According to the BBC, the missile attack on Hezbollah’s general command bunker is said to have caused 492 casualties, in addition to the wounded. The Israeli army has announced the killing, among others, of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and nearly the entire senior leadership of the party. The number of Lebanese casualties, especially in southern Lebanon and the Shiite neighborhoods of Beirut, remains unknown, as no one can yet account for those trapped beneath the rubble. Israeli forces have gained control of strategic positions near the border, while hand-to-hand combat between Hezbollah militants and Israeli soldiers has already claimed eight Israeli lives.
Despite these developments, few believe Hezbollah will disappear, and in the wake of Tehran’s missile strike against Israel – following a video message from Prime Minister Netanyahu directed at “the Persians” – the intensity and duration of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon may be shaped by the precarious regional dynamics. The Lebanese army has attempted to regain control of the country but has already ceded the last five kilometers before the border.
The full consequences of what has happened in Beirut will take time to comprehend, and there is growing concern over the potential “cantonization” of Lebanon as a de facto reality. To bring clarity without succumbing to emotions, yet without losing awareness or humanity, it will be helpful to follow three key paths: how Lebanon arrived at this point, what immediate internal challenges it faces, and what kind of country it could become. It is not feasible to simultaneously address the decisions and issues of the other parties involved.
How has Lebanon reached this point?
Hezbollah is one of the poisoned fruits of the well-known chain of errors that paved the way for the Khomeinist victory in Iran. In fact, it emerged shortly after the revolution, in the early 1980s, as a bridgehead for the Iranian Khomeinist regime on the opposite end of the territory that Tehran sought to control politically, economically, and militarily – much like the Soviet Union did in Eastern Europe with its “brother regimes.” This vast area includes Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, later expanding to Yemen, a crucial ally in securing control of access to the Red Sea.
In this way, Iran would have exported its revolution to countries that were once the centers of ancient Islamic caliphates, such as Syria and Iraq, while securing Beirut as a maritime terminal to one day realize its long-sought pipeline for exporting oil to Europe.
Over the years, Hezbollah has become Iran’s operational arm in all Middle Eastern conflicts. Many years ago, when Israel expelled dozens of Hamas leaders to southern Lebanon, it allowed Hezbollah to establish direct ties with this organization, despite their different sectarian orientations. This created the conditions for Iran to secure a solid foothold in claiming the Palestinian cause.
Hezbollah’s efficiency challenged Arab leaderships of various sectarian orientations, who were openly accused of ineptitude and corruption. This criticism resonated with broad segments of the public, fostering a sense of alignment with Hezbollah.
However, Hezbollah’s enormous success has transformed it into a criminal enterprise, with connections in various sectors, particularly drug trafficking, money laundering, and arms smuggling.
But money often leads to corruption, and it appears that corruption may have been Hezbollah’s downfall. It opened the door to uncontrollable actors and environments, undermining its intelligence network and making it vulnerable to enemy infiltration, as recent events demonstrate.
On October 7 of last year, Hamas’ pogrom and the subsequent Israeli response became an opportunity for Hezbollah to seize control of the Palestinian issue and deliver a strong blow to the “corrupt monarchies of the Gulf.”
Shortly after October 7, Hezbollah indeed launched a so-called “support war” for Gaza, which forced Israel to evacuate around 70,000 people from the northern villages, unable to live safely in their homes. The goal was to establish a ceasefire with Israel that would follow the one in Gaza, enabling Hezbollah to claim it had halted the enemy and to enhance its own prestige.
This was particularly aimed at the Gulf petromonarchs, who were pursuing the opposite path – an agreement with Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside it. Such a development would have diminished Iran’s regional influence.
The war of attrition had strategic value but did not change Israel’s plans in Gaza. Instead, it resulted in the destruction of southern Lebanon and the displacement of 110,000 Lebanese – refugees in their own country – without any support from a nation economically devastated by years of mismanagement.
Lebanese blood does not count, but Hezbollah was the first to assert this in practice. The plight of the 75,000 evacuated Israelis, however, has strengthened hardline positions against Hezbollah in a country that has changed since October 7. Furthermore, internal corruption may have resulted in a devastating backlash.
