In Germany, September dealt a harsh blow to Olaf Scholz‘s Ampel, the “Traffic light” coalition of Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and Liberals (FDP). Elections on September 1 in the eastern states of Thuringia and Saxony underscored the government’s deepening crisis. While the September 22 vote in Brandenburg brought a faint glimmer of hope, particularly for the SPD, it was far from a solid win for the Ampel. Nationwide polls continue to show strikingly low support for Scholz’s cabinet, raising doubts about its ability to hold together until the next national election, set for September 2025.
In Thuringia, the populist far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) won a German state election for the first time, securing 32.8 percent of the vote, well ahead of the second-place Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which garnered 23.6 percent. Although Thuringia is home to just 2 million inhabitants, this marks a historic victory for the identitarian right. Notably, the Thuringian branch of the AfD is led by Björn Höcke, the most prominent figure of the party’s more extreme right-wing faction. In Saxony, the far-right AfD came in a close second with 30.6 percent of the vote, just 1.3 percentage points behind the CDU.
In both Thuringia and Saxony, support for the Ampel coalition parties was astonishingly low: under 11 percent in Thuringia and less than 14 percent in Saxony. In contrast, the state elections in Brandenburg resulted in a victory of the SPD with 30.9 percent of the vote, narrowly beating the AfD (29.2 percent). This result was rightfully celebrated by the Social Democrats, as polls had predicted an AfD win for months.
However, it is worth noting that the SPD’s success was largely due to a substantial “useful anti-AfD” vote, which drew many voters away from its national Ampel coalition partners. The Greens fell to 4.1 percent, failing to enter the state parliament, while the FDP virtually disappeared, polling below 1 percent. Furthermore, the SPD’s victory in Brandenburg was primarily a local success, driven by its candidate Dietmar Woidke, who has governed the state since 2013. In fact, Woidke’s campaign was largely centered on distancing himself from the SPD-led federal government and Chancellor Scholz.
The Brandmauer – the Firewall
Despite its success in Thuringia and strong second-place finishes in Saxony and Brandenburg, the AfD is not expected to join any state government. All the other major parties in these three states have reaffirmed their commitment to the so-called Brandmauer (“Firewall”) against the AfD, rejecting any coalition with the far-right. This stance has also been echoed by Sahra Wagenknecht’s newly formed populist left-wing party, BSW, which emerged from a split from the far-left Die Linke. BSW represents a revival of conservative leftism, grounded in anti-immigration, anti-NATO, and pro-Russian Eurasianism. The party performed remarkably well, securing 15.8 percent in Thuringia, 11.8 percent in Saxony, and 13.5 percent in Brandenburg.
Forming the next governments, at least in Thuringia and Saxony, is expected to be quite challenging. The CDU may be forced to consider alliances with the BSW or the Linke – or even both. However, it is no secret that some CDU politicians in the east would prefer to open a dialogue with the AfD, despite the national party’s strict prohibition of any cooperation with them.
AfD’s Deep Roots in Eastern Germany
The AfD’s relative majority in Thuringia and its strong showing – nearly a third of the vote – in Saxony and Brandenburg were not unexpected. These results follow long-established political trends in eastern Germany that have been consistent for years. In the former socialist GDR, the AfD has become increasingly entrenched, drawing its support from two key social groups: those who feel betrayed by the promises of German Reunification and those who perceive themselves as an unfulfilled elite in the eastern states. While the 1990 Reunification significantly improved the quality of life in East Germany, not everyone benefitted, and the economic and social divide between West and East remains stark. Many in the East who feel they were left behind by the Reunification have turned to the AfD as the party that best represents their dissatisfaction. The same is true for those who, in recent decades, hoped to become part of a new local East German elite but were disappointed as many leadership positions were filled by an influx of West German managers, academics, politicians, businessmen, and civil servants.
Today, in the former GDR, the AfD is no longer just an occasional protest party – it has become something deeper: an expression of identity for a segment of eastern Germany, driven by what can be described as the ethnicization of social, cultural, and ideological demands. The far-right amplifies this through populist nationalism and conservative identitarianism, in some cases even aligning with neo-Nazism or its ideological offshoots. This development is partially facilitated by a different historical relationship with Germany’s Schuld (“guilt”) over National Socialism in the East.
In West Germany, the rejection of far-right positions was a cornerstone of the liberal-democratic social order built after 1945 and later extended to reunified Germany in 1990. But in the former GDR, political education centered around Nazi guilt played a much smaller role in societal self-reckoning. Today, for about a third of East Germans, challenging certain aspects of the rejection of far-right ideologies is seen as an anti-systemic counter-narrative to the current German state and its mainstream cultural paradigms. Paradoxically, this dynamic is also intertwined with the historical distrust that some former GDR citizens have toward the state as an institution, a distrust that has evolved into a new form of right-wing rebelliousness.
