I consider the specific characteristics usually attributed to “secular” society as one of the typical expedients used by human beings to eliminate obstacles faced during periods of change. In spite of the fact that the culture separating divine legitimisation from civil power dates back to our Renaissance, two centuries ago there were still a number of countries in Europe which had a State religion, with a cuius regio eius religio and difficult distributions of real jurisdiction between civil and religious authorities. And it was to get rid of this that secularism was defined as the public sphere’s complete deliverance from religion and religion itself was depicted as a totally private issue: maximum guarantees as far as freedom was concerned (also emphasising that this was to be individual freedom and not necessarily that of religious organisations) and instead no interference in collective affairs.

A secular society imagined in such a manner is an ideology and reality was destined to emerge. Regardless of all other possible considerations, in what has been the overall evolution of our societies towards the pluralism of individual and collective subjects, religious organisations naturally became the most important social players. Hence, if this is meaning of the passage from “secular” to “post-secular”, I do not consider this passage as a subject for discussion but rather as a fact. What is debatable is how one stands within the public sphere and if being part of it enables a recuperation or not of the jurisdictional aspects that the secular movement handed over to civil authorities. But this is a different issue. A comment might instead be useful: behind the principles that justified religion’s expulsion from the public sphere at the very beginnings of secularism, there was also the idea (on the other hand not equally shared) that it would also be removed from ethical issues, destined to be managed as a private affair and not through public rules. For millions of well-known reasons there is no doubt that the frequency with which the civil legislator is called upon to solve ethical issues is now increasing. This too must be added to “post-secularism’s” characteristics.

Since it has existed Böckenförde’s dilemma is the existential dilemma of liberal democracy, which on one hand contradicts its principles if it does not guarantee the freedom also of those wishing to destroy it, and on the other cannot allow that this destruction be implemented. The management of this contradiction has however within the historical event found its own rules. The best known is the “clear and present danger rule” drafted by the Supreme Court of the United Sates, which unconditionally protects freedom of thought, until it becomes part of the “trigger” used to set off subversive events. Based on this, and with at times significant expansions of its borders, many other rules have been invented to promptly fight “enemies”. And if one looks back, one inevitably comes to a conclusion. The existential dilemma has historically been solved by reserving the highest level of guarantees to all those placed within the assent/dissent platform considered compatible with the survival of the whole and instead leaving in a far less defended limbo all dissent set outside this platform.

Is this one of liberal democracy’s defects? Or is it not instead the natural consequence of its being the regiment of human beings who share its basic values and who therefore do not contribute a diversity of opinions and interests to the extent of justifying the jeopardizing of the fundamental rights of those with different opinions and interests? The second answer is obviously the one provided by those who like myself feel they are the children of this democracy. For this reason they come to the conclusion that it is entrusted, more than to its rules (and to the contradictions arising from these) to the creation – as Gramsci would have said – of a liberal hegemony, which the competence of its cultural and social leading players. This is what we work for, and, faced with the many diversities today’s world presents, we take great care not to be assimilationists or integrationists, and instead we try and outline pathways involving fecund contamination characterised by reciprocal acceptance. Each day we banish the devil – abysmally realist – that continuously reminds us that history has not yet proved liberal democracy’s capability to remain loyal unto itself beyond the happy islands in which it was initially conceived.

Giuliano Amato, professor of constitutional law at the University of Rome La Sapienza and professor the European Institute in Florence, is currently Minister of the Interior. In 1992-1993 and in 2000-2001 he was prime minister of Italy. In both of D’Alema’s governments (1998-2000), he was Minister for Institutional Reforms and Treasury Minister. From 1994 and 1997 he was president of the Competition and Market Guarantor Authority (Antitrust). He was vice-president of the Convention for the drafting of the European Constitution. Amongst his most recent publications: Tornare al futuro. La sinistra e il mondo che ci aspetta (Turning to the future. The left and the waiting world) (in collaboration with Fabrizio Forquet, Laterza, 2002); Noi in bilico. Inquietudini e speranze di un cittadino europeo (We the precarious. Worries and hopes of a European citizen) (Laterza, 2005).

This article was published in Reset, Number 101.

Translation by Francesca Simmons