The Brotherhood seemed to have a strong hand to play, having already obtained a huge victory in the parliamentary elections (together with the more conservative Salafist parties), and now in the Presidential elections. But the elections for the Parliament had been declared null, and the Parliament itself disbanded, the first Constituent Assembly (in which the Brotherhood had an overwhelming presence) had been declared unconstitutional, martial law has been for all purposes reintroduced, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has proclaimed, only a few days before the second round of the Presidential elections, an important addendum to the Constitutional Declaration that strongly curtail the powers of the new President in favour of the SCAF itself.
The military establishment had a strong range of instruments to intimidate the Muslim Brothers, and was obviously ready to make a full use of them, with the full cooperation of the “deep State”, the many surviving members of the previous regime in the public administrations, the judiciary and the police.
As if the above was not enough, the SCAF had also recently instituted a National Defence Council which will decide all matters concerning national security. The new President and its Prime Minister will be two of the 17 members of the new body, 12 of which will be the highest military commanders of the Egyptian Armed Forces and Secret Services. The military establishment will therefore remain independent from the elected civilian Government – for all purposes a State within a State – and will have the last word on all matters regarding internal security, economic policy and international relations.
This means that – while Mohamed Morsi won his election at the polls – the official recognition of his victory comes at a high price for the Muslim Brotherhood, first of all in terms of its political power. The new President – and the Government he will appoint – will lack the instruments needed to confront a very difficult political, economic ad international situation, and may soon have to pay for it a political price in terms of popular support. Even the budget for the coming fiscal year has been presented on the eve of the election by the outgoing Government and will be approved directly by the SCAF, which is exercising all the powers of the now dissolved Parliament.
Certainly the Brotherhood could have refused to compromise with the military establishment. In that case it probably would have had to renounce a very enfeebled position in the Presidency, and the candidate of the military, Ahmed Shafiq, would have been granted the position of the Head of State. But such an outcome – which would have amounted to a total failure of all the objectives of the Egyptian spring – could have started a cycle of violent protests and repressions probably worse than what has already happened in and around Tahrir square since January 2011. In the last few days the SCAF had clearly signalled that it was ready to repress with all the necessary force any protest against the decisions to be announced. Moreover a decision that contradicted the results of the election would have isolated Egypt in the international arena, creating difficult problems, first of all with the United States.
Therefore, even if the election of Mohamed Morsi under the present circumstances is a more modest achievement respect to many expectations, the compromises that led to it seem an act of political wisdom worthy of praise and, anyway, it still represents a substantial progress in the Egyptian political panorama. The Egypt of today is already very different from the Egypt of two years ago, and the situation gives many signs of an ongoing evolution.
In the short term the competition for power between the SCAF and the Brotherhood will certainly continue, and will play out again in two important occasions: the parliamentary elections, that have to be repeated after the dissolution by the Constitutional Court of the two elected Chambers, and the drafting and approval of the new Constitution that should define in legal terms the new political balance between the main political actors of Egyptian society, as they are and will be represented in its political institutions.
These events will take place in a political situation which is in a state of flux. As often happens after the end of a long period of political oppression, public sentiment may show rapid shifts. It has not been lost to all observers that, while Mohamed Mursi won the second turn of the Presidential elections, at the first turn of that election the plurality that voted for him was several million votes smaller that the votes obtained by the Freedom and Justice Party in the previous Parliamentary elections. This result reflects divisions in the Brotherhood (i.e. the candidature of another, allegedly more liberal, brother, Abd el Moneim Abd el Foutouh), but also the poor performance of the Freedom and Justice Party in the short lived Parliament and, probably, a reaction to what many Egyptian voters saw as an excessive political influence of the Brotherhood. And the compromises that led to the confirmation of Mohamed Morsi will certainly not enhance the prestige of the Muslim Brothers.
As the runoff for the Presidency was restricted to the candidates of the Brotherhood and of the military, the secular, moderate and more libertarian political movement that in January 2011 ignited the Egyptian tinderbox have attracted little attention during the last few weeks.
Much has been said, especially after the election for the two Chambers of Parliament, about the inability of the progressive movements to transfer their political influence from Tahrir Square to the political institutions. This inability has rightly been explained by their fragmentation, lack of leaders and of coherent political programs and, above all, of political experience, especially as opposed to a long standing and powerful and motivated organization as the Muslim Brotherhood.
Nevertheless in the first round of the Presidential election, the combined votes of the third and fourth runner ups – the secular Hamdeen Sabbahi and the moderate Islamist Abd el Foutouh – amounted to 40% of all votes cast. This means that there exists a strong moderate constituency, stronger perhaps that could have been envisaged one year ago, that could make its voice heard starting from the next parliamentary election, if only it will be able to unite around common candidates and programs.
This is clearly recognized by the Muslim Brothers, as Mohamed Morsi, probably to strengthen his hand towards the military establishment and the remains of the Mubarak regime, has promised to include representatives of the moderate secular movements in the next Egyptian Government. He will also have to reassure the Coptic Christian minority, understandably and deeply worried about the political emergence of the Islamist forces.
In the coming period, and certainly until a new Constitution is approved, the main focus of Egyptian political life will be the struggle of all Egyptian political forces against the continuing efforts of the military establishment and the “deep State” to control and dictate the rules of the political game. This will probably require cooperation between the Islamist and secular parties to obtain a Constitution which guarantees a reasonable division of powers, and an electoral system that allows the expression of popular political sentiment.
The future of the “Egyptian Spring” depends largely on the success of such cooperation. If one of the political forces prefers to make a separate deal with the SCAF to seek short term political advantages, it will be difficult to forecast substantial changes.
Only when (and if!) a new constitutional framework is in place, we will probably see a return to a competition between the secular and the confessional components of an Egyptian society, in the throes of a slow and uneven process of modernisation. It will be the responsibility of the military establishment – as it still retains so much power – to ensure that this competition remains on a peaceful level and support the development of the basic prerequisites for democracy: the rule of law, division of powers and widespread literacy. The Egyptian military can play the role of a referee of the political process in Egypt, or continue to be directly involved as one of the main players. This is the choice that will make all the difference.
Francesco Aloisi de Larderel is the former Italian Ambassador to Egypt