Populism is “an ideology that considers society to be divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: a pure people and a corrupt élite,” wrote political scientist Cas Mudde in 2004. Twenty years later, the idea of a populist Zeitgeist – which Mudde titled his article after – seems less visionary as right-wing and far-right parties proliferate across Europe, both at the national level and within the EU. Some of these parties, like Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia, have risen to power, albeit in coalition, becoming Italy’s leading party with a solid 28.8 percent. Others, such as Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, have gained significant influence, coming third in the French legislative elections, just behind the cordon sanitaire between Macron and the Nouveau Front Populaire. Similar trends are seen with Austria’s FPÖ and Germany’s AfD, both ranking first and second in the European elections in their respective countries. Although excluded from the new “Ursula majority,” the conservatives in the ECR and the Patriots of Europe (recently joined by Identity and Democracy) are now the third and fourth largest political groups in the European Parliament.
The Decline of Traditional Parties
At the political roots of the right’s ascent in Europe lies the decline of traditional parties. According to political scientist Yves Mény, founder of the Robert Schuman Centre at the EUI in Fiesole, by the 1980s, advanced democracies were witnessing a transformation into what Peter Mair termed “cartel parties: political formations that cooperate to maintain power while increasingly distancing themselves from their electoral base.” This process accelerated with the fall of the Berlin Wall, perceived as a total victory for liberalism, “marking the effective end of the traditional party system,” Mény emphasized in an interview with Reset DOC.
Albena Azmanova, a professor of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Kent, also views that period as pivotal, due to deep economic changes such as market liberalization and cuts in public spending. “The 1990s were the most prosperous decade in Western history, with economic growth and low unemployment. However, there was a growing sense of instability in a political economy focused on competitiveness within integrated global markets.” This instability led to a sense of insecurity along four dimensions, according to Azmanova: “Economic, in terms of employment; political – during that time, many corruption scandals erupted, leading to a distrust in the establishment; physical (fear of terrorism); and cultural, due to migration movements and the perception of an identity under pressure.”
“On the one hand, political parties tried to embrace the dominance of economic liberalism and globalization– which became the mantra of international politics,” Mény continued, “On the other hand, even those who did not want to support this trivialization were more or less forced to do so by participating in social-democratic or socialist governments. Two significant examples are François Mitterand in France and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Mitterand initially adopted a socialist policy, but after two years, he had to adapt to the failure of this strategy. The PCI, eager to govern, accepted the rules of the game.”
Shifts in the Left-Wing Electorate
According to political scientist Roberto D’Alimonte, founder of the Italian Center for Electoral Studies, those years contributed to a shift in the “classic” left-wing electorate: “Over the last 20 to 25 years, the working class has drastically diminished due to a process of deindustrialization and a technological revolution that has radically changed the structure of the labor market. A single statistic for Italy: today, workers represent less than 10 percent of the active labor force.” As a result, social democratic parties have had to broaden their electoral base, fragmenting the vote of their historical supporters: “The working class is no longer a primary constituency,” D’Alimonte explained to Reset DOC, although, according to the electoral systems expert, “the relative majority of the working class still votes for left-wing parties.” However, this search for new interlocutors poses dilemmas, such as in the field of civil rights: “On one side, there is a more educated and culturally advanced community, on the other, a class – if we can still call it that – of workers with different socio-cultural characteristics. Into the gap that has emerged, right-wing parties have inserted themselves, offering traditional cultural protection.”
The Loss of the Left’s Role in Channeling Social Protest
Another key factor is the left’s loss of its role in channeling social protest. “The PCI represented an important part of those discontented with Christian Democracy. The French Communist Party took charge of every protest to the extent that the politician Georges Lavau spoke of its ‘tribunician function’.” This role began to fade in the 1990s, making room for parties or, more often, social movements led by charismatic leaders,” Mény noted. “Initially, protests arose from limited elements: immigration in France, centralized policies in Italy, as with the Northern League, the euro in Germany, the European Union in the UK.” This trend culminated in the Yellow Vests movement in France, which, Mény continued, “had no program, no leader, no desire to govern, but only to protest against the government’s social policy.” Sociologist Chiara Saraceno argues that the disaffection with the left is also due to the fact that it has become “increasingly unrecognizable.” “And when the left tries to reclaim a distinctive identity, its slogans are no longer relevant to today’s reality,” Saraceno asserted. This misalignment has led many traditional left-wing voters to seek alternatives, often finding them in right-wing parties.
Neoliberalism and the Right’s Rebranding
At the same time, the right has repositioned itself, softening its fascist and reactionary narrative, and presenting itself as an ideology that embraces free markets – alongside nationalism and xenophobia – but also includes a certain degree of social protection. “It has co-opted much of the left’s agenda,” noted Azmanova, who describes the new right-wing leaders as “national capitalists.” For them, “the enemy is global capitalism – what today’s far-right populist parties advocate is social protection within a white national capitalism.”
In the 1980s, when the political elites of the center-left and center-right committed to massively opening their economies to global competition, “Western societies, with their technological advantage, could benefit from global economic competition in a win-win game,” Azmanova emphasized. However, everything quickly changed because “China learned to play better than us,” developing technological skills and attracting not only low-wage jobs but also high-quality ones. This hit the West unexpectedly, causing it to lose its technological edge and many of the economic benefits of globalization.
As a result, what Nancy Fraser calls “progressive neoliberalism” – which saw the center-left and center-right agree on a global capitalist agenda combined with certain cultural freedoms and a progressive social agenda – entered a crisis. “This soon became detrimental to the working class in Western societies, and the left, somewhat myopic, began to embrace the narrative of fighting inequality” when it saw it was losing the support of the working class, Azmanova continued. Strategically, this was a misguided narrative, as the main concern for everyone else remained job loss.