In the past decade, China has emerged as a strategic contender to the US-led international system, actively reshaping global economic and geopolitical dynamics. This repositioning has unfolded through China’s proactive involvement in the BRICS+, the launch of the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR, or Belt and Road Initiative), and, more recently, through a concerted push to mediate in crises worldwide, capitalizing on both political and economic opportunities. Reset DOC discussed these developments with Claudia Astarita, a professor of Chinese Studies at Science Po University in Paris and a member of the Italian Center for Studies on Contemporary China (CSCC).
The BRICS+ group, which convened in Kazan, Russia, in October, recently expanded to include Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia, now representing nearly half of the world’s population. What is China’s strategy within this enlarged group?
The BRICS has long represented an association of emerging and developing countries. China was a founding member alongside Brazil, Russia, and India, with South Africa joining later. This year, Egypt, Iran, the UAE, and Ethiopia also joined, highlighting its broadening influence.
Initially, these countries viewed the BRICS as a vehicle to amplify their voices collectively on the global stage, particularly to be heard by the Western world, rather than pursuing isolated attempts to reshape the system. With the evolving international landscape, the BRICS+ has become a more explicit platform for countries challenging the existing order.
While at their core they remain an organization representing emerging and developing countries, since last August China has revived this group into something more complex and difficult to untangle. From China’s perspective, the BRICS+ serve as a platform to demonstrate a commonality of interests among developing and emerging countries, aimed at securing better representation on the international level.
In China’s long-term view, linking the BRICS+ with the Belt and Road Initiative is crucial.
You mentioned that China has revitalized the BRICS+. In what ways?
For China, the BRICS+ serves as a proving ground for a possible alternative international organization – whether as an economic development forum or simply a coalition representing what China terms the “Global South.” China recognized BRICS’ untapped potential and persuaded member states to explore its future possibilities. It’s too early to predict what the BRICS+ may evolve into or its ultimate impact on the international system.
Why is it essential for China to connect the BRICS+ with the Belt and Road Initiative?
Though the BRICS+ and the BRI are not formally connected, they are essentially two ways China is working toward the same goal: exploring multiple avenues to unite emerging countries and amplify their voices in pursuit of development.
The BRICS+ has proposed moving away from the US dollar in international transactions. Do you foresee China promoting the renminbi (the Chinese currency) as a preferred currency through the BRICS+ and the BRI?
The shift is already underway. For instance, China now pays Iran for oil in renminbi. Additionally, in 2023, China initiated an industrialization program across BRI member states, which aimed at positioning the renminbi as a viable alternative to the dollar, enhancing China’s credibility and financial stability. New BRI contracts increasingly require that a portion of bilateral trade derived from this industrialization be conducted in renminbi, strengthening China’s currency in the global market.
I expect that China will gradually raise the stakes, and we’ll have to wait to see how the BRI countries and the US respond. Another recent shift is that countries seeking to establish or strengthen bilateral ties with China no longer have the option to do so without joining the Belt and Road Initiative.
You’ve closely studied the Belt and Road Initiative. Can you summarize its trajectory up to 2023?
The BRI is a central foreign policy initiative of President Xi Jinping, introduced in 2013. Its primary focus was to create a network of infrastructures in countries lacking these facilities, particularly in Central Asia and the Middle East, along the historical “Silk Road.” This also included a maritime road, creating new sea routes for China in the Indian Ocean and reaching the Mediterranean through the Pacific. This offered China the opportunity to build new ports under its control at strategic locations along these routes.
Between 2015 and 2016, BRI expanded to Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific Islands – none of which were associated with the original OBOR sea lanes and trade routes. This expansion quickly raised concerns in the West over China’s growing ambitions, concerns that intensified when China consolidated control over artificial islands it constructed in the South China Sea. Hence, the BRI became associated with China’s increasingly assertive behavior in building and reclaiming new territory.
Furthermore, debt sustainability issues in some BRI partner countries, such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka, have fueled a narrative accusing China of “debt-trap diplomacy” and “neo-colonialism.”
What do you think of these accusations?
I think there are different ways to interpret this, and the prevailing view in the West is not necessarily shared by China. China doesn’t necessarily see the project in the same light; rather, it views it as a means of advancing what it considers its national interests.
