With his third consecutive election victory Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has become an important politician in the Turkish historical narrative. The almost 50% of votes that Turkey’s electorate gave Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the June 12th elections proved once again that the democratic Islam that Erdoğan and his men represent is profoundly linked to the feelings and moods of a nation with 8% economic growth. The AKP is assuming an increasingly important and prestigious role on the international stage and is certain that its future will be better than its past.
But the overwhelming victory Erdoğan hoped to achieve—in order to have the power to change the constitution unilaterally, as well as to become a “Republican sultan” in Turkey’s political narrative—did not happen. The AKP won 326 seats in parliament, too few to either change the basic law or hold a national referendum (330 seats) or to change laws without having to consult voters directly (367 seats). Turkey therefore sidestepped the risk that Erdoğan’s electoral power would result in the abolition of pluralism. The results of the election evidenced the health of Turkish democracy, without military threats from either side influencing the results, as has often happened in Turkey’s history. The largest opposition party, the People’s Republican Party (CHP), gained about five percentage points at a little under 26%. The nationalist party (MHP), in spite of the sex scandals involving a number of its leaders during the election campaign, obtained 13% of the votes (slightly down compared to 2007). The pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) did extremely well, presenting its candidates as independents to beats the very high 10% threshold barrier, managing to win almost 6% of the votes.
To change the constitution written after the 1980 coup d’état, Erdoğan will now be obliged to establish a dialogue with the opposition. The subject of constitutional change has now entered the Turkish political agenda, and even the Republican and Kurdish parties have plans for reform. Conciliation and compromise have not, however, been strong points for Erdoğan; the prime minister is more at ease as charismatic , “strong-man” decision-maker. However, immediately after the elections, in his speech on the new charter, he seemed open and available, saying, “We will look for the consensus of the most important opposition party, as well as other parties who were not elected to parliament, from the media, NGOs, academics and all those with something to say.”
This is not, of course, the first time Erdoğan has expressed the wish to establish a dialogue with Turkey’s various personalities. If anything the novelty is that the leader of the Republican opposition is now Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu. The press calls him the “Turkish Ghandi” because of his peaceful temperament, and he has certainly changed the direction of a rigid and ideological party, entrenched in the positions of the secular establishment and the army. Kiliçdaroğlu has brought a breath of fresh air to the party, with reasonable ideas on the Kurdish issue and an openness to the possibility of constitutional change, no longer spreading the meaningless fear that, led by the AKP, Turkey will sooner or later become like Iran. If the changes made really manage to take hold (the former leader Deniz Baykal is already attempting to obstruct Kiliçdaroğlu), then there will be a serious chance for debate with the Islamic democratic party majority, if Erdoğan is capable of following his words up with facts.
Erdoğan’s re-election also portends changes in a number of Turkish foreign policy issues. After a year of great tension between historical allies Turkey and Israel, the two countries have started secret negotiations to normalize relations. Even if these efforts to establish a dialogue are strongly backed by the United States, Turkey also finds itself facing a difficult and unexpected situation at the moment at the Syrian border, where thousands of people are fleeing the repression inflicted by Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. Furthermore, the stabilization of the Middle East that only a year ago Ankara imagined it could achieve with a “zero problems with our neighbours” policy seems impossible to achieve in the near future. The significant unpredictability that exists in the region following the Arab uprisings forces Turkey to once again look to the historical refuges in its foreign policy, without neglecting the new horizons that have appeared in the meantime.
Among the old paths that may be followed again, one cannot exclude the objective of joining the European Union, forever the AKP’s strong point, and greatly neglected during the last government. Erdoğan three, in addition to leaving a mark on Turkey’s constitutional history, could also rebalance its international objectives, returning to the centre of its attention its relations with the West and with Israel, without, however, renouncing potential paths that have opened this year in the Middle East.
Translated by Francesca Simmons