Lebanon’s challenges
It is evident that Lebanon is at risk of implosion, and several potential epicenters of the emerging crisis are already becoming apparent. One of these epicenters involves the only land escape route from the country: Syria.
Even on Friday morning, before the strike against Hezbollah’s headquarters, many were fleeing Lebanon to a country that no one would choose to enter unless driven by desperation.
Being in a Lebanon already suffering from an overwhelming economic crisis, now ravaged by bombings in certain areas and gripped by panic over potential developments, makes this extreme choice understandable.
In the past three days, reports indicate that there are 30,000 refugees, with 80 percent being Syrians and 20 percent Lebanese, according to the UNHCR on September 27.
Lebanon has opened its borders with Syria, allowing anyone wishing to flee to do so without issues, including those who entered Lebanon illegally from Syria. This decision aligns with the well-known Lebanese desire to rid the country of Syrian refugees, as there is a plan to expel 30,000 of them, which, according to the Lebanese news agency, will be finalized in the coming weeks.
Thus, all Syrians who have sought refuge in Lebanon – including both registered and undocumented individuals, old and new – can return to Syria. Their numbers are substantial, with estimates suggesting that nearly two million refugees, both documented and undocumented, are currently in Lebanon.
The issue is that while Lebanese can cross the border without problems, Syrians must endure long lines, as they are required to pay one hundred dollars per person at the border to return to their country. Many large families do not have this amount. Will they be able to cross? If Syria continues to refuse to welcome them safely, who will manage their return?
Here, sea migration comes into focus, already facilitated by smugglers with considerable backing. The boats are available and being produced in Syria, and alongside the Syrian refugees, Lebanese have also been spotted on board.
This phenomenon is poised to emerge and strengthen, especially given the conditions Lebanon has faced for years. The fragile Lebanese state is unlikely to oppose it; in fact, it may even facilitate it.
To understand why, one need only consider Lebanon’s economic reality alongside the burden of its Syrian refugees.
Lebanon has been experiencing one of the most severe economic crises in the world, during which its national currency has lost all value in just a few years. In 2019, 1,500 Lebanese pounds equaled one dollar, as it had since 1991. Now, to purchase a dollar, one needs approximately 100,000 pounds. Additionally, current banking regulations prevent Lebanese citizens from receiving remittances in foreign currency from abroad.
Another potential crisis, if not already underway, involves the Christian areas adjacent to the Shiite regions, where mass flight is occurring due to the bombings. Community relations have held in the past, but now fears have emerged, primarily of two types. The most serious concern is this: if there are prominent leaders or members of Hezbollah among the Shiite refugees, it could lead to bombings in these territories as well. This fear has been expressed on many Lebanese websites and can only exacerbate the situation. The risk is a clash between the confessions.
There is indeed a constant fear that internal migration, initially temporary, could become permanent, thereby altering the confessional demographics. This issue is particularly concerning for the often insular and fearful Christian mountain communities, which sometimes have strained relations with their neighbors due to territorial disputes. Additionally, the Shiite community is growing in number, while the Christian community is shrinking. Will the army be sufficient to keep everything under control?
Many other crises are on the horizon, starting with the need to contain internal unrest in the large city of Beirut.
The bombings have been particularly violent in the southern part of the city, where the Shiite neighborhoods are located, including Hezbollah’s headquarters and the residences of party leaders and their militia.
The recently killed leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, along with the party, oversaw a parallel assistance system – one that is contentious and objectively questionable, but nonetheless reassuring for part of the population.
If many people fear that this support will diminish, maintaining order in the city will be a more complicated task than in smaller towns. The ongoing turmoil suggests that this risk is indeed real.
What country could Lebanon become
To understand what Lebanon will become, it is essential to remember what it once was: a bastion of Arab freedom and nationalism. Until the 1970s, Lebanon served as a refuge for dissidents from various backgrounds, not just Arabs. Thanks to its open relationship with religion – largely shaped by its significant 19th-century legacy – Lebanon fostered a coexistence of Islam and democratic freedoms within a multi-confessional and cosmopolitan society. Moreover, due to the efforts of both Protestant and Catholic missionaries, it became a center of education in the Arab world.
