Samir Al Qaryouti, in the declaration reached at the Annapolis summit does not mention the “core” questions, such as the status of Jerusalem or the Palestinian question. It only states that peace will come by the end of 2008. What are your views on all of this?

In our history there has never been a case, following a difficult, age-old conflict, where it was possible to bring a long peace process to a conclusion, in just a few months. If we are talking of achieving peace by the end of 2008, someone has obviously decided that everything which has been the object of negotiations for around fifteen years, since 1993, has been completely senseless. When we talk of “a joined declaration” or “declaration of intent”, as some in fact define it, we are not dealing with the crux of the problem. Or rather, those five points, defined in every language, which are essential to a definitive solution to the conflict: the important question of the status of Jerusalem; the rights of the Palestinian refugees to return to Palestine, as sanctioned by the United Nations resolution 194; the issue of the Israeli settlements and of the so-called “Jewish colonies” in the West Bank territories; the core issue of the approximately 11,500 Palestinian prisoners, and finally, the water supplies, a key point not only in Palestine but all over the Middle East. In fact, it should be recalled that the hundreds of settlements currently in the West Bank take their water supplies from all the surrounding villages and large Palestinian cities. All you need to do is travel around a little to notice: for a settlement of around a hundred people, wells and water systems are built which deprive the majority of the inhabitants and farmers of essential resources for every day life.

Coming back to the Annapolis summit, some analysts have defined the main characters – Bush, Olmert, and Abbas in primis – as “the weak ones”. They say that Bush is weak because of the outcome of the war in Iraq, and Abbas for the fact that the Palestinian authority is divided in two, Gaza on one side and Ramallah on the other. Is it possible the sign an peace agreement between the main characters and the weak “partners”?

This weakness shows that the Annapolis summit, for all three aforementioned leaders, was nothing but a public relations showcase, an empty ceremony. We all saw the smiles painted on Bush’s face while talking to Olmert, the same showing off at the White House when discussing with Abbas. These images truly made me sad, because Abbas was listening to political advice, while Olmert was talking to Bush especially in private meetings. In the more general ceremony, the encouragement was, of course: “Abbas, keep going”. Why was Abbas so weak? First of all, this is not only due to the division of the Palestinian people, but also to the lack of a popular base which can support this leader in such a complex process. Secondly, Abbas is the author, to put it one way, of the Oslo Accords, whose results are under the scrutiny of the Palestinians and the whole world. If in fifteen years we have not been able to consolidate the Oslo Accords as Abbas had wanted, how can we expect that by March, the official deadline, all the problems will be resolved? The suspicion arises then, that this conferences was organized to hide George Bush’s failings in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in the fight against terrorism.

Not only does the American President find himself in a difficult situation, but his politics have also completely failed. As far as Olmert is concerned, his failings are not connected to scandals corruption but to the war in the Lebanon, because he not was not able to carry out his duty, and the results – an absolute novelty for that area of the Middle East – are under universal scrutiny. With almost all the Arab countries as witnesses (bar one or two), as well as international organizations and the European Union, it is unlikely that something concrete will come of the union of these three weak spots. This is shown by the declarations of the various Foreign affairs ministers who participated in the summit: no one is waiting; everyone is talking about the difficulties. So, if there are so many hidden dangers, why was there all this rush to promote the Conference, if it was not for media and propaganda reasons, and perhaps to support Bush? In fact, the latter is certainly in no condition to be able to leave the White House as a “man of peace” – as someone would like -, destined to leave his mark in history. He does not have his papers in order to do so: we would have to cancel the war in Iraq or Afghanistan, and all the tension, due to what has happened during his two mandates, which is spreading insidiously all over the world.

So, we could say that the main aim of the Annapolis summit was to isolate Iran? Is this the real aim, as the participation of numerous Arab countries (“Sunni Countries, it is said) would seem to suggest?

