In Europe and the United States, politics has long been dominated by cultural wars, leading to extreme polarization in public debate. One consequence of this is the overshadowing of economic disparities and social conflicts. What are the origins of this phenomenon, how has it evolved in recent years, and how can it be addressed? To explore these questions, Reset DOC spoke with Mimmo Cangiano, professor of Literary Criticism and Comparative Literature at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Among his most recent works are Cultura di destra e società di massa (Right-Wing Culture and Mass Society, Nottetempo, 2022) and Guerre culturali e neoliberismo (Cultural Wars and Neoliberalism, Nottetempo, 2024).
In the Euro-Atlantic world, everything tends to turn into a culture war. What are the origins of this phenomenon?
This phenomenon has been unfolding for more than thirty years. The term culture wars was coined in the early 1990s, coinciding with the collapse of real socialism and the rise of center-left governments, particularly the so-called Third Way of Blair and Clinton. Soon after, at least initially, these cultural conflicts became part of a left-wing ideology increasingly detached from class discourse.
The core idea was that while the economic system had no real alternative, it could be improved with certain adjustments. On the one hand, these adjustments were socio-economic, still grounded in the social democratic tradition. On the other, they took the form of symbolic reparations—forms of emancipation that occurred primarily on a cultural level.
In this context, even in Italy—not just in the United States—there were early signs of what would later be called political correctness as early as the 1990s. For example, certain terms were rejected in favor of more neutral or refined alternatives, such as replacing netturbino (garbage man) with operatore ecologico (ecological operator).
How did it develop over time?
For about fifteen years, the culture war ideology on the left seemed dormant, but it never truly disappeared. Instead, it persisted within activist circles and U.S. universities, where it became closely tied to specific theoretical and cultural movements—most notably, the widespread influence of French Theory. Cultural wars re-emerged in this form around the mid-2000s, once again reflecting the broader political failure—on both the left and the right—to challenge the economic system in any meaningful way.
Are there cultural wars from the right?
Yes. A recent example is Trump’s claim that, if elected, he would put an end to the bullshit of liberal discourse. This was, in effect, a move in the culture war from the right. With this statement, he signaled to his voters that an entire narrative that did not represent them would be dismantled under his leadership. In doing so, he offered them a form of symbolic-cultural compensation, operating on what we might call a superstructural level—using a Marxist term to refer to ideology.
So, Trump’s attack on the left is also part of the cultural wars. Has something similar happened in Italy?
Yes. In Italy, one of the right’s most effective ideological tools over the past decade has been the concept of “buonismo” (roughly, naïve do-goodism), which has been highly effective in mobilizing its base. Right-wing voters have united in opposition to “buonismo”, making it a key rallying point.
The left has struggled to counter this accusation effectively, partly because there is a kernel of truth in it. One could argue that “buonismo” consists of accepting capitalism—a system that is far from benevolent—while focusing primarily on maintaining politically correct language.
At the same time, the right is often accused of “cattivismo” (harshness or cruelty) by the left for its intolerant and politically incorrect attitudes. But even on the right, no one really questions the economic system or how it functions, is that correct?
Yes. On the right, we see a familiar pattern: on one hand, there are vague—extremely vague—gestures toward a socially driven form of anti-capitalism. On the other, when it comes to economic policy, the right continues to uphold the core principles of neoliberalism.
In Italy, for example, Salvini can oppose globalization by championing the tradition of the presepe (Nativity scene) while simultaneously advocating for a flat tax to attract large transnational investments. Similarly, Culture Minister Giuli can invoke painter and Fascist ideologist, Julius Evola and the values of national identity while promoting a fully commercialized vision of culture, ready to be sold to the highest bidder.
Ultimately, sovranismo (sovereignism) is not an alternative to neoliberalism—it is a byproduct of it.
The right accuses the left of “buonismo”, while the left accuses the right of “cattivismo.” What other culture war trends exist in Italy and the broader Euro-Atlantic world?
