General Joseph Aoun, until now the commander-in-chief of the army, is the new president of Lebanon. This marks the end of a dramatic, thirty-year chapter in the troubled history of this small yet crucial country. After 26 months of a presidential vacuum, his election officially brings to an end the so-called “Iranian” era, during which Hezbollah, the Party of God, not only achieved military success but also made Lebanon the Mediterranean terminal for exporting the Khomeinist revolution.
To conquer Lebanon, the ayatollahs relied on an alliance with the Syrian regime and, over time, gained the support of key Lebanese political actors. This played out through some of the most brutal chapters of the nation’s history, beginning in the 1980s when the nascent Hezbollah militia took control of the armed struggle against the Israeli occupiers in southern Lebanon, working alongside another occupying force, Syria under Hafez al-Assad. After Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah’s fighters remained armed, effectively seizing control of national defence policy from the state. The militia decided unilaterally when it—and consequently the entire country—would go to war. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was a high-stakes gamble aimed at consolidating absolute power.
The military defeat of Hezbollah and the collapse of the Syrian regime, which retained control over much of Syria only thanks to Lebanese militias, led to the unraveling of the Khomeinist project. This project sought to extend the “Persian Empire” to the Mediterranean by transforming Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon into what Eastern Europe had been for the Soviet Union, replacing the Sunni Arab alliance with Shiite-apocalyptic hegemony. Hezbollah was both the tool for spreading and consolidating this agenda in other territories. In Lebanon, the militia took over the state, controlling the presidency with former President Michel Aoun (a Maronite), the government with the Sunni Najib Mikati as a compliant prime minister, and parliament through its Shiite ally Nabih Berri. The election of a president opposed to Hezbollah signifies the end of political occupation. Now begins the complex process of dismantling the military occupation and rebuilding a sovereign, independent state.
General Joseph Aoun’s first challenge is to secure a ceasefire, ensure Israel’s withdrawal, and safeguard the country’s territorial integrity by fully disarming Hezbollah within a 19-mile buffer zone from the Israeli border. This disarmament must extend from the surface to underground tunnels and bunkers, which Hezbollah had constructed and which must now come under the control of the army that Joseph Aoun has led so far.
Time is running out, and the hoped-for progress has yet to materialize. January 27, the date set to review reciprocal commitments and potentially bring about a definitive cessation of hostilities, does not currently appear to promise guaranteed results.
These are arduous and interconnected tasks, highlighting that the first test of Joseph Aoun’s new Lebanon depends not only on his resolve but also on the willingness of Israel and Hezbollah. For this reason, some speculate that Joseph Aoun may feel compelled in the coming hours to confirm Najib Mikati as prime minister, as demanded by the Shiite duo of Hezbollah and its ally Amal, led by Nabih Berri. Giving way on the premiership could be the price necessary to ensure Hezbollah’s true commitment to disarmament—a promise it made but failed to honor after the 2006 war. Others argue that such a price would be too high pay.
Joseph Aoun is fully aware, as he stated in his inaugural address, that his challenge is not just about this issue but also about rebuilding a destroyed state. Can the prime minister who presided compliantly over the final phase of this destruction be the man to restart the reconstruction of the state? Many argue he is not. However, without Hezbollah’s willingness to truly disarm in the critical 19-mile zone, hostilities would persist, and the reconstruction of the state would remain little more than an unfulfillable ambition.
The point is that both Hezbollah and Joseph Aoun well understand that the issue of disarmament does not end with the disarmament within 19 miles of the Israeli border, where the Litani River flows. The ceasefire text is both ambiguous and clear at the same time. For many in the international community, Hezbollah has effectively committed to disarm not only south of the Litani but across all of Lebanon. A relevant UN resolution, 1556, is referenced in resolution 1701, which led to the 2006 ceasefire and is also mentioned in today’s ceasefire agreement. No one in Lebanon can disarm Hezbollah alone—not even the weakened or debilitated version of the group. But if Hezbollah were to agree to disarm only beyond the Litani River and not on its near side, wouldn’t that indicate the intention to continue using its weapons, as it has in the past, such as when it assassinated Rafik Hariri and other politicians and intellectuals opposed to its militia’s hegemony?
The approach Joseph Aoun might take to address this complex issue—one that many have yet to fully consider—could involve a bold step: integrating Hezbollah’s fighters into the national army, which would remain under the orders of his successor as army chief, someone who would certainly be a trusted ally. This is a complex scenario. Some argue it would be easier to implement with a prime minister willing to cooperate with Hezbollah, easing the process. Others believe such a scenario would be more difficult under such a prime minister. This critical decision is unfolding at this moment. For Hezbollah, this would not mean the end but a transformation into a Lebanese political party—one that serves a Lebanese agenda rather than a foreign one. Such a shift would be difficult, especially for a group whose founding document states that ultimate authority over its decisions rests with Ayatollah Khomeini and therefore currently his successor.
