More than 18 million Algerians will be called to vote on the 17th May, to elect 389 parliamentary deputies with a five year mandate. These representatives of the people will be elected to National Popular Assembly (APN), the lower chamber which, in conjunction with the higher chamber, the ‘National Council’, constitutes the Algerian parliament. At first glance these elections seem to represent a peaceful alternation of power. In reality, however, those involved are content to see a mere change of façade, rather than to commit to a genuine democratic transition which would enable the emergence of political forces capable of making a clean break from the archaic methods of the old system.

An objective assessment of the country’s political situation on the eve of the general election further confirms this state of affairs. In effect this, the fourth general election in the country’s democratic history, since the declaration of the Constitution on the 23rd February 1989 put an end to single party rule, does not seem to offer any political projects which deviate from the current status quo – which appears now to be established and inevitable – and there seems to be no prospect of radical political changes in the near future. Is it premature to make such a statement? Informed observers point to a number of factors which encourage pessimism.

Since the 2002 elections, the Algerian political stage has been dominated by three political organisations commonly known as ‘the parties of the presidential alliance’. More specifically they are the Front de Libération National (FLN) – the former single party of rule – the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND), created by the ruling powers in 1997, and the Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix (MSP), a moderate Islamic party which preaches peaceful participation in political power. These three political groups form the government led by Abdelaziz Belkhadem, head of the FNL, and have been working around the programme set by the President of the Republic, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who has held power since 1999.

This governing coalition is not the product of the negotiation of political programmes and ideas from which a consensus has been reached, but has rather been formed on the basis of a pre-prepared presidential programme, in which the constituent parties have played no participating role. With this process the Algerian parties have marked a first in political practice; they have, in fact, transformed themselves into support committees for an independent candidate who is external to their respective political structures – in this case Abdelaziz Bouteflika, recognised as the agreed candidate in the presidential elections of April 1999 – when they ought to have aimed at achieving power themselves and introducing their own specific political programmes.

The continued existence of this political configuration from the 2002 general election to the present has rendered the political landscape opaque, monotonous and sterile. Some observers have spoken of the ‘presidential alliance’, that is, the coalition of the three parties grouped around President Bouteflika, in terms of a disguised attempt to kill off the country’s multiparty system – we have returned to another form of political monopoly; three parties built around a single thought! The consequences of this means of managing a political system are disastrous: a fictitious consensus which barely masks the lack of any opposition or alternative debate, and which highlights a political context which is both closed and paralysed. It is a situation which certainly does not favour the emergence of new élites and new political forces.

Current data has prompted observers to state that the elections on the 17th May will have no significant impact on the political map of the nation, given that they will be directed necessarily towards the continuation of the mandate of the presidential alliance which groups together the FNL, MSP and RND around President Bouteflika. In other words, we are heading towards a change in the continuity of the present political configuration. The leaders of these three groups have already given an idea of what will happen after the 17th May, stating – even before the start of the electoral campaign – that their parties will take the majority of seats in the future National Assembly. The General Secretary of the FLN, Belkhadem, has declared that his party will “win the elections”, Ahmed Ouyahia, head of the RND, guarantees that his will be “the second biggest political force in the country”, whilst the leader of the MSP, Abu Djerra Soltani, states that his will obtain “at least 30% of seats” – and so the results have been declared in advance! The current governing alliance has, by now, begun its electoral campaign, given that 14 ministers are running for the post of parliamentary deputy.

Nevertheless, the general elections on the 17th May will see the participation of the Kabyle region following an absence of 5 years essentially due to the boycott led by the civil movement of the âarch (born following the events of April 2001) and of those parties traditionally rooted in the region – the FFS (Front des Forces Socialistes), and the RCD (Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie.) This year the Kabyle will be represented with the participation of the RCD, of representatives of the civic movement, and of the UDR (Union Démocratique et Républicaine), created by Amar Benyounès, ex-Vice President of the RCD, who will be participating under the banner of the ANR (Alliance Nationale Républicaine, led by the former head of government Reda Malek), because his own party was not declared eligible for the elections.

The ‘Mouvement pour la Réforme Nationale’ (MRN) – an Islamic fundamentalist party opposed to political entryism (the availability to enter the government – ed.) – a tactic which is favoured however by the MSP and by its detractors within Enaahada and el-Islah, created by Abdellah Djabellah at the end of 1998 – has split into two, with the supporters of Djabellah on one side, and those of Mohamed Boulahia on the other. This latter has been declared eligible for the elections of the 17th May by the Ministery of the Interior, whilst the supporters of Djebellah have been excluded, and have therefore called for a boycott. The FFS has adopted a similar attitude, calling for an active boycott of these elections.

