In your book you write that “articles that ‘demonize’ China are often given full play in major Western newspapers.” How do you explain it? Are the reasons geopolitical, economical or cultural?
One reason is the need to focus on stories that sell papers. Certain public prejudices make some stories more newsworthy than others and those stories further reinforce those prejudices. Since the killings of June 4th, 1989 in Beijing, the Chinese government has been widely viewed as a ruthless and authoritarian regime that oppresses its citizens and stories that fit into that narrative are easier to sell. For example, the March race riots in Lhasa involved random killings of Chinese civilians but much of the reporting had the effect of hardening Western opinion against China. The Chinese government does exercise repressive rule over Tibet, but many other governments oppress minority groups and coverage of Tibet does seem somewhat disproportionate. Another factor that helps to explain why Westerners care so much about Tibet is that they often look at it as a kind of Shangri-La, an idyllic otherness to modernity.
Negative reporting about China is also related to its economic rise and the worry about economic competition from China. The fears are often irrational: so many Western consumers benefit from affordable Chinese products, the profits often flow to multinationals, and China bears the brunt of the environmental degradation. But the impact of trade with China is clearest when jobs are lost and Western politicians have a ready scapegoat. Hence, stories about poisonous foods and medicines, exploitation in factories and deaths in mines, and pollution in Beijing get wide airplay, the sub-text being that China is enjoying an unfair advantage by cutting corners and oppressing its own people in the quest for export markets.
There is also a perception of a military threat from China. Even though the country may be decades behind the United States in terms of military technology and it is surrounded by several countries with US bases, some American politicians play up the military challenge from China and this gets reported in the press. Shortly after it assumed power, the George W. Bush administration exaggerated the “China threat”, but China was “lucky” to be surpassed by another perceived enemy after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Now, China is often viewed as a long-term threat, and even some politicians in the Democratic Party speak of maintaining US military superiority rather than invoking a vision of a multi-polar world with different spheres of influence and responsibility, not to mention the possibility of a radically demilitarized future.
Perhaps racism also helps to explain negative perceptions of China. Given the history of racism in the West, it would be foolhardly to discount that possibility. I would argue, however, that another factor is more important: the rise of national pride along with the revival of tradition in China. For most of the twentieth century, Chinese liberals and Marxists engaged in a totalizing critique of their own heritage and looked to the West for inspiration. It may have been flattering for Westerners – look, they want to be just like us! – but there is less sympathy now that Chinese are taking pride in their own heritage and turning to their own traditions for thinking about social and political reform. When thinking about politics, many Westerners work with a democracy/authoritarian dichotomy: if they’re not fully in support of democracy, then they must be authoritarians. But what if there are Confucian-inspired political alternatives that don’t fit neatly in that dichotomy? I would argue that some mixture of Confucian-inspired meritocracy with democratic characteristics will shape China’s future, and it’s a mistake to box those debates in “West-centric” political categories.
How is the financial crisis going to change relations between China and the West?
For the moment, China is more confident that its model of capital controls and tightly regulated markets may be sustainable. The days when US Treasury Secretary Paulson could come to China and lecture the Chinese about the need to further deregulate markets are over. China will also seek more representation and power in international financial institutions such as the IMF. The government will look more to its own consumers to stimulate growth because it realizes the risk of heavy dependence on exports. To a certain extent, there are converging interests – in the long term, the US to save more and consume less – but if the US enacts protectionist measures then relations will take a turn for the worse.
What are the most shocking stereotypes about China you have found in the Western media?
The most shocking, in the sense of wrong, is the portrayal of China as a totalitarian country that controls the detailed aspects of the everyday lives of its citizens. But China has been undergoing a process of “detotalitarianization” the past three decades or so – now, citizens are free to marry, find work, travel, do business, etc. To the extent there are limits on choices in private lives, it has as much to do with economic factors (e.g., too few jobs for new graduates) as with political factors. The process of “detotalitarianization” is of course incomplete, and there is a need for further loosening of the state’s control in areas such as the media. On the other hand, the state is relatively weak in dealing with some socially necessary tasks like tax collection and there might be a need for a stronger state in those areas.
What does the West fail to understand about the Chinese system?
Regarding human rights, it is important to allow for the possibility that there are different ways of prioritizing values in cases of conflict and we shouldn’t assume that our way is necessarily the best. For example, the idea that the state has a first obligation to provide for people’s basic material needs has a long history in China, it wasn’t just invented by the communists. Over two thousand years ago, Mencius argued that the government must provide for the people’s basic means of subsistence so that they won’t go morally astray. Such ideas were influential throughout Chinese imperial history. So the idea that political rights must be sacrificed in cases of conflict with economic rights doesn’t seem so implausible in China.
It is also important to compare China’s human rights record with countries at similar levels of economic development. There is a tendency to draw comparisons with the US or Western Europe, but it makes more sense to compare China’s human rights record with that of countries like Mexico, Russia, and India. In such cases – and if one takes a comprehensive view of human rights, including social and economic rights – China’s human rights record does not seem so bad and it may be heading in the right direction. This is not to deny the need the fact that some improvements are possible and necessary now, such as taking seriously negotiations that would allow for more religious freedom inTibet.
