The electoral rounds which have taken place in part of Egypt on November 28th and December 5th 2011 are only the first stage in a process that will be complete with the election of the People’s Assembly (legislative assembly) in January 2012 and the election of the Shura (consultative assembly) in which will be completed by March 11, 2012. This first stage reflects the voting in 18 of the 27 Governorates in Egypt (including Cairo and Alexandria) but its results represent – after decades of totally unreliable and sometimes heavily manipulated electoral consultations – a first real sampling of political opinion in Egypt.
These results can be summarized as follows:
– A resounding success of the major Islamist parties, which appear to go beyond the victory that was expected. The Freedom and Justice Party, created by the Muslim Brotherhood, appears to have won a plurality of votes around 40%, and – still more surprising – the Nour Party, supported by the Salafi movement, seems to have won around 20% of the votes.
– The liberal Egyptian Bloc (comprising the Free Egyptians Party (FEP) and Egyptian Social Democratic Party (EDSP), both created after the revolution, and the Tagammu party, the biggest traditional leftist party in Egypt, obtained around 15 % of the votes.
– The candidates tied to the Mubarak regime have so far made a very poor showing.
– The electoral process was carried out without major accidents and appears to have been substantially fair, a welcome novelty after decades of substantially rigged elections.
– Popular participation in the vote – which had been extremely low under the Mubarak regime – has this time been very high (62%), indicating a strong desire of Egyptian citizens to participate in the political process, but also the belief that, for the first time in their life, their vote will count.
The second electoral round – which took place on December 14 and 15 – seems to have largely confirmed the outcome of the first.
With the obvious caveat that a full analysis will be possible only at the end of the process, these partial results are clear enough to allow some first comments.
The success of the Freedom and Justice Party, though expected, was in the higher range of any forecast available. It reflects the long history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, its organisational strength and the trust it has won with the Egyptian electorate despite the compromises it had to make, first with the Mubarak Regime, then with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The success of the Brotherhood was also facilitated by the electoral law, and by the relatively short time the parties had to organise for lections, which obviously was a huge advantage for political organisations already rooted in the country.
The success of the Nour party represents the real surprise, and is more difficult to explain, as the Salafi movement seems to have developed only recently in Egypt and seemed to lack the organisational advantages of the Brotherhood. It certainly benefited largely from the support (not only financial) from some important Gulf countries, but this fact seems to give only a partial explication of its success. It has run a very populist electoral campaign, accusing all the other parties (including the Freedom and Justice Party) of “elitism” and “intellectualism”, while the Salafi presented themselves as part of the people, living with the poor, and therefore understanding their problems. And the poor, as it is known, represent a very large share of the Egyptian electorate.
To the results of the two main Islamist parties one must add the 5% obtained by el Wasat, a more moderate offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The success of the Islamist parties is contrasted by the poor showing of the liberal and democratic political parties and alliances which initiated the Egyptian revolution, repeatedly filled Tahrir square demanding democracy and protection of civil rights, and stood firm in the face of the provocations from the remnants of the previous regime and the increasingly brutal repression from the police and the military authorities. Notwithstanding their essential role in initiating the fall of Mubarak and the political transition, their results confirm that they still represent a minority of the Egyptian society. Moreover they were certainly hampered by the multiplicity of parties and movements which represented them, their lack of leaders, organisation and resources, and also by the call to boycott the vote which originated in the more recent demonstration in Tahrir square on the eve of the elections. As the next electoral rounds will take place mainly in small towns and in the countryside in the Delta and Upper Egypt – more religiously conservative than Cairo and Alexandria – it is unlikely that the liberal political forces will be able to improve their position.
The political heirs of the Mubarak regime took part to the elections with eight political parties and several candidates for single-winner constituencies. Though Mubarak’s NDP had won 86% of the seats in the 2010 elections (which had a very low voter turnout), this time they placed themselves at the very bottom of electoral results and failed to elect any candidate in the single-winner constituencies. Their lists appear to have been swamped by the very high turnout of voters that, for the first time, sensed the opportunity to make their voice heard.
As far as the SCAF is concerned, the mere fact that the electoral process has started on schedule, with a high voter turnout and reasonable credibility, is a success.
Meanwhile the prospects look increasingly dire for the protesters of Tahrir square, who are still insisting on an immediate transfer of power from the military establishment to a civilian government. Once that the elections are successfully taking place, their criticism of the electoral process has largely isolated them and diminished their credibility. They now face the preposterous accusation, by Prime Minister Ganzouri, of being “counter revolutionary”, that is to oppose the transition to democracy (as engineered by the SCAF, naturally!). The very harsh repression they had to suffer on December 16th and 17th at the hands of the military (not only of the police!) seems to underscore this point. The leadership of the Muslim Brothers has condemned the repression perpetrated by the Egyptian military, but one may doubt about the restraining effect it might have achieved.
One may therefore conclude that, after the first round of voting there are two winners; the Islamists and the SCAF, and two losers: the liberal/secular movement, and the would be heirs of the Mubarak regime.
This being the situation, it is still far too early to try to understand where the country is headed. First of all as long as the electoral process is not completed – that is until March 11, 2011 – the political utterances of Egyptian political leaders reflect mainly the ongoing electoral campaign. This explains, for the time being, the reassurances coming from the Muslim Brothers about their intention to protect civil rights, the rights of the Christians and the status of women. The Brotherhood has also spoken about their preference for an alliance with moderate secular political forces, rather than with the Salafis, who could probably ensure an absolute majority of Islamist forces in the two chambers of Government. It remains to be seen if these encouraging moderate positions will be confirmed once all the votes have been counted. V. I. Lenin used to say “Never have enemies to your left”. The Muslim Brotherhood may soon be tempted to apply the same rule, but on their political right.
It also remains clear that the election of the two chambers of Parliament does not still give them the right to nominate a new Government. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has again stated that – until there is a new Constitution and a new President has been elected – the SCAF itself is the acting Head of State and, therefore, chooses the Government of Egypt. As a matter of fact it has just nominated the third Government since January, led by Kamal Ganzouri, who headed one of Mubarak’s governments a few years ago.
But the political relevance of the two new Chambers will be felt in another field, that is in the selection of the members of the Constituent Assembly that will discuss and approve the new Constitution. The rules for the election of this Assembly are still not entirely clear, but it is known that the SCAF plans to have a substantial influence in the selection of members and that, in the present timetable set for the transition, it has allowed for the surprising short time of only a month to discuss, write and approve the Constitution itself. If this is true, it certainly does not bode well for the transition process.
Given the very strong presence of the Islamists parties in the Egyptian Parliament the main issue in the constitutional discussion will certainly be that of the nature of the Egyptian state, religious or secular, of the role given to the Islamic Law, and of the protection of minorities, especially religious. Another central issue will be that of provisions – wanted by the SCAF – that not only protect the privileges that the military already enjoy in the Egyptian society, but give them the right to intervene if the political process develops outside predetermined parameters. That means that the military establishment could end up as counterforce to political Islam in the country.
Only when these fundamental issues are settled we will know if Egypt will be a parliamentary or presidential State (probably the latter) and it will be possible to proceed to the election of a President and the selection of a Government representing the new political spectrum.
This will happen in a future which is still to clouded by many uncertainties to allow even general predictions. Some of the main factors to be followed are the economic situation of the country, which is increasingly worrying, and the opportunities for foreign intervention in internal matters, as the outcome of the Egyptian drama is particular relevant to many important players: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, not to mention Israel and the United States.