Can we still discuss nowadays the “Sinic Civilization” as described by Samuel Huntington in 1993, which would comprise China, North Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan and the Chinese Diaspora?
According to Huntington’s theories, the countries you mentioned all share one same, fundamental feature: the Confucian culture. What is interesting is that this feature is at present used by the rulers of these countries who justify the nature and form of their regimes by reference to Confucianism. This is an aspect common to the belief of the ruling classes (both in left-winged and right-winged orientations, at least in their origins). The Confucian theory was first adopted by the founding father of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, and was later acquired by the Chinese governing class in spite of its Maoist origin. Confucian theory implies that the Western concept of liberal democracy is not exportable to these Asian countries because, due to their Confucian legacy, these countries tend to view themselves, their systems, and their rules as those of a family: an organic system founded on strong relationships of solidarity, on cultural cohesion and at the same time on strict hierarchical rules. This belief has been forcefully expressed by Lee Kuan Yew in building the authoritarian right-winged paternalism of the city-state of Singapore, but it is also present -in a less explicit form- in today’s communist Chinese Nomenklatura.
Therefore leaders use the Confucian legacy to justify their actions to a population that did not elect them democratically?
Yes, although while in Singapore this is very explicit, in China it is not officially stated. There will never be an article in a Chinese newspaper stating: “We will not grant you democracy because we’re Confucian”. It is a subtle belief circulating among the governing class and regularly repeated to Western journalists. Every time we have the opportunity to pose a question to the governing class (from members of the regime to the new capitalists) our attempts to raise a principle of democratic theory are countered with this argument. This “doctrine” is very present but it is not official since the formal doctrine still relates to Mao Zedong.
Isn’t this strong sense of community clashing against the individualism that has dominated the recent decades?
Evidently it is; the comeback of Confucianism represents an attempt to contain this individualism. As a result of the tragedies and hardships it endured during Mao, Chinese society has, for some decades, been looking for refuge in the private sphere. During the 30 years of Maoism and especially in the decade of the Cultural Revolution, China experienced the strongest invasion of politics into the lives of individuals ever seen in the world. The level of politicization was extreme. Once Mao died, even though his theories were never officially cancelled, the phenomenon of hypocrisy of the Maoist discourse arose. People realized that behind the egalitarian Utopia were atrocious inequalities. Even in Mao’s times, the Nomenklatura had extremely blatant, illegitimate and scandalous privileges. Once hardcore Maoism was over, the tendency was to discredit any theory that implied a collective interest. This resulted in a mass retreat into the private sphere. Individualism is now palpable in China. The prevailing interests are those of the individual, the family and the clan. This clearly creates some problems because unconstrained individualism can lead to social instability and conflicts. The return to Confucian theories is clearly an attempt to find an ideology to fill the great void of Maoism.
Huntington saw in the Islamic world a potential ally for China…
Of all of Huntington’s mistaken prophecies, this is perhaps the most egregious. From living here, I can assure you that there is no other country as anti-Islamic as China. There are some Muslim minorities in the country, the most important being that of the Uiguri, as Westerners and Chinese call them, who themselves identify as Turkmen. It is the population of the Xinjiang and it numbers about seven million people. Other Islamic minorities, such as the Hui, are also present. Every time any of them show sympathy for Islamic fundamentalism they are ferociously supressed. In the mosques in Xinjiang, which I have visited, police security cameras film the believers as they pray, 24/7.
Is this also because the government fears that Islamic fundamentalism could fuel a secessionist movement…
Exactly. In the Xinjiang there is a secessionist movement claiming the region as Eastern Turkmenistan. But such secessionist attempts are repressed with a brutality that is unparalleled in the rest of the world. China has no intention of being contaminated by the germ of Islamic fundamentalism and is fighting it with an absolute determination. China does not allow religion to become a pointof organization for movements of civil society that could elude the government’s control. This attitude also impedes reconciliation with the Vatican; China will not let the Vatican appoint Catholic bishops. The present government will not allow the Dalai Lama back in the country, falsely claiming that he is a secessionist. The truth is that the government will not recognize the existence of any authority that could potentially undermine or be an alternative to the exclusive authority of the party and of the state.
Yet, during UN meetings, China always sides with Islamic countries, especially with Iran.
There are common interests with certain Islamic countries, but this only pertains to political, strategic and economic issues. Due to its need for oil, China is now one of the most important supporters of Iran and Sudan. But this support does not originate in any sympathy for Islam, but rather because China tends to take advantage of situations in which it can replace the West and steer countries that are rich in natural resources and energy away from American influence.
Is it realistic that the Chinese model, based on “wealth without democracy”, could be more successful than Western democracies in the future?
Yes, the threat is well-grounded. Vietnam, for instance, is copying the Chinese formula with a few years of delay: market economy, communist regime and censorship of dissent. Other Asian countries could be tempted to do the same. If North Korea is to reform itself one day, it will probably do so according to the Chinese model. And outside of Asia, every country in the developing world is fascinated by the Chinese model. This explains why China manages so easily to relate to countries as different as Venezuela, Sudan and Angola; the explanation does not lie only in China’s wealth. It is the wealth factor and the fact that China never poses questions about human rights issues. It presents this philosophy as a noble one, saying ‘we are not here to meddle with the country’s internal affairs, we will cooperate in order to develop economic relations.’ This undoubtedly augments the fascination with China in countries where democracy is non-existant or extremely fragile. This mix of authoritarianism paired with economic dynamism can be dangerously attractive, especially to the Southern hemisphere and to countries that already have good relations with China.
Oxford scholar Timothy Garton Ash states that the average European debate, during its first 30 minutes, is always concerned with the United States. In order to understand our future, should we read more Chinese than American newspapers?
It would be sufficient just to read American newspapers more attentively, since, with the exception of the British press, a good American newspaper contains on average six or ten times the quantity of news on China and India than that found in the European press. But I do understand the point of the question. We should definitely recalibrate our vision and try to understand how important relationships are changing; we should acknowledge that “Chindia” is now a real power shifting the center of the world towards itself as the world’s factory. The United States understood this much earlier than we did and the attention that they are devoting to these countries’ evolution is much greater than that they are devoting to Europe. Whether in the form of press, business operations or academic research, the economic resources that the United States is investing in understanding China and India are absolutely predominant.
Translation by Mia Ceran