We live in a time of looming culture clashes or “clashes of civilizations” (to use Samuel Huntington’s phrase); and of course, we live in a time of “terror wars” involving the continuous alternation of terror and counter-terror. This means: we live in a time of power politics, now on a global scale. Power seems to be the only “currency” recognized in the world. Politics tends to be identified with power politics. Needless to say: this is a recipe for culture clashes and terror wars. But is “politics” really the same as power politics? Is there not something else in politics? Does not tradition teach us about a different politics? Aristotle defined politics as the striving for justice and the “good life”.

And Alfarabi wrote about a “virtuous city.” And how do we find justice and the virtuous city? Not by power, but by wisdom and learning—and learning depends on listening and dialogue. My intent is twofold. First I want to discuss with you the idea of intercultural dialogue, and I shall do so by pointing out different forms of dialogical interactions. Next, I want to examine some implications of dialogue as a remedy against culture clashes. To be sure, not all relations between societies and cultures are dialogical or communicative. At a minimum, dialogue implies some kind of mutuality or mutual exchange of views. Probably one can arrange intercultural relations along a broad spectrum ranging from complete monologue to genuine dialogue, from radical unilateralism to full-fledged multilateralism (and perhaps cosmopolitanism). In one of my writings, titled Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter I have discussed this spectrum, paying particular attention to the monological side of this scale. On the monological or unilateral side, one can find such prominent examples of non-mutuality as military conquest, forced conversion, and ideological indoctrination. I shall not dwell here on these unilateral modes of intercultural relations.

Rather, I want to concentrate my attention on the dialogical side of interactions. On this side of the spectrum one can distinguish between three, or maybe three-and-a-half, different possibilities. I shall take my bearings initially from an essay by the German social theorist Jürgen Habermas titled On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason (which serves as the opening chapter in his book Justification and Application). In his essay, Habermas differentiates between three distinct uses or employments of “practical reason,” that is, a reason geared toward practical interaction: the pragmatic, the ethical, and the moral uses. The first type derives from utilitarianism and finds expression in the confrontation between, and possible accumulation of, individual interests. The second (“ethical”) type draws its inspiration from Aristotelian ethics as filtered through Hegel’s dialectical philosophy. Those thinkers, Habermas notes, who emphasis the “ethical” use appropriate “the Hegelian legacy in the form of an Aristotelian ethics of the good,” while abandoning “the universalism of rational natural law.” The third (“moral”) type, finally, operates “in a Kantian spirit” and accentuates “the unavoidable presuppositions” of argumentation and the “impartiality” required of anyone judging from “a moral point of view”. For Habermas, adopting a rationalist stance, the third type is “grounded in the communicative structure of rational discourse as such”. His own moral theory, called “discourse ethics,” in his view “forces itself intuitively on anyone who is at all open to this reflective from of communicative action.” In this manner, discourse ethics “situates itself squarely in the Kantian tradition”.

So far my summary of the Habermasian account. In what follows I shall partially appropriate, but also significantly modify his tripartite scheme for my own purposes: namely, the task of exploring different forms or modalities of intercultural dialogue. My main departure from Habermas has to do with his portrayal of the “ethical” use of reason. As it seems to me, his portrayal involves a radical misreading of both Aristotle and Hegel (and one might include Alfarabi). Most importantly, ethics in the Aristotelian and Hegelian sense is reduced by Habermas to a purely descriptive-empirical set of prevailing customs or situated practices—a reading which completely bypasses or ignores the inherent “ought”-quality of Aristotle’s notion of virtue and of the Hegelian striving for Sittlichkeit. There are some other problems in this reading which I leave aside.

Adapting, but also modifying the Habermasian scheme I distinguish between three, or perhaps three-and-a-half, main types of intercultural dialogue. I list first the different modalities and then comment briefly on each of them. The three basic forms are these: (1) pragmatic-strategic communication; (2) moral-universal discourse; and (3) ethical-hermeneutical dialogue. To these one can add a fourth type—but I prefer to treat it as a sub-category under (3): agonal dialogue or contestation.

In pragmatic-strategic communication each partner seeks to advance his or her own interests in negotiation with the interests of other parties. To the extent one can describe such communication as “dialogue,” the latter takes the form mainly of mutual bargaining, sometimes involving manipulation and even deception. This kind of communicative exchange is well known in international or inter-societal relations and constitutes the central focus of the so-called “realist” and “neo-realist” schools of international politics. Prominent examples of such communication would be trade or commercial negotiations; negotiations about global warming and ecological standards; disarmament negotiations; settlements of border disputes; peace negotiations, and the like. Much of traditional diplomacy is in fact carried on in this vein.

In moral-universal discourse partners seek consensus on basic rules or norms of behavior binding on all partners, potentially on a global level. Here the legacies of modern natural law and of Kantian moral philosophy retain their importance. Basic rules of (potentially) universal significance are the rules of modern international law; the international norms regarding warfare, war crimes and crimes against humanity; the Geneva Conventions; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and others. One does not need to be a Kantian in a strict sense in order to recognize the importance and even “categorically” binding character of these norms (which have been accepted by the great majority of governments and endorsed by the vast majority of humankind). Surely, ours is not the time to disparage or tamper with the mandatory quality of international norms. Thus, the rules of the Geneva Conventions are mandatory, no matter what terminology individual governments choose to adopt. Likewise, launching an unprovoked war is a crime against humanity; so is the wanton killing of civilian populations. Here the collective conscience of humanity has reached a certain level below which we do not dare do regress.

