On January 19, just before President Trump’s inauguration, a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas came into effect. While the agreement will not end the 15-month war on Gaza, it marks a significant breakthrough on one of the war’s key objectives outlined by the Israeli government: the release of the remaining hostages. This objective is also the one that enjoys the strongest public support with 57.5 percent of Israelis in favor. After months of negotiations in Qatar, the deal aims to secure the return of all hostages in three stages.
During the first phase, three abductees will be released each week over 42 days, in exchange for halting military operations on the Gaza Strip and freeing approximately 1,903 Palestinian prisoners. However, the three-phase structure and the gradual implementation are the deal’s weakest points, as its success relies entirely on the goodwill of both Hamas and Israel, without any monitoring mechanism or peacekeeping force in place. Progress in subsequent phases depends on both parties’ full commitment to shared objectives, a facto that has raised concerns, particularly among the Hostage Family Committee.
There is also additional apprehension that Hamas opted for progressive implementation because it no longer has full control over all the hostages. This approach could give Hamas time to locate and negotiate for captives potentially held by Islamic Jihad or other militant groups in the Strip. Given the deep mistrust between the parties and the fact that critical aspects of the deal remain unresolved, the agreement risks collapsing at any moment. Ha’aretz’s chief military correspondent, Amos Harel, also highlighted a key vulnerability: Hamas’ demand for a full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in the second stage.
As part of the agreement, the IDF must comply with several key provisions. On the seventh day, the army is required to withdraw from the Netzarim Corridor, which bisects the Strip and divides it into two sections. For the first time, residents who were evacuated and forcibly displaced from the northern region will be permitted to return home, though the IDF will conduct security checks on individuals and vehicles passing through.
Simultaneously, 1,900 prisoners will be released from the Ofir and Shikma detention facilities, including detainees described as having “blood on their hands,” who will then be sent overseas. Among the released prisoners are 1,167 Gaza detainees held since October 7, 2023. Additionally, 50 injured militants per day will be allowed to cross into Egypt for medical treatment, while the Rafah crossing will be opened to facilitate the transfer of wounded civilians.
Humanitarian aid deliveries will increase insignificantly to 600 trucks per day—tripling the current 200 rate. However, the distribution of this aid remains contentious, particularly as it be overseen by the embattled UNRWA, an issue yet to be fully addressed in negotiations. The IDF is also set to execute a gradual withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor, the border zone between Gaza and Egypt. This area was the focal point of the Rafah incursion in May 2024 and considered an existential threat by Prime Minister Netanyahu. However, a buffer zone of varying width will remain along the border with Israel.
The current plan follows the blueprint established in May by the Biden administration’s negotiation team. Many observers have noted that an agreement based on this framework could have been reached long before the conflict had escalated, potentially saving the lives of 100 dead Israeli soldiers and 11,000 Palestinians.
However, Israeli analysts, such as Mairav Zonszein of the International Crisis Group, argue that the political conditions in May were not conducive to such an agreement. Since then, Israel has reasserted its deterrence capabilities through significant military achievements. These include a successful operation in Lebanon that cleared Hezbollah forces from the south of the Litani river, the elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and the decapitation of his organization, as well as the targeted killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and most of Hamas’ senior leadership, including Ismail Haniyeh. Israel has also benefited from regional developments, such as the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the emergence of new governments in Bierut and Damascus that oppose the Axis of Resistance.
This interpretation aligns with President Biden’s rationale for the timing of the agreement: “Hamas leader Sinwar was killed; Hamas’ strongest supporter, Iran, launched attacks at Israel and those attacks failed after my administration organized a coalition of nations to stop them…a coalition of 20 countries to stand up to attacks by the Houthis…then Hezbollah, another of Hamas’ strongest backers was significantly weakened…and its leadership was destroyed…the terror network that once protected and sustained Hamas is far weaker.”
However, Palestinian scholars, such as Mouin Rabbani, remain skeptical. They argue that the last-minute ceasefire agreement was primarily the result of pressure exerted on Netanyahu by Trump’s impending presidency. Trump’s widely publicized warning that “all hell will break loose” if the hostages were not returned by January 20 reportedly added urgency for the Israeli government to act. Behind the scenes, it appears that Steve Witkoff, Trump’s Middle East envoy, was prepared to travel to the region to remind Netanyahu of the balance of power in the “special alliance” between Israel and the United States. Witkoff reportedly emphasized the firm US strategic interest in securing a deal, regardless of the internal tensions within Israel’s governing coalition.
While the agreement was widely celebrated by both Israeli and Palestinian public opinion, its lack of a comprehensive approach drew criticism from the families of hostages. Meanwhile, the government coalition faced significant strain over the deal. Public Security Minister Ben Gvir (Jewish Power Party) and Finance Minister Smotrich (Religious Zionist Party) both publicly denounced the agreement as “dangerous and irresponsible.”