It must be said that the parliament is a marginalised institution, a ‘chamber of registration’ for projects and legislative proposals, which has no influence on major political decisions. The last period of legislature confirms this fact, the Executive having systematically and improperly made recourse to presidential dictates, which do not in any way allow for discussion, debate or opposition. Evidence for this can be seen in important laws such as the family code, the law on hydrocarbons and the general status of public functions, to name but a few, which were all passed via presidential dictates.

A review of the previous parliamentary mandate highlights how the majority of the 89 laws adopted by that institution were done so via presidential dictates declared between parliamentary sessions. On the other hand, there is no record of any legislative proposal – other than that of El-Islah on the modifications made to the electoral laws – nor of any parliamentary inquests. Nor have the guidelines been declared for the drawing up of the budget, at a time when the country has been rocked by a number of financial scandals, including the ‘Khalifa’ group affair (in which the country lost nearly 2 billion dollars), and deputies are often forced to wait several months before receiving any reply to the questions posed in parliament.

These elections are taking place within very particular circumstances, marked specifically by an increase in terrorist attacks. Following a period of calm over recent years, on 11th April Algeria was hit by a suicide bomb attack which shook the government headquarters and a police station which houses the Algerian Interpol, causing 30 deaths and dozens of injuries. This resurgence in terrorist violence has generated a climate of psychosis and panic within the population, who fear further attacks. Whilst terrorism may have been defeated militarily and politically, the latest attacks – for which the ‘Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat’ (GSPC), considered to be an affiliation of Al Qaeda active within Islamic north Africa, has claimed responsibility – have brought once again to the fore the question of national security, and, to an extent, have called into question the policy of national reconciliation supported by President Bouteflika. Terrorism, or armed islamicism, has definitively lost the battle in Algeria, but not all of those who ferment a climate of fear have been eliminated, and the measures taken against these have been shown to be somewhat contradictory.

It is worth noting that some months prior to the start of the electoral campaign, the government was called to account for the policies intended to contain the economic and social crises, which were found to be a complete failure. Algeria is struggling to leave behind the repercussions of its ‘black decade’, and its oppressive legacy: more than 100,000 dead, 20 billion dollars of damage, 7,000 missing people and a society left severely traumatised. From 2000 onwards, thanks to the considerable increase in the price of crude oil, the State has focused on recovering the ground lost during the years of terrorism, but the rhythm of the reforms initiated, and the practical results of these, have not gained the approval of all the citizens, who feel that their real concerns have not been taken into due consideration, and who cannot understand how a country with 80 billion dollars of reserve currency at its disposal is unable to eradicate poverty, reduce unemployment and improve the quality of life of its own citizens.

The greatest challenge which faces the present leaders of Algeria consists in defining a national policy of development capable of giving concrete solutions to the economic and social problems which the country faces (work, health, training, home life, etc.), capitalising on the improvement in the current economic situation, which is the most significant of its history. Experts talk about a historical opportunity for Algeria to bring itself up to date, by initiating real reforms; should this fail to happen, it will be extremely difficult to manage the issues and problems which are becoming ever more serious, regardless of an unjustified official optimism. But here there is a fundamental question to be posed: how can such economic reforms be realised in a weak, if not fictitious ‘democracy’, which struggles to reconcile itself with popular participation in public affairs and to construct an effective opposition which is capable of acting as a counterbalance to restrict abuses of power, and the creation of absolute power? This is the real issue that needs to be confronted. If the general election on the 17th May reconfirms the present political configuration, with all its weaknesses and deficiencies, the lack of solutions to the very real problems which the Algerian people face today will bring to the fore the need to call into question the present status quo and to surpass this façade of a democracy which is preventing the country from familiarising itself with the authentic traditions of democracy.

Mahmoud Belhimer has been assistant editor of the Algerian newspaper Elkhabar – “the most important Arabic daily in Algeria with a circulation of 500,000 copies” – since 2002. He helps to manage the dynamic editorial team, and is responsible for the column ‘Moudjeradrai’, on the back page. In June 1991 he graduated in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Algiers, where he later completed a Masters on the theme of ‘Democratic transition in Algeria’.

Translation by Liz Longden