The October 26 elections and the developments that followed have drawn international attention to Georgia in a way not seen for some time. This interest arose both from the uncertainty surrounding the vote and, especially, from the broader historical and political context: the ongoing war in Ukraine, renewed debates about European Union expansion, and concurrent, hotly contested elections and referendums in Moldova.
Polarization in Georgia
The Georgian election was portrayed as crucial by both the opposition and the ruling Georgian Dream party. While the pro-European, pro-Western opposition presented the vote as a choice between Europe and Russia, the ruling party, associated with Bidzina Ivanishvili, framed it as a decision between war and peace. To emphasize this, Georgian Dream circulated images of bombed-out cities, warning that an opposition victory could lead to conflict and arguing that Georgia must find ways to coexist with its powerful neighbor to avoid Ukraine’s fate. Both sides intensified the polarization around the vote, tapping into two strong public sentiments: the desire to continue the path toward EU membership, backed by around 80% of Georgians, and the fear of renewed Russian aggression after Moscow’s 2008 invasion and the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In this polarized climate, with polls predicting sharply different outcomes, a contested result was expected well before election day—and that’s exactly what occurred. Tensions escalated as images circulated on social media showing alleged incidents of vote tampering and violence during the election, followed by conflicting exit polls once voting closed. Both the ruling party and opposition forces swiftly claimed victory.
Further deepening the political divide was Georgian President Salomé Zourabichvili, who has increasingly aligned herself with pro-European opposition parties and has been in open conflict with the Tbilisi government for months. She initially declared victory and then, in the hours that followed, accused Georgian Dream of staging a “Russian special operation.”
The opposition’s mistakes
The ruling party’s 54 percent result, reported by Georgia’s Electoral Commission the morning after polls closed, stunned the opposition, which immediately challenged the numbers. In the capital, where the more pro-Western forces had won, the day after the election was marked by confusion. Opposition supporters, while expecting some vote tampering, possibly affecting around 5 percent of votes, were caught off guard by such a decisive result, seemingly unprepared to respond to a scenario where even a relative majority had voted for Georgian Dream. As a result, it took several hours for any concrete protest actions to materialize, with calls for an initial mobilization only surfacing two days later.
In addition to struggling to address cases of vote tampering – even amidst undeniable irregularities – the opposition faced a decisive defeat. The widespread sense of shock was partly due to their poor performance at the polls, as they failed to mobilize voters outside major urban centers, particularly Tbilisi. This disconnect between city centers and rural areas is a phenomenon seen in many countries worldwide.
Voter turnout reached around 60 percent, an increase from the 2020 and 2016 elections, but it fell short of the opposition’s expectations. The main anti-government parties that surpassed the 5 percent threshold secured between 11 percent and just under 8 percent of the vote. This level of support was disappointing and can be attributed, in part, to the opposition’s narrow focus on the European agenda, while in many rural and peripheral areas, where clientelist networks persist, voters were more concerned with economic and social issues.
The European Union’s Support
A coordinated and immediate response from the European Union and Georgia’s international supporters was notably absent after the election. The only leader to take a public stance, primarily to serve his own political interests, was Viktor Orbán. By openly supporting Georgian Dream and traveling to Tbilisi, the Hungarian prime minister broke the EU’s silence, directly challenging Brussels in his role as the current president of the EU Council. Orbán’s visit underscored the EU’s hesitancy and highlighted its internal divisions, evident when only 13 member states initially signed a letter calling for an independent investigation into the election’s legitimacy.
Divisions were also apparent among observers from the OSCE, from NATO’s parliamentary assembly, and from European institutions assigned to monitor the election. While international delegates identified irregularities and reported a tense atmosphere in the country, they refrained from making a definitive statement on the election’s legitimacy. This cautious approach shifted responsibility to the Georgian people, indirectly bolstering the Tbilisi government’s position.
Gradually, muted support for President Zourabichvili and the opposition began to emerge from Europe. After an initial official protest, the opposition escalated the situation into a constitutional crisis: refusing to recognize the election results, declining to enter the new Parliament, and demanding new elections under international oversight. For these demands to have any chance of success, they will need both solid backing from European and Western allies and a unified stance among opposition forces – neither of which is assured.
Unity among the opposition may depend on the course of the protests, as Georgian Dream is likely to work to fracture their ranks. However, the EU’s response poses the greater challenge. Although Brussels has called on Georgian Dream for clarification, it remains uncertain about its next steps. Some member states, particularly the Baltics, accuse Russia of interference and push for a strong EU response, while others are less engaged or see no issue in working with the new Georgian government.
While Georgia holds EU candidate status, its accession process has stalled due to the increasingly authoritarian path taken by Georgian Dream. Brussels faces a difficult choice: compromise with a populist party showing anti-democratic tendencies, at the risk of Georgia resembling Belarus or Hungary –though still nominally committed to the European project and with strong public support. Alternatively, the EU could openly back the opposition and President Zourabichvili, risking a further shift by Georgian Dream toward anti-Western, pro-Russian positions and a possible loss of influence over the country, with the additional threat of a more aggressive response from the Kremlin.
For now, the EU’s commitment to Georgia remains uncertain. Meanwhile, the US, though taking a firmer stance on the election’s fairness, is currently preoccupied with its own presidential race and seems unlikely to adopt a proactive position in the short term.
The Russian position
Meanwhile, Moscow is watching from the sidelines. Although there is no concrete evidence, Russia’s well-documented pattern of interference and hybrid warfare in elections worldwide suggests that the Kremlin likely sought to influence the Georgian vote as well. In recent months, the ruling party’s decision to adopt anti-Western rhetoric and implement measures reminiscent of Russian policies has been welcomed by the Kremlin. This reflects a growing alignment of interests between Ivanishvili’s movement, which seems primarily focused on maintaining power at any cost, and Russia.
Moscow benefits from the status quo, favoring a Georgia that remains effectively neutral, with minimal claims over the two separatist regions, and particularly one that does not fully embrace European values.
Now, attention turns to the upcoming protests in the country. So far, opposition demonstrations have been numerous – though not massive – and peaceful. However, it is uncertain whether this will continue, as there doesn’t seem to be much potential for a significant turning point, similar to the Ukrainian Euromaidan. The outcome will largely depend on how much the EU and the US are willing to support the opposition and whether any government repression will maintain international focus on Tbilisi.
Cover photo: Georgian opposition supporters attend a rally to protest against the results of the parliamentary elections in Tbilisi on November 4, 2024. (Photo by Giorgi ARJEVANIDZE / AFP)
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