“Every day there’s something new. Donald Trump’s political agenda is totally unpredictable: today it’s the Gaza Strip, tomorrow it will be Ukraine!” Sebastien Boussois, scientific collaborator at CNAM Paris (Security and Defense Team), and Director of the European Geopolitical Institute (IGE), is one of the most authoritative voices in the French-speaking world on the subject of relations between the West and the Gulf States. He recently authored Donald Trump: Retour vers le futur (Mareuil Éditions, 2025) and Pays du Golfe: Les dessous d’une crise mondiale (Armand Colin, 2019). In the aftermath of Riyadh’s vehement opposition to the American proposal to empty Gaza and rebuild it, his first comment is unequivocal: “It’s all a show, a complete charade! I think that Saudi Arabia, through the voice of its Foreign Minister, is obliged to reject Trump’s proposal for annexation. But also that there is no lasting or solid agreement in the region as strong as the one between the United States and Saudi Arabia: let us remember, it dates back to 1945, after the end of the Second World War.”
As is the one with Israel. Unbreakable and enduring…
And in fact, it is inevitable that Washington will eventually bring its two major allies to some form of reconciliation. Some insist on saying that Riyadh has now frozen the idea of underwriting the Abraham Accords, but simply recalling a few statements by Mohammed Bin Salman (Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and current Prime Minister) to Anthony Blinken (Secretary of State in the Biden administration from 2021 to 2025) and even now with the new White House makes it clear that this is unrealistic. The truth is that the Saudis, and all other Arabs, have never cared about the Palestinians: to claim otherwise is merely historical hypocrisy. Of course, the Saudi kingdom is the guardian of the holy sites and has a magnificent peace plan dating back to 2002, tucked away in a drawer, but normalization has been in the works for far too long and at various levels.
The White House holds its line and reiterates the need for an agreement, in keeping with that of Abraham, by the end of 2025. Under these conditions, do you think the goal is achievable?
For Trump and Israel—let’s bear this in mind—shielding off Iran, putting it with its back to the wall to make it innocuous is an obsession. Having said this, yes.
In 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a de-escalation agreement mediated by the Chinese. What is left of it today?
There are superficial reconciliations and other more substantial ones. Let’s talk about the 2017 embargo against Qatar. It was 2017. Inspired directly by Donald Trump, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt attempted to politically and economically isolate Doha. Well, in 2022, there was a reconciliation (officially mediated by Kuwait and the United States), which was clearly only superficial, given that the two sides are still waging an all-out battle—albeit relocated outside their territories—to assert dominance.
Is the opening of a dialogue with the Saudis in Iran’s interests today? Is it really in such difficulty as the Western mainstream claim?
I am not a fan of ‘collapsology,’ pardon the term. Over the years, it has often been said that the Islamic Republic was on the verge of collapse. And yet, within ten days, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria fell, and no one saw it coming. However, it’s clear that the moment is complicated for Tehran: Hamas and Hezbollah are weakened, their proxies are crumbling. For Trump, targeted strikes on nuclear sites become a feasible option, especially because, for him and his administration, it’s possible to negotiate with anyone on anything—even with China I understand he would be willing to abandon Taiwan in exchange for a good economic deal with Beijing—but on the Iran dossier, there’s a firm No to any form of dialogue.
Going back to the Abraham Accords of August 13, 2020, which the Saudis are not a part of—although in some way they orchestrated and supported them—how have the signatories of the agreement positioned themselves during the war in Gaza?
Neither the United Arab Emirates nor Bahrain raised their voices against the Israeli bombings. Even the King of Morocco, who is the president of the Al-Quds Committee (an intergovernmental organization celebrating its 50th anniversary this year), did not protest particularly strongly, given the importance of the Jewish community in the country. So, in my view, the isolation of the Palestinians and even that of Iran is clear and definitive.
Who is still supporting the Palestinian arguments? What role could Turkey have, a country that we know has supported Hamas materially and politically for a long time?
First, we need to understand what Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants from Israel. Until 2010, relations were excellent. Then came the Mavi Marmara incident, also known as the Gaza flotilla raid. After that, there was another reconciliation. And again, with October 7, everything changed. Traditionally, Erdogan has supported the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated groups in the regional sphere. In this regard, while we are all pleased that the Damascus regime has fallen, I find it hard to forget who Ahmed al-Sharaa (the transitional president in post-Assad Syria, better known by his battle name al-Jolani, formerly the leader of the Salafist Front al-Nusra during the Syrian civil war) once was. And his main backer has always been Turkey. That said, regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, I do not believe Ankara can provide any meaningful diplomatic or any other form of contribution today. The Hamas card is now spent, and Mahmoud Abbas is very isolated in the Muqata.
From your words a rather pessimistic comprehensive vision of the region can be deduced. Is that correct?
I see no hope whatsoever. And I don’t believe there’s any room left for the creation of a Palestinian state. Israel doesn’t want it, and after October 7, less than ever: it would be like giving a gift to Hamas. How could it be possible to move the 450,000 settlers now living in the West Bank? Trump evokes the annexation of the West Bank, the relocation of all Gazans. Supporters of international law, human rights, and multilateralism are overwhelmed by a wave of despair.
…which, we can imagine, goes beyond that specific regional dossier.
Today, a question arises that goes beyond individual crises, yes: what should we do at this point with international law, multilateralism, and the United Nations? What would happen if we returned to the jungle of international relations? If there were only bilateral relationships and nothing more? This also concerns us Europeans: against the European project—a magnificent dream that, at this moment, in the way it has been conceived, shows its limits and, it’s quite true, needs to be rethought—populist movements are rising, seeking to “undo the fabric” of the values defended by Brussels.
Cover photo: A man walks past the flags of the countries attending the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit at Bayan palace in Kuwait City on December 5, 2017. (Photo by Giuseppe Cacace / AFP)
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