If the aim is to isolate Iran, perhaps we can even be satisfied. The dread, fear and fright, however, is that this was not the aim, but rather the constitution of an anti-Iranian front, to wage a war against Iran in the space of a few months, or even weeks. You only need to read the declarations of some Israeli intellectuals, such as Benny Morris in an interview to the “Stampa” newspaper a few days ago. Morris’ words, especially, send shivers down your spine: the Palestinian question – the great Israeli historian declares – has nothing to do with Annapolis, nor do the Arabs; the main and only worry is to hit Iran. Israel is intent in moving in this direction, but it cannot do so using its traditional weapons because they are insufficient, so it is forced to resort to nuclear. This would be a complete disaster. In the same interview, done on the occasion of the launch of his book in Italy, Morris said: ‘We did the Palestinians a favour when we hunted them in ’48, otherwise there would have been a second Holocaust’. These are very serious words, and the fear is that they will lead to war with Iran; a country which is not like Iraq or its other Arab neighbours, but rather represents a State which is historically more united and faithful to its own Persian identity. And I do not believe that a war or resorting to force against Iran can solve this problem, as some think. If Israel thinks it can solve this challenge in this way, or to push the United States to do it, I invite everyone to remember the example of Iraq, of Afghanistan and especially of Lebanon, under Israel’s responsibility. Meanwhile, I ask myself: where are we going?

The Annapolis summit stressed further the divisions between Palestinians, therefore between Fatah and Hamas. Is it possible to reunite this front, and if so, how?

The inter-Palestinian conflict is a reality, unfortunately. Al Fatah has made some tragic mistakes, not only last June but also before the elections two years ago. Al Fatah’s mistakes are incalculable: political, strategic, of all kinds. The support thus given to a Palestinian national authority which is profoundly corrupt made the Palestinian people and militants of the majority-party Al Fatah, pay a very high price for many years. Hamas’ victory was not completely a result of the consensus of its militants: many supporters of Al Fatah voted for Hamas. In particular, all those who were disillusioned and angry because of the rampant corruption, and exhausted by the Oslo talks, which brought about absolutely nothing. Therefore, the blame for everything that happened is put on Al Fatah, on the Palestinian National Authority and on some of its members, such as the Security Commander – I do not want to name names, but everyone knows who he is -, which led to the clashes after the Mecca Accords. There is no doubt that Hamas is somewhat to blame. Especially for the more recent acts of violence, such as on November 12th, which some militants opened fire on unarmed civilians during the celebrations of Arafat’s death. Hamas has been in trouble since its electoral victory. He formed a government, but it should be said that he was not allowed to govern, not even for one hour: everyone was against him.

And the Palestinian National Authority has stressed all of this, punctually entering into his political initiatives, even before the installation of the nationally united government. Now, the value of the national unity is sacred for Palestinians. By Palestinian, I can say that in the last century, or further back still, there has never been any conflict among Palestinians. Apart from one time, after the events of 1982 in Tripoli and in Lebanon, in the attempt – as was later verified – to get rid of the PLO and Al Fatah in a cruel way, with weapons, at the hands of some separatists who had re-entered the Palestinian movement. Naturally, in recent years the Palestinians have always maintained a sense of responsibility towards national unity, and I am sure that this people will put pressure on both the PNA and on Hamas to return. In the next elections, the two political formations – I am more than sure – will be excluded without too much hassle if they do not change direction, because there is by now a sense of frustration which is spreading insidiously, as never before, amongst the Palestinian people. If the declaration of Annapolis is not enforced – and I am sure there will not be any results -; if this were to happen, in the near future, the failings of Abu Mazen, no one would save the region from a Third Intifada. This time, it will not strike out against Israel, but against the Palestinian National Authority and the majority of the Arab regimes and governments who have accepted or tolerated arriving at this point.

Olmert has invited the Arab countries not to boycott the peace process and said: Israel is prepared to make painful concessions. In your opinion, what is he referring to?

I do not trust Olmert; I say it loud and clear. The Arab peace process is well-known, clear, and transparent: it anticipates the return to the boundaries of June 14th 1967, full stop. There is nothing more to discuss. This is the initiative to undertake, as all the international resolutions confirm. Now, when Olmert says that there will be painful decisions, he is only concealing a conundrum: it is hard to know how to interpret his words. He is the most important paladin of unified Jerusalem, and therefore he is not prepared to negotiate on the issue of the division. He wants to exchange the territory of ’48 with some of the larger settlements. He has left 200 thousand Arab-Palestinian citizens of Jerusalem outside their city, building a wall of “racial separation”, as we call it, And the most recent discovery: before this summit, e wanted Abu Mazen’s recognition of the Jewish nature of the State of Israel; in such a way, laying posing an end to the Palestinian problem plain and simple; as a consequence, destroying the Palestinian cause and the right for the refugees to return; that is to say, the rights of the Palestinians to live in Israel. In fact, you only need run into a Muslim or Christian Palestinian to give the order: “You are not Jewish, so clear off”. This is the crucial question. I do not know if Olmert intends all of this, when he speaks of “painful changes”. He should have asserted, rather, that he accepts the Arab initiative; but he did not do it, not even in the joined declaration. He never declared all of this.

