leaning towards the right, from anti-immigration campaigns supporting Brexit to agreements with Rwanda and Rishi Sunak’s “Stop the Boat” slogan – ironically, a ship, the Bibby Stockholm, was moored off the English coast by the British Prime Minister to house asylum seekers (at a distance).

These events reflect deep fractures that extend beyond British society alone. Comparably significant is the January 2021 assault on Capitol Hill in the United States, where, in a context of severe political polarization, misinformation (“Stop the Steal”), conspiracy theories, and Donald Trump‘s incendiary rhetoric led to a direct attack on democratic institutions. These extreme examples of radicalization, fueled by cultural and economic insecurity and exploited by political forces to gain support, fit into a broader framework of dynamics that have led to the rise of the right, including in Europe.

 

The Transformation of Political Identities into Cultural Ones

“Western democracies are increasingly oriented not along a left-right axis, but along an opportunity-risk axis, at least in the eyes of voters,” argues Albena Azmanova, a professor of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Kent and long-time advocate of this theory. For instance, “those who see socio-economic opportunities in neoliberal policies tend to support leaders from Tony Blair to Joe Biden and Emmanuel Macron today, while those who perceive risks turn to the far right, but also the far left,” she explains to Reset DOC. According to Azmanova, it is insecurity, more than inequality, that drives modern populism. Insecurity that the right has successfully exploited, weaving a narrative of social (and partly economic) protection and cultural defense that transcends national identity. Behind slogans like “France First” or “Italy First” or “Britain First,” “there is not so much the idea of ‘the French against the Italians’,” Azmanova continues, “but rather a ‘civilizational’ understanding of that identity, namely white, Christian, anti-Muslim, and to some extent, European.”

Sociologist Chiara Saraceno notes that a sense of humiliation plays a role: populations that feel economically threatened – first by deindustrialization and then by the increasing precariousness of work – and culturally –by demographic decline and migration flows – tend to identify an external enemy. “In politics, emotions matter a lot. And to survive, one identifies an enemy, who is usually the one who would take your place, not the one who caused your condition,” Saraceno emphasizes. “Shortly before Trump won in 2016, sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild interviewed the white underclass, Tea Party supporters, for the book Strangers in Their Own Land,” Saraceno continues, “when asked who was to blame for their conditions, those living in areas heavily polluted by industry – the source of many illnesses – pointed the finger at blacks or Mexicans, never at the industry itself, let alone the rich.”

 

Leftist Elitism, Right-Wing Populist Narratives

Political scientist Yves Mény also points out that right-wing populist movements have capitalized on the fear of immigration and multiculturalism. Moreover, “the left has gradually forgotten some central issues for the working class. Think of the coexistence in the suburbs with migrants. The French Communist Party allocated public housing to the poorest, who in the 1970s and 1980s were increasingly people from North Africa,” says the political scientist, who emphasizes: “And this coexistence was difficult because it was a cultural competition before it was a labor one.”

The move towards more progressive issues, such as civil rights – though necessary according to Roberto D’Alimonte due to the shrinking working class for electoral reasons – has fueled the perception of leftist elitism. “The intellectual hubris of the left has alienated the working class,” Azmanova emphasizes, “driving people away, for example, with what can or cannot be said (as in the case of cancel culture), when the real battle was often over jobs and livelihoods.” Azmanova comments, on the recent French case, that “48 percent of teachers and university professors voted for the Nouveau Front Populaire in the last legislative elections.” Meanwhile, “the narrative on the cost of living has been at the center of Jordan Bardella’s speeches: lower energy bills and taxes, no income tax for those under 30—explains Azmanova—the Rassemblement National has used the language of immediate solutions. Most people do not understand the academic language used by the left on social justice.”

 

Simple Solutions to Complex Problems

If simple solutions to complex problems are the populist response, often through lies, some of these solutions are ideologically off-limits to the left: “The far right counters the ‘cultural threat‘ quite simply: by stopping immigration. The left cannot because it is cosmopolitan, inclusive, and progressive,” Azmanova points out.

“The right has offered traditional cultural protection and, at the same time, an offer of economic protection similar to that of the left, thus managing to penetrate the traditional electoral bases of the left,” emphasizes D’Alimonte. In this context, the left has instead failed to find a balance between the almost blind defense of rights and the positions of the far right, which represent the signal of a deeper popular discontent, according to Mény. “This leads to a long-term reflection: we cannot continuously increase the non-negotiable, intangible part of the democratic structure, while at the same time allowing the popular part to shrink—Mény stresses—especially since democratic political rhetoric insists on the idea that the people are sovereign, while a part of the people feels that their voice is never heard.” Meanwhile, the same populists present themselves as the true representatives of the “people.”

 

 

Cover photo: A protester stands opposite a police officer in Liverpool on August 3, 2024 during the ‘Enough is Enough’ demonstration held in reaction to the fatal stabbings in Southport on July 29. (Photo by PETER POWELL / AFP.)

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