Anti-Immigration and Neo-Identitarianism
In both East and West Germany, anti-immigration sentiment remains the primary political driver of the AfD. These views are rooted in a rejection of immigration as a contingent phenomenon and strongly fuel debates linking immigration to key security issues like crime and terrorism. However, this anti-immigration stance also reflects a deeper neo-nationalist worldview, characterized by a new German identitarianism and a staunch opposition to multiculturalism as a pillar of the liberal social order.
Another crucial aspect is that the populist far-right’s anti-immigration resentment is not uniformly directed at all non-Germans but is primarily focused on Muslims in Germany. This ranges from secular anti-Islamism to more extreme, absolute hostility toward Islamic communities.
“The Kids are Alt-Right”
In a world where strong identity politics have sharply defined the spectrum of political passions and claims across various communities, the AfD has succeeded in rallying support for a new form of Euro-white identitarianism in Germany. It is no surprise, then, that the AfD has found particular success among younger voters by channeling identity-based claims and neo-traditionalist aspirations through the appealing communication strategies of social media like Instagram and TikTok. In Thuringia, for instance, the AfD secured 38 percent of the votes from those aged 18 to 24. The party is also making inroads with younger voters in western Germany, as the traditional parties are starting to realize that the younger generations are not all automatically left-wing, environmentalist, or liberal.
Germany’s Domestic Intelligence Agency and the AfD
It is crucial to note that the rising support for the German far-right is unfolding despite ongoing assessments of the AfD by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency. Tasked with the active and preventive implementation of the concept of a “fortified democracy” (Wehrhafte Demokratie), the BfV has publicly placed the AfD under observation as a suspected “extreme right” party. Its evaluations are increasingly leaning toward an official classification of the party as hostile to Germany’s Freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung (FdGO), or the “liberal democratic basic order.” Additionally, the AfD’s youth organization, Junge Alternative, has already been designated as “right-wing extremist” by the BfV.
At the regional level, domestic intelligence agencies (LfV) of Thuringia, Saxony, and Saxony-Anhalt have similarly classified local AfD branches as “right-wing extremist.” Yet, contrary to the assumptions of some mainstream political analyses in Germany, these intelligence assessments appear to have had only a limited effect in dissuading citizens from supporting the AfD. A dynamic that underscores a significant divide between a minority but growing segment of society and liberal-democratic institutions, reflecting the ruling parties’ struggles to bridge this dangerous social rift. In response, the AfD has intensified its criticism of the BfV, accusing the agency of political bias and failing to adhere to principles of neutrality.
The CDU is Betting on the Next Elections
The recent elections in Brandenburg, Thuringia, and Saxony were the last significant events before the upcoming German national vote, officially scheduled for September 28, 2025. The Ampel coalition parties are approaching the election with fear and a sense of vulnerability. Despite a resurgence in Brandenburg, the SPD has lost its footing and may consider changing its leadership and candidate for chancellor. The Greens are grappling with ideological challenges and have strayed far from the enthusiasm of a few years ago, while the FDP is uncertain whether it will secure a seat in the next Bundestag.
The reality is that the far-right is already shaping Germany’s political landscape and discourse, even though the AfD currently ranks as only the second strongest party in national polls, with support estimated between 17 and 20 percent. The CDU appears to be the only party benefiting from the current scenario, consistently leading the polls with over 30 percent approval. CDU leader and confirmed chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz, known as an anti-Merkel figure, is working to reposition his party between the center-right and the conservative right. Merz aims to attract voters who wish to avoid the AfD while advocating for stricter immigration policies, reduced environmental regulations (to enhance international competitiveness in the short term), and a non-Left economic approach to welfare and public spending.
In a reactive move, the Scholz government has announced the reintroduction of anti-immigration controls at Germany’s borders, a decision recently articulated by Interior Minister Nancy Faeser and reinforced by the chancellor himself. However, it is the CDU that appears to be betting on a conservative surge that could empower it to form a coalition as the senior partner. The German Christian Democrats are engaging in a complex strategy, though, that could potentially alter the structural equilibrium of the Brandmauer against the far-right.
Cover photo: From left to right, Alice Weidel, AfD national spokesperson, Hans-Christoph Berndt, deputy chairman of the AfD Brandenburg and top candidate, and Tino Chrupalla, AfD national spokesperson, stand on stage at the election party of the Brandenburg AfD in a pub in Potsdam-Marquardt before the first projections on September 22, 2024. (Photo by Christoph Soeder / dpa Picture-Alliance via AFP)