The new man in Egyptian politics continues to make people talk. Director General of the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 1997 to 2009, and Nobel Peace Prize winner in 2005 for his commitment to nuclear disarmament, Mohammed El Baradei is a leading figure in international diplomacy. Present on the Egyptian political stage since the beginning of the year, when to everyone’s surprise he returned to Cairo after retiring, El Baradei has not stopped establishing new alliances functional to his project to reform “a 7,000-year-old system” as he has often stated in public.
All this is taking place close to two strategic elections, the September election for the renewal of the People’s Assembly (the Egyptian parliament’s lower house with 444 elected members and ten appointed by the president), and the presidential elections in January. The National Assembly for Change (NAC), the transversal movement that assembles the various opposition factions and Egyptian political activism, founded by El Baradei in February, is also playing an important role thanks to the credibility of its political stature. His success has been such that the Muslim Brotherhood sided with moderate Muslim El Baradei without further delay in his head-on clash with 82-year-old President Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party.
The Muslim Brotherhood members, forbidden to found an official political party but present in the Assembly with 88 members of parliament elected as independents, hope to improve the result obtained in 2005, when joint pressure applied by the United States and the European Union facilitated the holding of free and fair elections. Now, due to the El Baradei effect, Islamist opposition trusts in a new democratic breakthrough in September, especially after its resounding defeat in the elections for the Shura (parliament’s upper house which has 264 representatives of which 176 are elected) held on June 1st. The Brotherhood did not win any seats – four ‘senators’ were elected from the secular opposition which therefore doubled its representation in the Shura – and reported ballot-rigging and irregularities, and is now hoping for ‘compensation’ in the autumn.
More discreet but nonetheless visible is the rapprochement between the moderate El Baradei and the Coptic Church, which invited the former diplomat to Easter Mass, celebrated by Patriarch Shenouda III. Egyptian Christians, who represent between 10 and 15% of the population, with the prudence that is compulsory for a minority whose rights are hanging by a thread, are waiting to see the Assembly’s political agenda, all the more carefully after the rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood. But, above all, will El Baradei be able to challenge President Mubarak in 2011? At the moment, since he is not a member of any political party, as is required by the constitution, his candidature is a remote possibility. Only an amendment to the constitution would allow him to oppose the current president who is serving his fifth term. Additionally, the NAC is not an officially recognised political party and should it obtain official status before the end of 2010, it will not have existed for the five years required to present a presidential candidate.
This is why the new symbol of Egyptian reform is collecting signatures – the objective is one million – to change the constitution and pave the way for his candidature. Should this not occur, his commitment will not immediately change the political landscape, nor will it influence the uncertain presidential elections. Hosni Mubarak, in spite of his precarious health, could decide to run for a sixth consecutive term, should the succession of his son Gamal, who has led the NDP for the past five years, be judged premature by the army, the party or even his family. The country’s leadership may support a more experienced candidate such as Omar Suleiman, who has led the Egyptian secret service and according to many sources, has been Mubarak’s real right-hand man for years.
The surprise element may be a minister or a representative of the army also respected by foreign allies. There are many unknown elements, although the president’s recent gall bladder surgery in Germany, has emphasised the need for a definitive strategy for the handing over of power, after an ‘absolute monarchy’ that has lasted for almost thirty years. The succession, and with it Egypt’s stability, is of great concern to Europeans, Americans and neighbouring countries. Another concern is the democratisation not yet implemented by the current regime, due to the not entirely unfounded alibi provided by the Islamist terrorism risk. Over the medium and long-term a transversal reformist movement such as the one proposed by El Baradei, which aims to abolish the emergency laws (martial law has been in force since 1981 when Anwar Sadat was murdered by Islamists), could become the interlocutor for a post-Mubarak majority party.
The new star of Egyptian reformism does not meet the approval of those who have made a profession out of antagonising Mubarak. Intense criticism comes from Nasserites and liberals, who blame him for everything and the opposite of everything, such as his frequent trips abroad – hence he is allegedly to close to the West and not sufficiently focused on Egyptian political life – his alleged distance from the real problems of the people and the lack of a clear programme. He is also accused of populism, of looking down on the political class and of being conceited. It is what happened to Ayman Nour, ‘lambasted’ with the same intensity by majority and opposition alike.
Translated by Francesca Simmons