One year after the Hamas massacre on October 7th, the war has expanded into a regional conflict, involving Lebanon and later Iran. In Gaza, the death toll has reached nearly 42,000. Most of Hamas’ leadership – except for Yahya Sinwar – has been killed, as well as Hassan Nasrallah and much of Hezbollah’s leadership. Meanwhile, 101 Israeli hostages remain in Hamas’ hands, at least half of whom Israeli authorities believe are still alive, and violence in the West Bank has become increasingly frequent, with many analysts warning of a potential “Gaza-fication” of the area. Reset DOC reached Prof. Olivier Roy, Professor of Political Science at the European University Institute (Florence).
Prof. Roy, do you believe the October 7th attack was aimed at undermining the progress made between the Gulf Arab states and Israel, particularly through the Abraham Accords, which marked significant advancements in regional relations? Has Hamas achieved what it wanted?
I don’t think that stopping the progress of the Abraham Accords was its primary goal. Hamas knows the Arab governments well, especially leaders like Mohammed bin Salman and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. They understood that these leaders wouldn’t be swayed by October 7th. Nor do I think they expected an uprising among the Arab populations. They know that Egyptians, for example, aren’t eager to support the Palestinians – they’re actually happy to keep the Gaza border closed and certainly don’t want a million Palestinians entering Egypt.
I believe Hamas’ goal was paradoxically to push Israel into negotiations. They wanted to show Israelis that their country is not as secure as they think, that the IDF is not invincible, and that if they want peace, they must negotiate. But it was a strategic mistake, especially because of the rapes and cruelty of the attacks. Now, was that cruelty planned? What was clearly planned was to show that the IDF cannot fully protect Israeli civilians, and the objective was to take as many hostages as possible. They aimed for negotiation, as that has worked in the past – every time Hamas captured Israeli citizens or soldiers, negotiations followed.
Hamas made a huge mistake by not realizing that the brutality of the attack would make negotiations impossible. They expected a strong military response from Israel against Gaza and were prepared for guerrilla warfare. Hamas is not yet defeated, and the fight continues in Gaza. However, they miscalculated Israel’s new strategy, especially under the extreme right, which doesn’t seek negotiations or care about Palestinians – they seek expulsion.
How did Israeli strategy shift?
Israel’s strategy has shifted from seeking a security balance to a new phase with two goals: one, from the extreme right, to annex the Occupied Territories and destroy Gaza; and two, from what used to be the Israeli left, which has stopped caring about Palestinians. When the left protests, it’s for Israeli democracy and because Netanyahu didn’t negotiate over the hostages, but they don’t care if freeing one hostage means killing 500 Palestinians. So now, the Israeli right has free rein. The two-state solution is dead. It’s still a motto; it is the official position of the UN, the USA, and the European Union. But it is dead.
On the other hand, Israel’s reaction was somewhat predictable – Hamas likely expected it, including the disproportionate response against the civilian population in Gaza. One result of this is that Israel has never been as unpopular or as isolated on the global stage as it is now.
Israel is far from isolated. The Americans are fully backing Israel, Germany is completely in support, and the European Union stands with Israel as well. Argentina is supporting Israel. Ukraine is also supporting Israel. The Russians are being more cautious…
How have the consequences of the events of October 7th impacted both the broader Muslim world and the Arab world specifically?
They have had very little impact overall. Emotionally, people talk about Gaza, but in political and strategic terms, there has been no significant change. There are no large pro-Palestinian demonstrations, and the existing governments remain unaffected. They haven’t changed their policies toward Israel. The Abraham Accords are still functioning, of course discreetly. Countries like Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Egypt maintain their rapprochement and cooperation with Israel. Algeria stays disengaged. Tunisia, while expressing strong support for Palestine, has not taken any action and likely won’t. In Jordan, the situation is unchanged: the population supports Palestine, but there is little prospect for political action. In Syria, there is no response because the civil war consumes the country’s focus. Iraq, on the fringes, sees some threats from Iranian-backed militias toward the U.S., but overall, the impact has been minimal.
What about the Arabs abroad?
There have been demonstrations on campuses and in traditional protest locations like Place de la République in France. Here in Florence, we had one in Piazza San Marco. But nothing more – no terrorist actions. The number of terrorist activities is decreasing, or more precisely, their impact is. Most terrorist actions now are carried out by individuals with knives, so the impact is nowhere near that of events like Bataclan or September 11th. There’s no “intifada” in the French banlieues, as some have suggested. The youth in the french Banlieu don’t riot, they never rioted for Palestine. When they riot it’s because a young boy has been killed in an encounter with the police. It’s the same story in Los Angeles, Cincinnati, and Paris – there are riots over police actions, but not for Palestine, and they won’t be for Palestine.