Olmert always says that he hopes for bilateral negotiations, but when it comes to the moment to negotiate, he never agrees to discuss with all the Arab countries. When he wants recognition and normalisation of the relations, however, he reunited them all: this is his little game, and the Arabs and the Palestinians know it very well. There is the fear that the Annapolis summit (or reunion, or meeting, however one wants to call it) was organised with the aim of establishing an anti-Iranian front, which has nothing to do with the solution to the Palestinian problem. We can quite clearly say that the fear is alive and kicking in the minds and souls of all the Arabs and Muslims. They want to play the card of the division between Sunni and Shia, which is nevertheless comparable between the regimes and their supporters. But between the Arab and Islamic population, such a division does not exist. We will notice it in a few weeks, at the start of the pilgrimage period, which reunites Sunni, Shia, Ishmaelites, Muslims, indiscriminately. Those who have not lived that experience, cannot understand. There are no divisions. Not even ritualistic ones: everyone has the same rite and use the same words. And so, when no difference was found between Sunni and Shia in Palestine, this evoked the clash between Hamas and Fatah. This, once again, probably reveals the importance and worth of national unity and of the democratic State. The first slogan of the Palestinians is in fact: ‘Create a democratic State in Palestine’. A democratic and laic State where Christians, Muslims and Jews can live in peace. This is a fundamental principle first agreed upon in 1965. That is to say, in the years which witnessed the birth of Al Fatah, the Palestinian movement and what was once called the ‘Palestinian Revolution’, whose aim was definitely not to create a Muslim or Arabic State.

A novelty at Annapolis was the presence of Syria, who consciously supports various Palestinian movements which are against the Oslo Accords. What the significance of the Syrian presence?

Syria finds itself in a very difficult position. One cannot talk of an Arab world without Syria. One cannot talk of war in the Middle East without Syria. One cannot talk of struggle without Syria. Syria, intended as a country, not as a regime. Syria, intended as the cradle and heart of the world and of the Arabic Orient. In light of its current politics, one cannot even talk of peace without Syria. I do mean to say that one should not take into consideration the Lebanese factor and Lebanon, but Syria had more right than the others to be present in this meeting, because its Golan territory is occupied, and up till now all the international UN resolutions – seeing as many are good at only speaking about international legality – have sanctioned that this needs to be completely given back, without any concession. Syria showed its intention of not participating in Annapolis if the Golan question were not discussed, or officially inserted in the order of the day. In other words, it wanted some commitment. Do you know why it made a joined declaration and not at least a framework of agreement?

Because, unlike a written agenda, a joined declaration does not ask for any commitment. And especially, it does not commit Olmert, or the United States. That is why, in my opinion, Syria wanted to keep one foot in each camp. That is to say, it did not want everyone to go to Annapolis without discussing Golan. Neither did it want to give the impression of stabbing in the back its allies, which, before Iran, include the Lebanese and Palestinian political forces, including the NPA. For a large part of his life, Abu Mazen, president of the National Palestinian Authority, lived in Damascus, where he was eve considered Syrian. Only after the Oslo Accords did he leave the Country. But his political life, like that of Al Fatah, was in Syria. It is for this reason that Syria, given its importance, could not miss the meeting in Annapolis. Now, has the alliance between Iran and Syria been broken? This is another question altogether. Today one cannot talk of Iraq or Iran without pulling Syria into the equation: the latter says “no” to what seems to be complete resignation to America’s wishes in the area and to the refusal, on the part of some Israeli exponents, to discuss the five fundamental points which we have remembered here above.

Translation by Sonia Ter Hovanessian