Cairo, Egypt

But what has really put the brakes on the rise of the Party of Justice and Development? Diaa Rashwan, political expert at the Al-Ahram Center of Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) and specialist on radical movements and the Muslim Brotherhood explains: “I don’t think it is a question of ‘what has left the Moroccan electors unconvinced’, but rather of what we outside observers expected. We shouldn’t forget, indeed, that in Morocco the Islamists have grown with respect to the previous ballot, and that they are now the second biggest party in Parliament.” An ‘explosive’ result was expected, “but I see that with steady progress, and no steps back, that party is moving forward, even if this is at a different speed to parties in other countries,” Rashwan explains, widening the field of observation, “Everywhere in Muslim countries, where there is a multi-party system, Islamic movements are destined to win strong majorities in the parliaments. Because their experience of the social fabric is far greater than that of the others.”

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, too, is omnipresent across the territory, can boast members across the social strata, and is the strongest and best organised movement of opposition to Hosni Mubarak’s regime. “That Egyptian system has only one party however,” notes Rashwan, “in which the National Democratic Party has absolute control of the institutions, including the committee which authorises the creation of new political organisations. And the new laws are going in that direction.” Amongst the articles of the Egyption constitution which were revised in spring, the fifth was modified in such a way as to ban all parties with a religious foundation – a provision clearly intended to bar the way once and for all for the Ikhwan muslimin (Muslim Brothers), who are already banned in Egypt, and have been since 1954.

And so the 88 seats won by the Muslim Brothers in the parliamentary elections of 2005 are officially atributed to independent deputies, and the other parties of opposition as a whole comprise just 2% of the seats. The NDP has a monopoly on more than 75% of the National Assembly, which is composed of 454 deputies. “Whilst the NDP remains in power, nothing will change. The Muslim Brothers will not be legalised, and the smaller parties like Tagammu (the Unionist Party), the WAFD (Delegation) and Ghad (Tomorrow) will remain weak”, Raswan predicts. The situation in Morocco is radically different, however, where “there are many parties, which are strong and which have a long tradition, and the competition between them is real.” Until now, forms of alliance between the different bodies of opposition in Egypt “haven’t worked”, such as the National Front, established in 2005, which Ikhwan joined, but only at the last minute. Rashwan does not believe, however, that, in the case of an uncertain succession to President Mubarak, the Brotherhood can realistically opt to take up arms.

Frédéric Vairel, a researcher at the Center for Economic, Judicial and Social Studies and Documentation of Cairo (Cédéj), recently returned from Morocco, is of the same opinion, as he explained to Reset: “In pratice, for at least thirty years the Muslim Brothers has not resorted to violence, and so the people who comprise them have changed. Even the means of recruiting members has changed. It is clear that they do not turn to the same people to propose a ‘big strike’ or small demonstrations at the university and candidature for the elections”. On the 10th December, 2006, however, an incident alerted public opinion: at the end of Friday prayers at the university mosque of Al Azhar, along with the usual anti-Western and anti-regime demonstrators, there was a march of masked and uniformed youths, suggesting the existence of a paramilitary group close to the Muslim Brothers.

Vairel, currently working on a comparative study of social movements in Morocco and Egypt, comments: “There have been oscillations within the confraternity concerning the reorganisation of the movement in the wake of events. The difficulty now consists in understanding whether, when there are so many militants, it is possible to keep them occupied and under control, or whether they might slip out of the leadership’s grasp. Perhaps (that episode) was permitted by the organisation in order to give the youths the impression that they are important and have a role in the confraternity. But it may also prove to be a strategic mistake, a mis-calculation of risk and of the likely reaction of the regime.” In Morocco the Islamists have abandoned all revolutionary proposals for some time now, effecting a long-term transformation in the heart of society: “The functionaries of the PJD, from the mid-eighties onwards, have theorised the abandonment of revolutionary action,” Vairel points out, “favouring a non-violent path, and a rapprochement with the Parliament and with day-to-day politics. And all of this has been accompanied by a revisionist doctrine – in other words , every new political step is accompanied by a theological interpretation. It is a question of people who want to enter into politics because this also corresponds to their social needs: doctors, lawyers, entrepreneurs, university professors, whose professional development is influenced by their entrance into politics.

And if the Muslim Brothers can boast a widespread presence across the territory, and a connection with the most vulnerable sections of society, the Moroccan Islamists have “a clientèle which comes from the petit and middle bourgoisie – literate people who have a different relationship to religion from those who live out in the country. They are small, local intellectuals,” interested in a process of religious reform. “What is important to note,” Vairel highlights, “is that in the Moroccan slums – stigmatised as a breeding ground for suicide bombers – the PJD, like other parties, has no audience. These shanty towns have been abandoned by both the State and the political parties”. The PJD is nevertheless the most important Moroccan party: “In terms of the number of votes, but not of number of seats. This is the result of the division of the country into constituencies, carefully studied by the Minstry of the Interior. Electoral ‘engineering’ has a long tradition in Morocco, stemming from the very first elections following independence (from France, in March 1956 – Ed.)”

It seems that the threshold conceived by the ‘electoral engineer’ is around a maximum of 20%, so that no party be capable of “supporing itself on the people, and doing without the monarchy”. And if, in Egypt, the NDP and the presidency are like Siamese twins, “the Moroccan King, with the excuse of pluralism, has chosen to have no party too close to him. This permits him to have a kind of shield, to have people who manage public affairs, but who, if they make mistakes, will not taint the image of the Palace.” In short, the predominace of the King is immutable – the numerous planning projects give the subjects the impression that it is the King who acts, and that the Chamber has no real power. And this explains the culture of abstention. “The difference (with respect to the past – Ed.) is that this year we are confronted with genuine levels of abstention,” says Vairel. “The Ministry of the Interior didn’t go and gather up the people in buses to make them vote, some candidates did.”

The trading of votes was also inferior. Finally, in order to pursuade the electors to stay at home, “the electoral card [was]split into 33 different parties, with 3 possible Islamist options”, and therefore fragmented; and an “muted”electoral campaign that was “little followed” because it took place over the middle of the summer. In the meantime, the Egyptian Islamists have been experiencing one of the most bitter periods of their history: “The Muslim Brothers’ daily paper has however always been under pressure,” Professor Vairel reminds us, “with continual recourse to secret, anonymous funding. Having said this, it is true that since the beginning of this year the Brothers have become even more the object of government repression. This time they have been struck hard, and at the top – high ranking members have also been arrested and court marshalled.” It is possible that “the security services had discovered that the Brothers, following their electoral success of 2005, were recruiting more militants than in the past, and that the regime was anxious about this. For the Americans, these kind of arrests do not provoke any reaction at all. But it could also be a way for the regime to prepare for the succession, in order to prevent the organisation from being too strong when this happens.”

Vairel has found few links found between the Moroccan and Egyptian movements: “In Morocco, political islamicisation has a much stronger internal dimension, even if this has not prevented them from feeding on the ideological currents coming from Egypt, that is, the thinking of Hassan El Banna or Sayyid Qutb. But in Morocco, historically, there are no Muslim Brothers, even if Moroccan Islamists are sometimes wrongly referred to by this epithet.” For both however, the time may have come for the ultimate test – that which will determine whether they are real parties of government, ready to implement economic and social programmes, or merely talented preachers, able to adapt to different political climates.

Translation by Liz Longden