Usually Western intellectuals do not think we can learn anything from non-Western societies (while, as you write, the Chinese are now trying to learn from the Scandinavian model, too). What could we learn from Chinese society?
I think Western intellectuals are open to learning about Chinese art, medicine, and culture. Some aspects of Chinese social life, such as concern and respect for the elderly, should be appealing to Western intellectuals. But I doubt there is much openness to learning about Chinese political values, such as harmony. For one thing, the Chinese state needs to do more to take those values seriously and to show a good moral example. Once the Chinese state acts morally abroad, then it can articulate and promote its values to the rest of the world. Otherwise nobody will listen. Confucian values should also be seen to influence domestic policy, which would involve greater tolerance for different political viewpoints. One of the most famous sayings of the Analects of Confucius is that exemplary persons should purse harmony but not conformity, a contrast that was first drawn in an early text, the Zuo Zhuan, where it clearly referred to the idea that the ruler should be open to different political views among his advisers.
Having said that, I’m still not persuaded Western intellectuals will listen much until their societies experience serious social and political crises. Societies are more inclined to learning from other societies in times of crisis. For much of the twentieth century, China was in crisis – it viewed itself as “the sick man of Asia” – and it looked to the West for remedies. If Western countries go through prolonged crises, then it may look to China for political inspiration. At the moment, the need is to understand what’s going on in China and to allow for the possibility of morally justifiable differences that need to be tolerated, if not respected.
In your book you write that for the current Chinese leadership, Confucianism counts more than Marxism. Is this good news for the West?
Marxism is still the official ideology of the party and my point is that there is increased interest in Confucianism among the Chinese leadership, not that it counts more. Abroad, the government is promoting Confucian culture rather than revolutionary Marxism. For example, the opening ceremony of the Olympics, which was vetted by the Politburo, had a lot about Confucius and nothing about Mao and Marx. It’s as though the twentieth century was scratched from the collective memory. The government is also promoting Chinese language and culture abroad via the Confucius Institutes. And party schools are increasingly teaching the Confucian classics. I think it’s good news in the sense that the classics emphasize rule by moral example, informal rituals, and persuasion, with harsh punishments as a last resort. If rulers take such values seriously, and if they are educated in the classics (as opposed, say, to being exclusively trained in engineering or the sciences), they will rule with more moral sensitivity, which is good news.
Why do Chinese expatriates tend to “self-ghettoization” more than other communities?
I’m not sure if that’s true: the Koreans, for example, also tend to congregate in “Korea towns”. Anyway, one important factor that explains the “Chinatown” phenomenon is that extended families – clans – tend to work like mutual help associations, they help each other immigrate and find work. Usually they are quite poor immigrants and they work hard and sacrifice for the education of their children, who are then expected to move up the economic and social ladder in their new societies. The relatively wealthy Chinese immigrants or the next generation may be less prone to “self-ghettoization”. To the extent it still happens, such factors as the desire to be close to good Chinese supermarkets and restaurants help to explain the desire to live close to other Chinese expatriates. If you’ve been to “Chinese” restaurants in small North American towns, you would know what I’m referring to. The food is awful and nobody who likes good Chinese food would want to live there.
How can Western and Chinese civil societies learn to get to know each other?
University life is part of civil society. The universities in China are much more free than expected, and more exchanges between students and professors would help to defuse misunderstandings and the dangers of unncessary conflict between China and the West. Actually, I think most educated Chinese know much more about Western societies than educated Westerners know about China. One reason is that educated Chinese often learn English and travel abroad, and many Western works are translated in Chinese. Now there is increased interest in learning the Chinese language in the West, which is a good thing. But how many Chinese academic works are translated in Western languages? We still have a long way to go.
It’s also worth noting that “civil societies” may operate differently and we may need to respect those differences. For example, the liberal ideal of civil society imagines a group of citizens engaged in free and open dialogue without any power relations influencing the outcome. But Chinese visions may allow for some justifiable hierarchies, for example, hierarchies based on age. The Confucian view is that moral judgment improves as one gets older, as one experiences different roles and deepens experience in particular role. So it might make more sense to give extra voice to the elderly in civil society, an idea that would appear strange in Western contexts.
Will China become a source of stability or instability for international relations?
At this point, I’m relatively optimistic. I can’t imagine China launching wars against far away countries in the face of global opinion. I also think China has a huge stake in the global economic system and the government will do its best to stabilize it. It also depends on other governments. If China is treated like an enemy, it will begin to act like one. For example, the Republican presidential candidate John McCain had a proposal to form something like a “League of Democracies”. Such proposals would be viewed negatively by the Chinese regime, just as Russia reacted negatively to NATO expansion. Why go out of your way to confront and encircle regimes with common interests? Hopefully the Democrats will not go along that road.
Do you have any suggestions for American President-Elect Obama to improve relations between China and the US?
Show genuine interest in Chinese culture, perhaps even use a few Chinese words in speeches addressing the Chinese. I realize the President Obama won’t have much free time on his hands, but that will warm the hearts of the Chinese and make it easier to solve problems.