What has happened to Europe and to Europeanism after an umpteenth negative referendum? Until the Irish vote on June 12th, Sarkozy had a very ambitious programme for the semester during which France holds the Presidency. Great plans, addressing issues that range from immigration to energy, security and defence, the environment and the economy, all to the tune of a “Protective Europe”. Once again, a year after his ascent to the Elysée, the liberal and protectionist Sarkozy is preaching competition in his own country and attacking on all fronts organisations said to threaten the French State’s protective role, from the ECB to the WTO and the Commission (in the person of the current Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, considered responsible for the Irish ‘no’). Today however, he finds himself busy managing above all the umpteenth stalemate since the one in 2005. It is too soon to know whether the strategy outlined during these first weeks is the right one. The (informal) slogan chosen by Sarkozy certainly appear to be in sync with European public opinion.

The most recent Eurobarometre data, published at the end of June, suggests at least three issues. The first concerns a trend that had been ongoing for at least 4-5 years, the progressive abandonment of Italian traditional Europeanism. Traditionally more a façade than real, Italian Europeanist sentiment became politicized with anti-Euro tones with Prodi’s Presidency of the Commission and under the blows of The Northern League’s Euro-scepticism, and with special support (by the current Minister of the Economy, Mr. Giulio Tremonti, editor’s note). Today levels have fallen below the average of the 27 in consensus for the EU. And almost twenty points separate the centre-left “pro-Europe” voters from the centre-right “euro-tepid” ones. A record in the history of Eurobarometer surveys. There are however two other elements that should be addressed in-depth within the international context, well aware that abroad – and not only among the few remaining left-wing governments – Berlusconi’s Italy continues to be observed with suspicion. Firstly the economic crisis that has resulted in pessimism; and hence even more than in the past the EU has become the obvious scapegoat. Sarkozy’s rhetoric certainly encourages this transference. Are his attacks on the ECB perhaps not addressed at blaming Europe for not having provided protection from the imbalances resulting from globalisation? The last element, the overall backdrop for these trends, could seem inexplicable: it consists in the overall continuity in support provided to EU institutions – both in comparison to the last 10 years as in more recent times. But are we not once again experiencing a crisis, as in July 2005? Why did the Irish vote ‘no’ and yet remain leaders as far as Europeanism is concerned?

Between France and Ireland

France is now more than ever at the centre of Europe. Sarkozy’s moves appear incomprehensible if one does not take a crucial point into account. Ever since Monnet, France is the country that has given the most as far as the process involving European integration is concerned, but also the country that has always endured the progressive concessions of national sovereignty. The fact that over the past two decades there has not been a powerful project involving political liberalism to match the free-trade project has exasperated this trend. Within Europe, the French are those most opposed to the markets and to globalisation. Hence Sarkozy’s slogan, which does, however, risk widening the “moat” represented by the Channel. This matters little for as long as Gordon Brown is Prime Minister, since he has far too many problems at home to address quarrels in Europe, but things may well change when, perhaps quite soon, the Conservatives return to power. The balance between the more important countries is of the greatest importance when managing EU affairs, as seen when Sarkozy’s backtracked on Mediterranean Union matters after in recent months the Germans vetoed his “Franco-centric” project.

Ireland has enjoyed enormous advantages during its 35 years of membership in the EU. The country has changed from being an exported of butter, beef and Guinness to the place where some of modernity’s symbols are produced – ranging from Viagra to Botox, and including microchips. The Irish ‘No’ was the result of a complex mix of different kinds of generally unfounded fears that became increasingly founded with the perception that a negative vote would have no effect on the country’s economic and social wellbeing or on its position in Europe. On the contrary, as far as the final result is concerned, the presence of a “pro-Europe” ‘no’, supporting the status quo, has probably played a decisive role faced with the country’s possible loss of power within the new institutional context and with further enlargements. In an atmosphere with little information, with leaders incapable of stating what is really at stake, the No became that bastion of the Irish identity taking a stand against blind challenges (losing the Commission, a pitch invasion on ethical issues and military neutrality) and further cessions of sovereignty. Eurobarometer data confirms that the Irish, and with them most Europeans, are happy to belong to the Union as is stands today. There is no doubt that this sort of referendum would have provided the same results in many other countries. This is the crux of the matter: the referendum and the solution for this new crisis.

Exit voice or loyalty?

Let us compare the two interpretations. On one hand, according to Larry Siedentop, the use of a referendum emphasises the European parliament’s lack of authority and its impact on public opinion. Reactions to the Irish ‘no’ do not take into account that market benefits do not create political loyalty. Liberal Democrat systems do so by providing equal rights, aspirations to self government that compensate the markets’ unfairness. This balance, however, is extremely complex within the EU, and in particular in the United Kingdom, where the fundamental principle of parliamentary sovereignty – in the absence of a written constitution – is in conflict with the creation of a European identity. The results of referendums cannot be ignored, as, if anything, they emphasise the EU’s greatest current deficit: a lack of idealism. It has not been possible to replace in a worthy manner, and with a new message of ideals, that of its founders, based on French-German reconciliation (Financial Times, July 1st 2008). On the opposite front, although sharing many of the doubts on the use of a referendum, Andrew Moravcsik believes that there is no democratic deficit; that the EU can continue to work perfectly well without any new treaties, that the entire process started in 2001 is based on an illusion, that of providing substance for an unnecessary process since the EU will never be a super-state. And that quite simply, the grand project represented by the single market in the Eighties and the single currency in the Nineties, today no longer exists and nor should it. Within this framework, the European project’s success should arise precisely from the failure of the constitutional process. And idealism does not become the solution but rather the cause of the problems (Prospect, July 2008).

Sarkozy travelled to Ireland with the idea of ensuring the Irish would vote again faced with an ultimatum: accept Lisbon or keep Nice, which would result in the country losing the Commissioner already in 2009, instead of in 2014. Jürgen Habermas proposes a European referendum to be held alongside the 2009 elections. Antonio Padoa Schioppa suggests a solution based on Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice and loyalty. “A) withdraw from the Union (exit), b) restrict European integration to the management of the single market (hence basically withdraw from more recent steps forward in the form of voice), c) over time achieve a political union of European states and citizens both locally and globally, effectively protecting their security, environmental, energy and immigration issues, as well as guaranteeing respect for national traditions and diversities (loyalty)”. Whatever the option chosen between now and October, there is the need for a leader capable of saving us from the sand bars of conservationist Europeanism, which is stopping the European Union from progressing. With the price of oil hitting the roof, inflation at record levels and the international institutions’ fundamental inability to identify shared solutions for the most burning issues (see the failure of the G8 at the beginning of July), the time has come to establish whether we still wish to move forward and above all in which direction.

Gianfranco Baldini is an associate professor of Political Sciences at Salerno University. He is director of research at the Cattaneo Institute and an analyst at the Centro Studi Progetto Europeo, both in Bologna. His recent publications include his editorship (together with M. Lazar) of La Francia di Sarkozy, Il Mulino, 2007.

Translation by Francesca Simmons