For this reason, former General Joseph Aoun must immediately begin rebuilding the state. Paradoxically, this task is as challenging as ensuring compliance with the ceasefire. To truly succeed, as he has vowed to do, Aoun must finally implement the clause in the constitutional preamble that identifies overcoming sectarianism as a national objective, a goal that has remained unaddressed since 1990.
According to Saad Kiwan, former director-general of the Samir Kassir Foundation for Freedom of Information, reached by Reset DOC, “The fact that no political force has even hinted at nominating Fouad Siniora for the premiership during the consultations that began on January 13, 2025, shows that if Joseph Aoun truly wants to rebuild the state, he will face more resistance than allies.” Fouad Siniora is the man who held Lebanon together after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri by Hezbollah on Assad’s orders. Killed in 2005, Hariri had rebuilt central Beirut as best as he could, creating a national identity and a shared space for all Lebanese. Siniora was the only one able to distinguish Lebanon from Hezbollah, the so-called Party of God, during the 2006 war, which some observers believe Hezbollah instigated to make the Lebanese forget the assassination of Hariri by rekindling external enmity. Siniora also conceived resolution 1701, which pulled Lebanon out of that conflict and, reinforced by an international monitoring committee, helped Lebanon escape the conflict of the past fall.
Fouad Siniora, a Sunni, has previously served as prime minister and could do so again. Why isn’t he being considered? “Because Siniora understands the workings of the state and the sectarian system—what can be salvaged, adjusted, and its distortions. He is a civil servant with a political agenda dedicated to rebuilding institutions, not an institutional agenda serving those who have occupied and distorted them,” Kiwan explains. “It’s striking that one of the few Lebanese with an internationally respected track record, who proved himself during extremely challenging years, isn’t even being mentioned now.” He continues: “Of course, Siniora isn’t the only option. His successor, Tammam Salam, prime minister in 2014, would also offer assurances. Yet the opposition to Hezbollah’s former majority seems to have chosen the less convincing Fouad Makhzoumi. This day is crucial because the parliamentary groups’ proposals are binding—if a name emerges with majority support, the president must honor it.” Kiwan also notes: “The real news is the recent report, aired on television and cited by a parliamentarian on the evening of Sunday, January 12, that the current president of the International Court of Justice, Nawal Salam, is willing to accept the role if parliament nominates her. A jurist for a state that needs to regain its form, substance, and dignity?”
This decision is critical. While governments can be dissolved and changed quickly, Lebanon has lost so much time that Aoun cannot afford further delays. Lebanon’s state must be rebuilt from its foundations, as it has become the property of a business cartel. This is demonstrated by two interconnected facts. First, Riad Salameh served as governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon for 30 years. Known as the custodian of Lebanon’s sectarian consociationalism, he was only replaced after Lebanon declared bankruptcy, despite half of Europe seeking his arrest on charges of money laundering and other financial crimes. He was arrested just last year. This chaos rendered the Lebanese pound worthless; once pegged at 1,500 to the dollar since 1990, it now fluctuates at around 90,000. When the crisis fully erupted, the Central Bank (illegally) froze all foreign currency accounts, impoverishing countless families.
This dramatic and decisive chapter is linked to a recent investigation by the Lebanese daily Orient Today: “According to the IMF, dollar deposits were fully available in the financial system as recently as 2014, the year Ali Hassan Khalil became finance minister under pressure from Amal and Hezbollah. He held this position until 2020, the year of the default. The decision for an unstructured default became evident when Nabih Berri, the speaker of parliament, supported by former Central Bank governor Riad Salameh and the Lebanese Banks Association, refused to pass a capital control law. Five years later, this key measure—implemented in similar cases worldwide—has yet to be enforced. This allowed for huge capital outflows, estimated at around $14 billion, including $8 billion the Central Bank paid to banks in January 2020, just two months before the default declaration. While no trial has been held, multiple banking and judicial sources claim that much of this money belongs to politicians, bankers, and influential figures.”
These figures highlight what many describe as a cartel of sectarian party leaders who divide power in an impenetrable system. The infighting within the Christian, particularly Maronite, political sphere—where everyone pursues a presidential agenda due to their constitutional claim to the office—has prevented any real contribution to rebuilding the state. Antoine Courban, a professor at Saint Joseph University in Beirut, interviewed by Reset DOC remarked as follows: “Joseph Aoun’s inaugural address gave some hope to the Lebanese people. As for Christians, their inability to curb their rivalries prevents them from fulfilling their role as apostles of Lebanon’s message of fraternity, as defined by John Paul II. Perhaps this new mandate will take steps to dismantle the political cartel paralyzing the state. It is a daunting task, but I remain cautiously optimistic.”
Cover photo: Lebanon’s newly elected president Joseph Aoun smiles as he walks into a meeting at the presidential palace in Baabda, east of the capital Beirut, on January 10, 2025. (Photo by Anwar Amro / AFP)
Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn to see and interact with our latest contents.
If you like our stories, events, publications and dossiers, sign up for our newsletter (twice a month).