In ethical-hermeneutical dialogue partners seek to understand and appreciate each other’s life stories and cultural backgrounds, including cultural and religious (or spiritual) traditions, storehouses of literary and artistic expressions, and existential agonies and aspirations. It is in this mode that cross-cultural learning most importantly takes place. It is also on this level that one encounters the salience of Aristotle’s and Alfarabi’s teaching about virtues and of the Hegelian practice of Sittlichkeit. Ethics here is oriented toward the “good life”—not in the sense of an abstract “ought” but as the pursuit of an aspiration implicit in all life-forms, though able to take very different expressions in different cultures. Since ethics on this level speaks to deeper human motivations, this is really the dimension which is most likely to mold human conduct in the direction of mutual ethical recognition and peace. Hence, there is an urgent need in our time to emphasize and cultivate this kind of ethical pedagogy. On a limited scale, cross-cultural dialogue in this sense already is practiced today: examples would be inter-faith dialogues, the Parliament of the World’s Religions, the World Public Forum, the World Social Forum, various centers for the “dialogue among civilizations,” exchange programs of scholars and students, and the like.

To the three main types mentioned so far one may wish to add as a fourth category that of agonal dialogue or contestation. I prefer to treat it as a sub-category of ethical dialogue, and I shall indicate my reason for doing so. In the agonal situation, partners seek not only to understand and appreciate each other’s life forms, but also to convey to each other experiences of exploitation and persecution, that is, grievances having to do with past or persisting injustices and sufferings. In addition to better understanding, agonal dialogue adds the dimension of possible retribution and rectification of grievances. Yet, retribution does not necessarily involve the desire to “get even,” to take revenge, and possibly to return injustice for injustice by turning the previous victimizers into victims.

This is why prefer to list the agonal case as a sub-category within ethical-hermeneutical dialogue. Placed in this context, confrontation and contestation are not ends in themselves but are put in the service of ethical reconciliation and healing. There are prominent examples of such an agonal hermeneutics in our time. I am referring to the great commissions of inquiry established in various parts of the world at the end of ethnic conflicts and/or dictatorships: the so-called “Truth and Justice” or “Truth and Reconciliation” Commissions. The point of these commissions was both to establish a record of past criminal actions and injustices and to promote a process of social healing which would prevent the recurrence of victimization.

In light of the horrendous forms of oppression and injustice prevailing in the world today, one can only hope that humankind some day will have the wisdom and courage to establish a global Truth and Reconciliation Commission charged both with exposing and rectifying existing abuses and with laying the groundwork for a more just and livable global future.

Here are some words of Bishop Desmond Tutu who served as President of the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” in South Africa (you can find the passage in his book God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope for Our Time): “I saw the power of the gospel when I was serving as chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. . . . The Commission gave perpetrators of political crimes the opportunity to appeal for amnesty by telling the truth of their actions and an opportunity to ask for forgiveness. . . . As we listened to accounts of truly monstruous deeds of torture and cruelty, it would have been easy to dismiss the perpetrators as monsters because their deeds were truly monstruous. But we are reminded that God’s love is not cut off from anyone”.

Bishop Tutu speaks here as a Christian minister. But the statement could also have been written by a Muslim—any Muslim who remembers the opening lines in every chapter of the Qur’an: “In the name of Allah, the all-compassionate and all-merciful.”
Let me conclude with some words on intercultural dialogue as an antidote to culture clashes and terror wars. As it seems to me: we have today a huge surplus of “war talk” and “mission talk” in the world, and a huge deficit of civilization and of intercultural or “civilizational dialogue”. In early August of 2004 the writer Salman Rushdie spoke to an international PEN conference in New York City. I am not going to defend everything Rushdie has ever done; but what he said at the PEN meeting was right on target.

“I want to start by saying that I don’t think any of us who are at this event delude ourselves about terrorism. Terrorism does exist. In this city of all cities, we know that. We know when it exists, what it has done, what it tries to do. We know it exists and must be fought. I don’t think any of us would question that (But) How we fight it in my view is going to be the great civilizational test of our time. Will we become our enemy or not? … Will we become intolerant as our enemy is intolerant? Or will we not? Will we fight with different weapons, weapons of openness and acceptance, and seeking to increase the dialogue between peoples rather than decrease it. This is a big test . . . It seems to us, to PEN, to many of us in the last month that we are not passing this text very well”.

This is also for me the big test today. As I see it, the big issue is whether we can develop a counterweight to the dominant culture of violence, of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Can we develop a politics aiming at the welfare, the well-being or “eudaimonia” of peoples in this world, instead of a mere politics of domination and warfare? Can we develop a politics promoting the good in people everywhere, rather than merely controlling or eradicating perceived ills? Can we have a global civilization, rather than global civil war? A global “virtuous city” in Alfarabi’s sense, rather than a global politics dominated by war lords equipped with weapons capable of annilating the world many times over?

This text has been read by the author during the conference Beyond Orientalism and Occidentalism, organized by Reset-Dialogues on Civilizations and held in Cairo, Egypt, March 4th/6th 2006.