Those seeking education from across the Arab world traveled to Lebanon, attending its high schools and universities. Although it was never favored by nationalists, Lebanon began to move beyond the ideology of a single Arab nation by proposing the Arab League – a concept similar to today’s European Union, representing a union of sovereign states linked by a common culture. Economic success soon followed; the Bank of Lebanon issued loans in national currency to India and boasted the fourth-largest airline in the world.
The troubles began when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, after the Arab defeat in 1967, supported the relocation of Palestinian fedayeen (“resistance fighters”) to Lebanon during the Khartoum summit.
This transfer threatened the delicate balance among Lebanon’s various confessional communities, raising fears of a disruption in their equilibrium. The influx of weapons further exacerbated tensions, ultimately plunging the country into a devastating civil war, where all sides bore some responsibility for the conflict.
Today, it is important to highlight a lesser-known factor attributed to Christian groups: their declaration of war on central Beirut as a promiscuous city, both socially and architecturally. They envisioned Beirut modeled after Berlin, with its long, well-structured avenues. The aim was for Beirut to “emerge” from the Middle East, transforming from an Arab city into a Europeanized, modern, and Mediterranean one.
The civil war lasted 15 years, from 1975 to 1990, and it took a controversial figure like Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri to rebuild the city center, which had been utterly devastated by the warring militias.
When Hezbollah operatives assassinated him in 2005, as confirmed by the International Tribunal, Lebanon entered a slow and painful decline. This murder marked a breaking point between Hezbollah and Lebanon as a state, which the Khomeinist militia has undermined through a shocking series of assassinations and numerous accomplices. While the details may not be necessary, they illustrate why Lebanon risks disintegration.
When people referred to Lebanon as the “Switzerland of the Middle East,” they were not simply envisioning its beautiful green hills and snow-capped peaks; rather, they were alluding to a confessional cantonization, which poses a significant risk for the future.
Many Christians openly express this sentiment, reflecting a tribal backlash and a rejection of their history, which has been fundamental to the birth of a country that is cosmopolitan by choice and vocation. Such a drift is concerning and would severely undermine hopes for internal growth within Arab societies, beyond the tribal dimension.
Certainly, the waning of Hezbollah’s totalitarian power also benefits Lebanon’s cosmopolitan character.
However, the disintegration of the crucial Sunni bloc that Hariri had modernized could lead to dire consequences. Some voices in Beirut opposed to Hezbollah emphasize that it seems highly unlikely that the Party of God can be uprooted and replaced by a pluralistic entity.
Therefore, history offers guidance on the way forward.
On February 14, 2005, Valentine’s Day, a devastating explosion rocked the center of Beirut, leaving a massive crater that made the Lebanese capital’s waterfront impassable. It is not until 2020 that the International Tribunal concluded that Hezbollah operatives detonated the car carrying former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a Sunni Muslim who had rebuilt the war-torn downtown area of Beirut, along with the 22 people traveling with him.
On March 14, a million Lebanese took to the streets to honor the assassinated Prime Minister and demand the withdrawal of Syrian occupation forces, who were seen as allies and alleged instigators of the crime carried out by Hezbollah.
On May 7 of the same year, the Christian writer Samir Kassir was murdered in the street.
On June 21, former Communist Party Secretary Georges Hawi was assassinated.
On December 12, Christian writer Gebran Tuéni was killed.
On November 21, 2006, Christian Minister Pierre Gemayel was assassinated.
On December 1, 2006, Hezbollah laid siege to the Prime Minister’s palace to demand his resignation.
This is the totalitarian project from which Lebanon must free itself, but it must find a way to include the Shia component, essential for avoiding sectarian drift.
To achieve this, Lebanon needs a surge of dignity from its national leadership and the immediate formation of a national unity government. This government should not impose cultural capitulations but instead respect the state and the freedoms of all its citizens.
This article was originally published in Italian on the newsletter Appunti by Stefano Feltri.
Cover photo: Iranians wave flags of Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Palestine in front of a portrait of Lebanon’s Hezbollah Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli air strike in the suburbs of Beirut, while celebrating Iran’s missile attack against Israel, in Tehran, Iran, on October 1, 2024. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl / NurPhoto / NurPhoto via AFP)
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