Also, China has always operated with a long-term perspective. According to this outlook, the main confrontation China anticipates in foreign policy is with the United States. It’s reasonable to assume, then, that China aims to shape a global environment in which it feels secure, even in the face of potential open confrontation with the US.
Viewed from this perspective, it makes sense for China to connect with a range of countries whose relations with the US are less favorable, positioning itself as an alternative. Initially, China wasn’t widely regarded as a serious alternative – it wasn’t seen as powerful enough. But now, we see more and more countries willing to at least listen to China’s side of the story.
Let’s consider China’s actions regarding the three main geopolitical points of tension: the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the situation with Taiwan. It’s worth noting that even when China is not fully “neutral”, it strives to maintain relatively good relations with both sides in a conflict. For instance, it upholds diplomatic ties with Ukraine and maintains relatively stable (if cooling) trade relations with Israel, while remaining a primary partner to Russia and Iran and openly supporting the Palestinian cause.
What we need to understand is that China’s priority is China itself. It prioritizes its own interests above those of other countries. Its realignment with Russia is an inevitable result of its highly competitive relationship with the U.S., making it impossible for China to align with the West.
However, China is not simply playing along with Russia’s agenda; instead, it leverages the conflict by securing concessions from Russia. Russia is so dependent on China that the Chinese government can afford to sustain its trade relationship with Ukraine. Ultimately, China’s main concern is to maintain productive trade relations with any partner.
We observe a similar approach in the Middle East, though I believe China is far more concerned with developments there than with those in Ukraine.
So, unlike the war in Ukraine, is the Middle East crisis perceived as a threat to China’s interests?
“I think that, from China’s perspective, the Middle East situation can easily spiral out of control. While the war in Ukraine is horrific and unacceptable, it is at least contained. In contrast, the escalation that we are witnessing in the Middle East goes far beyond the control of any country, both within and outside the region. This level of unpredictability is genuinely seen as a threat by China.
This is a situation China cannot control; they are attempting to adapt and activate their diplomacy, but the circumstances are largely beyond their influence. Whatever happens, China will strive to clarify its position and promote its economic interests, which remain its top priority.
How do you think the opening of a Polar Silk Road will impact Russia’s dependence on China?
As I mentioned before, China and Russia are not bound by loyalty; their relationship is shaped by current geopolitical circumstances. This situation allows China to demand various concessions from Russia, including greater access to the Arctic. Historically, Russia, like other Arctic nations, has been reluctant to let China play a significant role in the region. However, its current dependence on China has altered this dynamic.
There’s also a possibility that China might assert claims over territories in Russia that it views as part of historical Manchuria, aiming to expand its access to the Pacific. China is an extremely ambitious and pragmatic country – wherever opportunities arise, it will try to leverage them. This conflict may have created conditions favorable for China to gain such access, though we’ll have to see how things develop.
What is China’s interest in positioning itself as a mediator in the Middle East and Ukraine?
Despite certain advantages that China gains from the conflict in Ukraine, it is genuinely interested in becoming a mediator because it has a vested interest in seeing both conflicts come to an end. It is a simple reality that economic development cannot be promoted effectively while conflicts persist.
That said, China’s efforts to mediate have not succeeded thus far, and it remains uncertain whether they will ultimately prove effective.
Do you think China might escalate the situation in Taiwan, despite the potential disruption to its own economy from a break in the semiconductor supply chain?
I believe the intention is there, but I don’t think a military scenario is likely at this point, as it would work against China’s interests. China has been clear that it does not consider Taiwan an independent country and aims for reunification as soon as possible. They are transparent about these intentions.
However, China’s preferred approach would be to embed Taiwan, little by little, in additional ties. The only way I foresee a military conflict arising is through an uncontrollable escalation of mutual provocations.
It’s a delicate balance: China will never back down, nor will the U.S. or Japan, whom Taiwan views as protectors, since retreating would undermine their credibility. For now, maintaining the status quo remains the best option.
Cover photo: Officials, including South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and China’s President Xi Jinping, attend a plenary session in the outreach/BRICS Plus format at the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 24, 2024. (Photo by Maxim Shemetov / POOL / AFP)
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