So, the idea that the Middle East is in flames? No. There’s an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Hezbollah is involved. Yes, there’s an increase in casualties and bombings, but it’s a bilateral war between Israel and the Palestinians. Pro-Iranian proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis are involved on the frontlines, but Iran itself is staying in the background. The only real issue is if Iran steps up and takes a frontline position. But they won’t, for a very simple reason – they don’t have the means to attack Israel.
What is the current balance of power in this phase of the conflict between Shia and Sunni forces, particularly between the Shia power of Iran and the Sunni power of the Gulf states, especially Riyadh and Tehran?
Riyadh is quite content to see Iran being weakened by Israel. For the Sunni Gulf states, Iran is the real threat now – Israel no longer poses the same danger. I’m not talking about Morocco or Algeria; for the Maghreb, the situation is different. But in the Gulf, the focus is on Iran. The real issue now is the Arab Shias, not the Iranian Shias, and they are deeply divided. You have many Shias who oppose Iran. In Iraq, for example, there are both pro-Iranian and anti-Iranian Shia militias. Similarly, the Shias in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain do not support Iran.
For the past two years, Iran has been fighting Israel indirectly through proxies. But Hamas is not an Iranian proxy; they are on the same side because they share the same enemy. Hamas initiated the October 7th events without Iran’s direct approval. Now, Israel’s goal is to dismantle these proxies and destroy Hamas’ military forces. As a result, Iran is now in a difficult position, with its back against the wall.
The Israelis are pushing Iran to step up and fight directly, essentially saying, “If you want to fight, fight us.” But Iran is unable to, for various reasons. Militarily, the balance of power is now in Israel’s favor. There is no real Iranian military threat against Israel. The recent missile attacks from Iran were more of a display than a serious threat—it was almost a joke. Iran is simply incapable of posing a military threat to Israel. In fact, Israel can now strike Iran’s nuclear bases without needing American support. That’s something new. Up until recently, the idea of Israel attacking Iran without U.S. backing was unthinkable. But now, we know they could do it. Why? First, Israel has the technical capability. Second, the U.S. wouldn’t oppose it. And third, Mossad has successfully infiltrated both Hezbollah and Iran’s leadership at the highest levels.
According to many analysts, Netanyahu’s real objective is to remain in power. What do you think?
Yes, Netanyahu wants escalation to stay in power, but it’s not just him – the military establishment, his government, and a large portion of the population support escalation. Focusing solely on Netanyahu doesn’t capture the bigger picture. Since 1967, Israel has gradually shifted from a focus on security to one on annexation. Even when the left was in power, they never stopped the settlers – they may have asked them to keep a low profile, but they never actively opposed settlement expansion or sought rapprochement with the Palestinians. Netanyahu is a problem for the Israeli left when it comes to democracy within Israeli society, but from a geostrategic perspective, he’s not the main issue.
What do you believe could truly stop this escalation? We’ve mentioned Saudi Arabia and how it’s eager to see Iran weakened. Could it still play a role in this conflict, perhaps by normalizing relations with Israel?
For de-escalation, there’s no realistic path right now. The only ones who could push for de-escalation are the Americans, but they won’t, especially with elections around the corner. If Trump is re-elected, he’ll likely give Israel free rein. If Harris takes power, they’ll use big words but won’t take significant action.
What could change the situation? Strong pressure from Russia. But with Russia entangled in Ukraine, they don’t want to get involved in the Middle East. Russia also maintains good relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, so if the Arabs tell Russia to stay out, they likely will. Turkey won’t intervene either – Erdogan talks a lot, but he’s still sending weapons to Israel. Military cooperation between Turkey and Israel continues because it’s business, and business goes on.
Given the current balance of power, there’s no reason to stop escalation. In fact, the more Israel perceives Iran’s weakness, the more they’ll push forward because they believe they can win. I suspect they’ll even attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, and the Saudis will be quite happy about that.
Cover photo: “Europe, Religion, Integration: A Lecture by Olivier Roy”, at Boston University Pardee School of Global Studies. Friday, February 3, 2017. Courtesy of the Center for the Study of Europe Boston University from Boston, USA (Wikimedia Commons)
Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn to see and interact with our latest contents.
If you like our stories, events, publications and dossiers, sign up for our newsletter (twice a month).