Beirut, The Lebanon

Saudi Arabia is the United States’ greatest ally in the Gulf, and thanks to its relative stability and increased economic welfare, it is now the most influent Arab country in the entire Middle East. Across the water instead it must confront Iran’s expansionist objectives resulting in a confrontation that assumes various forms both in the Lebanese and the Palestinian internal scenarios. The alliance between Washington and Riyadh is the pillar of traditional regional balance; the Gulf’s Arab theocracy, once the main supplier of oil for the United States, still continues to be one of the main crude oil producers and the guarantor of stability in this area. And although American troops have abandoned their Saudi military bases, US protection continues to be guaranteed by significant numbers of US troops stationed close to the Saudi kingdom in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Ever since the colonial era, these territories that later came under the rule of the al-Saud family, were always considered by European powers as "the gateway to the Indian Ocean".

So still now the superpower continues to need Saudi Arabia as the launching pad for implementing its own hegemonic plans in Central and South Eastern Asia. In exchange, Riyadh receives military, political, economic and diplomatic support; the house of Saud guarantees its own political stability without any minority being "used" (as happens instead in Iran or in Syria) or any “human rights” campaign being unleashed by friendly media (as happens now for Tibet used as in anti-Chinese role) so as to try and make King Abdallah’s throne totter. The internal situation is apparently even more reassuring. After the change at the country’s summit with sovereignty going to King Abdallah, now represented abroad by the super Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal, the house of Saud does not appear to be threatened by internal or family coups. With its 27 million inhabitants (eight million of which are foreign workers without citizenship), the kingdom is not exposed to threats from the turbulent Shiite minority (15 percent of the population), mainly concentrated in eastern towns closer to the Persian Gulf such as Qatif, al-Ahsa, Dammam. Internal security services and special police forces, well-trained by US and British officers and equipped with the most sophisticated war instruments, are the main deterrent for a minority whose suppressed rights have not been “internationalised" and whose autonomist aspirations are only backed by nearby Iran. On the other hand, hypothetical threats to the Saudi regime coming from extremist Islamic groups, close to or inspired by al-Qaida, have for the moment been avoided, thanks to success achieved by Riyadh’s policies in exporting these cells elsewhere to keep them far from the country’s borders.

Saudi foreign policy is increasingly based on the need to confront Teheran’s advance both in the Gulf and the whole of the Middle East. A mission to be completed both so as to maintain its own position of power in this region, and to satisfy the United States’ "security" requirements, since America sees Iran as the main obstacle to its own Central Asian excursions, preliminary to the final confrontation with China. Confronting Iran does not however mean that Saudi Arabia is prepared to go to war with its most powerful neighbour; any conflict, perhaps with nuclear consequences, would be too risky for Riyadh, with its drinking water mainly coming from desalinisation plants situated in the Gulf. The first “western” targets that the Islamic Republic could attack would be the Saudi centres of power, which would probably result in the entire internal system collapsing. As far as Iran is concerned, according to Riyadh, tough and belligerent words must be alternated with willingness to talk. The two countries know each other well; they challenge and yet fear one another. A sort of "micro-Cold War" on the shores of the Gulf.

In the Lebanon and in Palestine this Saudi-Iranian confrontation often has far more dramatic repercussions. In the country of cedars, Saudi Arabia supports the current government led by the Sunni Premier Fuad Siniora, representing the parliamentary majority that opposes traditional Syrian influence. The political-institutional crisis that took place in the autumn of 2006, was partly precisely the result of this rift; on one hand the front sponsored by Washington and Riyadh, and on the other the opposition led by the Shiite Hezbollah movement, backed by Damascus and above all by Teheran. In the middle are the people of the Lebanon, for almost six months without a new President of the Republic (precisely due to the confrontation between these two parties) and with the country also burdened with an unprecedented economic crisis. Political assassinations, periodic clashes in the streets and a variety of attacks keep tension in the country at a high level, by many described as "the edge of the precipice, moving towards another civil war". For the moment, neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia seem intentioned to increase the tension, and have put a stop to all danger involving an internal conflict more dramatic than the one that devastated the Lebanon between 1975 and 1990.

In the Palestinian Occupied Territories living conditions are even more dramatic and for some time now politics have provided no solutions. In February 2007 “agreements” were celebrated in the Mecca between Fatah, the party led by Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), and the radical movement Hamas, winner of the January 2006 elections and supported by Iran. At the time, Saudi Arabia’s objective was to place its seal of approval regards to reconciliation between the two Palestinian political parties. This mission failed miserably in just a few weeks; since June 2007, Hamas has gained control using force over the entire Gaza Strip, driving out Fatah’s men to the West Bank. Leaving aside promises of peace spoken last November at the Annapolis Conference (USA) by Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas, and also ignoring the continuous spiral of violence fomented by the Israelis and Palestinian radical groups in Gaza and in the Occupied Territories, relations between Hamas and Fatah have remained unchanged, nor has the distance between Riyadh and Teheran changed as far as this contest from a distance is concerned for conquering power among the people of Palestine.

Translation by Francesca Simmons