In recent years, two significant trends have emerged: woke politics and rossobrunismo—a hybrid ideology that combines far-left anti-capitalism with far-right nationalism and sovereignism.
The woke movement seeks to challenge the system by advocating for minority recognition, promoting political correctness, and emphasizing diversity and pluralism. Rossobruni, on the other hand, aim to disrupt the system by positioning the nation-state in opposition to a corrupt global market.
Each side accuses the other of being complicit in the status quo. Rossobruni argue that woke politics remains trapped within a liberal framework, addressing issues that are ultimately part of capitalism itself. Meanwhile, the woke critique of rossobrunismo is that it revives the right’s traditionalist, monolithic, and universalist discourse.
Ultimately, both movements see themselves as genuinely anti-system while viewing the other as reinforcing it.
And yet, both ideologies are compatible with capitalism.
Capitalism is not permanently aligned with any single ideology. Instead, it constantly shifts, adapting to whatever best serves profit. Individual capitalists adjust their ideological stance based on what benefits their economic interests.
A recent example is Amazon, which initially embraced woke politics—donating hundreds of millions to social justice causes and implementing inclusive language training—only to later support Trump. Shortly before his victory, The Washington Post owner Jeff Bezos even silenced journalists at the paper who had been critical of Trump.
Capitalist ideology is never fixed because capitalists compete with one another. As a result, they adopt and tolerate different ideologies as needed. Even Marxist symbols have been commodified and stripped of their revolutionary meaning—Che Guevara T-shirts are a prime example.
Can ideological change influence economic and political transformation, or is it inevitably assimilated and instrumentalized? What role can intellectuals and public debate play in this context?
I firmly believe that ideology—the superstructure—can influence the structure, meaning the economic and political system. However, this can only happen if it connects with a real social movement and leads to tangible societal effects. Unfortunately, this is not happening today.
More than 120 years ago, Antonio Labriola noted that, in the absence of a revolutionary outlet, he had no choice but to write books. It seems that we are still in the same situation.
This is a challenging issue because, in the absence of a practical outlet for their ideas, many intellectuals today believe that emancipation can be achieved through the market. They tend to think that ideological battles are the only ones left to fight.
However, this overlooks an important truth: when ideas are commercialized and disconnected from practical action and social movements, they risk becoming mere commodities. This tendency is magnified by the logic of culture wars, which often distracts from the need for real structural change.
Do you think this is reflected in the debate surrounding today’s “waged” wars?
Today, there is a risk of interpreting ongoing “waged” wars as clashes of civilizations, to borrow from Huntington’s concept, and thus as forms of culture wars. However, this interpretation is incomplete. The wars we see today are, in fact, clashes between different forms of capitalism. While cultural issues play a role, they are not the only battleground.
Take, for example, the mobilization around the Gaza conflict. It has been largely framed in cultural terms, which has had ambivalent consequences. On the one hand, it sparked political engagement among a generation sensitive to postcolonial issues, leading many to support Palestine. On the other hand, this postcolonial push has been limited, often detached from a critique of the transnational capitalist system of exploitation.
In your view, should we address the culture wars from the perspective of class struggle? How?
The culture wars should be taken seriously; they are not, as sometimes claimed, an invention of the right. However, we need to transform the culture wars into material wars as well. I believe this can be achieved by adopting the perspective of class struggle.
While gender and race represent identities, class is not an identity—it’s the position each of us occupies within the capitalist production system. Of course, gender, race, and other differences constantly intersect with class, meaning that we don’t all experience class in the same way. I fully support the culture war theorists on this point. However, gender, race, and other differences don’t erase our class position, and class isn’t equivalent to these differences. Rather, it defines how they play out in specific contexts.
This is the lens through which we need to reconsider the culture wars—by analyzing them through the framework of class struggle and understanding their intersectionality.
Cover photo: A man argues with an anti-gay religious protestor at the 2023 LA Pride Parade on June 11, 2023 in Hollywood, California. (Photo by Robyn Beck / AFP)
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