Starting with Libya.
The Libyan case is very easy. There are various elements trying to prevent the country from continuing on its path towards stability and “democratization.” Libya has taken steps towards creating its first democratic institutions, but it is a slow process. This has created many enemies, especially among Gaddafi loyalists (like Saadi Gaddafi who is creating trouble from Niger), who can count on a degree of support from within the country. Gaddafi loyalists have money and are using terrorist groups to create instability. There are also criminal bands and disparate Salafite groups forming to the right of the Islamic moderates who are also, according to what is being said in Tripoli, financed by Saudi Arabian groups. There is also Al-Qaeda, which is rapidly penetrating the country, counting on this mix of sympathizers. On the other hand, we have a state that is institutionally weak, that is only at its beginnings, without a functioning police or efficient secret service, because they have been infiltrated, and with militias spread all over the country. This is the context in which the attack on the consulate took place, just the last in a long series of destabilizing and negative events.
Why did the United States not take these factors into consideration, leaving the area vulnerable, unlike Iraq and Afghanistan?
The U.S. made a clamorous error in judgment, over-estimating the successes achieved and acting as if the Libyans were capable of managing their affairs and governing their country. Added to this optimism and the opportunism of the Libyan political class, is the fear of the anti-Americanism felt by the Americans themselves. But the anti-Americanism in present Iraq, Egypt or in Afghanistan does not exist in Libya, if only as a reaction to Gaddafi’s anti-Americanism. In a recent Gallup poll, for example, it emerged that Libyans are more pro-American than Canadians. If the Americans had stayed with the Europeans and patrolled the area, trained and reorganized the police, we would not be in this situation.
Conspiracy theories heard on the attack in Benghazi.
These arguments concern the America of the 1950s; the United States that organized coups d’état in other countries. The world today is too big and too complex and the U.S. no longer has total control. Even the CIA has changed. Recent events in Benghazi confirm this. They had no idea this might happen. Perhaps the United States is still capable of manipulating world finances, in some fashion, but from a political and military point of view it is no longer the country it once was and is frequently caught off-guard because it does not have the flexibility to evaluate situations case by case. Look how they act with Saudi Arabia. Their greatest ally is their greatest enemy that sank them in Iraq and in Syria and is fomenting anti-American terrorism as well as keeping them in check-mate between Israel and Iran.
Beyond the conspiracy theories, at a public opinion level, what effect did the Benghazi attack have on the current presidential campaign?
Foreign affairs are so unimportant at this moment for the American people that the effect of these kinds of incidents is minimal. In any case, if Libya were to fall apart, Romney could point the finger at Obama blaming his competence in foreign policy, because if it is true that the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan were a legacy of the past, the Libyan situation is different. The political campaign could hinge on this and on the stalemate in Syria, but the fact remains that the American people have other worries at the moment.
You spoke of the need to work to distinguish between the various events taking place in the region. In what way?
Every country has its own reality and logic. In Egypt a clash with the Muslim Brotherhood is taking place and the same in Tunisia. In Algeria the government is clamping down and preventing demonstrations. In Morocco the government is more open and protests have been minimal.
The division of the world into two sides, with allies and enemies, is a legacy we have inherited from the Cold War. Are the Salafites enemies or friends? They are enemies almost everywhere, but at the moment they could also be friends. The same goes for the Muslim Brotherhood. It depends on the geopolitical interests of each individual country. Compared to the past, movements have formed today that require greater participation and there is a need for a new way of implementing more flexible strategies.
What are the prospects?
I see a complete shift of the axis towards Iran and Egypt that will have to be addressed by the West with a far more open attitude. Egypt’s President Morsi [Muslim Brotherhood leader, editor’s note] could be an excellent ally for the United States, but America’s attitude is pushing him towards Iran.
In this context, could a consequent isolation of Israel place new international pressure on Tehran?
Unfortunately serious problems, however, are coming home to roost. The U.S. government should be sufficiently sensitive to open up to Iran, through Egypt, without abandoning Israel, stopping what was known as the Shi’a Crescent. If Syria falls, allies will be needed to manage the situation. But at this time, who would be the right allies? We are completely exposed, without paying attention to the changes and to a situation on the ground that is changing radically.
On the subject of anti-Americanism and fundamentalism, how would you judge the latest events in Tunisia?
The situation in Tunisia is very important and very serious, because there is an attempt under way to question the Muslim Brotherhood’s progress as a moderate movement. There is an elite close to the West that is ready to cooperate, but a more radical base that is aligning itself with the Salafites. If there is a Salafite plan, it is to prevent democratization in the area, because in their eyes a democratic Libya or Tunisia would be a dangerous example for the people of Saudi Arabia. The Wahabi’s main ideological taboo is the democratization of a country. If we want to find common ground, it certainly would involve blocking this process, but even in this case one must make distinctions.
Saudi Arabian businessmen are very close to Saadi Gaddafi and are financing pro-Gaddafi forces in Libya. Things are different in Tunisia where Saudi Arabia has helped the Ennahda government, but there are also Saudi Arabian groups helping the Salafites against the Ennahda government.
Translated by Francesca Simmons