Consensus for the Justice and Development party (AKP) has risen compared to 2007 general elections, but not as much as expected. Why?
The 49.9 per cent result is outstanding – but they didn’t get more seats in parliament because two of the opposition parties did much better. So it didn’t feel quite as good as last time!
How much have Prime Minister’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan charismatic personality and image affected or influenced the election’s results?
Immensely. Prime Minister Erdogan is the most effective leader the country has had since Ataturk’s day. Voting for AKP means voting for him. But AKP is also extremely well organized, and that has to be taken into account as well.
Compared to before, Erdoğan and his ministers have kept a low profile rhetoric despite of AKP’s clear victory, refraining from an exaggerated celebration…
Well, they are used to winning, and the victory isn’t so spectacular as before because they have not got enough seats in parliament to change the constitution on their own. Mr. Erdoğan in particular had hoped to create a presidential system, which now seems very unlikely to materialize.
Which role has religion played in the electoral campaign?
Not much. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) based its message on its secular brand, but did not get a huge vote as a result. AKP does not stress Islam, it stressed development and money. That seemed to work.
AKP has promised a new reformist and inclusive constitution. Do you believe it will (be able to) stick to these promises?
Yes, it will have to make an honest effort on constitutional reform.
The outgoing AKP government’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce has released a 226-page “Turkey’s Industrial Strategy Document (2011-2014)” last December. How seriously does the new government take the economic issue?
The government prioritizes economic issues in the sense that it puts development first. On the other hand, it has had a relatively easy ride in recent years, with plentiful international capital to fuel its spending and current account deficits. There will be a correction at some point, but nobody knows when, and nobody in the government talks about it much.
Syrian refugees are flooding into Turkey and the government’s (verbal) reactions to Bashar al-Assad’s violent repression of protesters are becoming more severe (even if still mixed), starting with Ankara’s open message ahead of Assad’s speech that if he failed to announce reforms even in a third attempt he would “miss a big chance” to preserve power. On the other side Turkey seems to understand the importance of avoiding a miscalculation over Syria similar to the Western interventionist’s overestimation of the Libyan opposition. And there are strategic and economic ties between Turkey and Syria. Any forecasts about this issue?
In the short term, there is great stress in the relationship. In the medium and long term, once the transition in Syria starts happening, I think we will see Turkey move up with a very strong supportive role for any future, more democratic new government. Only one per cent of Turkey’s exports go to Syria, but it has a broad set of links to the country due to its proximity, the dependence of Syrian businesses on Turkey, and the many Syrians who visit Turkey.
Do you think that the Syrian problem will affect the goals and features of Turkey’s engagement in the Middle East?
I think the rhetorical side of Turkey’s Middle East engagement will change, in the sense that they will no longer try to accommodate dictatorial leaders so much. Turkey will also worry that there is not so much money to be made in the Middle East as well. If Turkey is wise, it will also act to normalize its relationship with the EU, which has almost slipped off the radar despite the fact that Turkey is supposed to be negotiating for full membership. But Turkey’s aim to build up more stability and interdependence in the Middle East will remain, since instability affects Turkey negatively as well.