The two ministers, who represent the settlement movement within the government, threatened to leave the coalition. Ultimately, only Ben Gvir followed through on this threat. Smotrich, facing poor electoral prospects, chose to remain in the coalition, postponing his strategy to leverage assurances from Netanyahu. His strategy involved securing commitments that a full-scale war would resume at a later stage, with the ultimate goal of toppling Hamas and achieving a total victory. Netanyahu is believed to have agreed to these assurances. Critics argue that the prime minister’s primary focus was to secure the release of a limited number of hostages as a goodwill gesture to President Trump, while leaving the IDF with significant freedom to conduct future military operations in the Strip.
The failure to topple Hamas remains a concern for right-wing politicians, citizens, and families of fallen soldiers. Many claim that without achieving a decisive military victory in Gaza, the sacrifices made so far would have been in vain. Additionally, critics decry the terms of the prisoner exchange, noting that for each Israeli hostage released, approximately 30 Palestinian prisoners will be freed – an exchange they view as uneven.
Some also suspect that Netanyahu may have struck a deal with the settler movement to secure additional concessions. In exchange for Smotrich’s support of the ceasefire, settlers are reportedly set to receive significant benefits, including the green light for future annexation of Area C and more lenient treatment of violent settlers by state authorities.
The suspicion gained traction when Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on the same day that five settlers would be released and that settlers would no longer be held under administrative detention. This practice, commonly applied to Palestinian detainees, allows imprisonment without trial for security reasons. Katz’s announcement implicitly signaled a policy shift, suggesting that state authorities may turn a blind eye to criminal acts by settlers in the West Bank. Additionally, Trump’s recent decision to lift sanctions on settlers further underscores his support for this stance.
Netanyahu does not need the support of both parties to secure his government’s approval. Following Gideon Sa’ar party (New Hope) switching sides, his coalition retains a slender two-seat majority (64) in the 120-seat Knesset, even after Ben Gvir’s departure. With Trump now in power, Netanyahu is expected to face reduced pressure from the US on judicial reforms and his own legal troubles, bolstering his ability to consolidate power and avoid conviction. The hostage deal has already served him politically: it provided him with some domestic legitimacy while earning him credit with Trump. This leverage enabled Netanyahu to pressure the IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi to resign, shifting the blame for the October 7 failures onto him ahead of a potential state commission of inquiry.
What stands out is that Israel has not achieved the three objectives it set for the war: the eradication of Hamas, the elimination of all threats from its enemies, and the release of all hostages. Brigadier General Amir Aviv, chairman of the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF), candidly acknowledged the IDF failure to “disconnect the Hamas organization from civil society.” Despite the staggering toll of 47,000 victims, most of whom were civilians (with only about 17,000 identified as Hamas fighters), Israel did not devise a plan to address the civilian needs of Gaza’s population and foster political change. As a result, Hamas remains in power, continuing to recruit young militants for around 150 NIS (41 euros) per month, even as its resources dwindle. The Philadelphi Corridor to Egypt has been sealed since May 2024, and most of the tunnels used for smuggling have been blocked.
While Hamas has lost significant influence clout in the Arab world and its key allies in the Axis of Resistance, Israeli analysts caution it may still be able to exploit the situation. Hamas is expected to control much of the humanitarian aid entering the Strip and benefit from the return of Palestinian civilians to the northern regions, using the population as cover.
Early signs of Hamas’ resilience were evident during the ceasefire, with militants openly patrolling Red Cross convoys attending to hostages and parading armed through Gaza’s ruins on the first day of the ceasefire. Although Hamas is unlikely to pose a military threat to Israel in the near future, it is still expected to maintain its grip on Gaza’s society, influence future governance of the Strip, and exacerbate internal Palestinian conflict.
The world must not delude itself: this ceasefire is far from a turning point, for two key reasons. First, Netanyahu has likely once again ensured Hamas’ survival to prevent the Palestinian Authority (PA) from reclaiming power in Gaza, thereby thwarting Palestinian reunification and the prospect of an independent state. Second, Hamas has failed to secure the release of Marwan Barghouti, the only Palestinian leader with the potential to reunite the two Palestinian factions around a single national project.
After 15 months of war, the situation has effectively reverted to square one. With no political alternative available, Gaza’s youth are likely to join Hamas in large numbers, training as militants as no political alternative is available to them. Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s government will remain in power, capitalizing on widespread Israeli fears of another massacre akin to October 7.
The seeds for the next Gaza-Israeli conflict are already sown. Both sides remain trapped in a cycle of violence and a lack of prospects, paving the way for further bloodshed.
Cover photo: A Palestinian woman runs to shelter from the rain amidst building rubble in Bureij in the central Gaza Strip on January 23, 2025, days into a ceasefire deal in the war between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (Photo by Eyad BABA / AFP)
Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn to see and interact with our latest contents.
If you like our stories, events, publications and dossiers, sign up for our newsletter (twice a month).