Even if in tone and delivery this communiqué echoed the announcement the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued twenty-eight months ago to oust Hosni Mubarak and seize full control of the state, it is too early to imagine that they will directly interfere in Egyptian politics. On June 23, general Abdul Fattah al-Sissi, the Defence minister and Commander in chief of the Armed Forces, warned that the military would intervene just to prevent violence and unrest. On Monday statement, the military council also emphasized its reluctance to resume political power. “The armed forces will not be party to the circle of politics or ruling” the statement said.
For Morsi’s supporters Egypt is facing a military coup, but it is still possible that the Army has less drastic power sharing measures in mind. Throwing Egyptian flags to anti-Morsi demonstrators in Tahrir square, the military wants to regain the popularity it lost during the transition. That is one of the reasons why it could prefer not to directly manage such a difficult phase that could bring it in a scenario very similar to those it created after Mubarak’s fall.
The next step the army will take in Egypt is the most important and divisive concern inside the very heterogeneous opposition front. While there are those who dream the restoration of the old regime and an active military role, the majority of the demonstrators just want the military to give Morsi the last push out of the scene. “Then they have to go back to the barracks” says a 28 years old engineer we met in Cairo. “We have to prevent them to take the same power they had in 2011.”
Even if anti-Morsi demonstrators cheered the Army statement, erupting in applause, it is hard to think that real revolutionaries would tolerate a military solution. Many of them are the same who last year fought and asked the military to give up its hold of violent power.
“We are happy because the army statement is a move against Morsi” says a 32 years old demonstrator. “This is an important step: it seems that the alliance between the Army and the Brotherhood is going to collapse. This gives us hope.” Although until now the Army has safeguarded the independence of Islamist leadership to see its own privileges protected, this “power-sharing” relation could evolve. Now that the constitution guarantees the Army what it wants, the Armed Forces could also think to change their attitude toward the Islamists.
In fact, the ultimatum issued by the military seemed to leave Morsi few choices: to cut short his term as president with a resignation; to share significant power with a political opponent in a role such as prime minister; or try to rally his supporters to fight in the street. It is hard to think that the first option will ever occur. Morsi is not only the first elected president after decades of dictatorship, but he is also a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement that is fighting its battle since 1920. To deny this group the chance to govern would be an epic defeat.
Even if it is very hard to imagine any resignation, Morsi has already lost his battle and his whole popularity. To preserve his power, the president mentions the legitimacy that the ballots gave him last year. But ballotocracy – this is the term coined by Amr Ezzat, blogger and activist – is not enough. In 2011 revolutionaries did not take the street only to have free and fair election, but to fulfill a series of socio-economic objectives that Morsi has not be able to achieve. According to Khaled Fahmy, a professor at the American University of Cairo, during the last year the Muslim Brotherhood committed seven deadly sins. One of them is that it relies on an “ancient and outdated political philosophy whereby the people’s participation in the political system seems to start and finish at the ballot boxes.”
To defend their position, the Islamists have often ascribed much of the opposition in the streets to a conspiracy led by Mubarak-era political and financial elites determined to bring them down. But no conspiracy can bring millions to the street, and Sunday demonstration was probably the biggest one since 2011.
Underestimating the campaign that organized this last protest, Morsi made the same mistakes of his predecessor. As it happened in 2011 to Mubarak, his future is also linked to the US that has great influence on the Army. Until now the White House gave Morsi full support. Last week, US ambassador in Cairo Anne Patterson, criticized plans for 30 June demonstration and Associated Press quoted her as saying “Egypt needs stability to get its economy in order. My government and I are deeply skeptical of any street action.” But after the death of an American citizen killed during the demonstration in Alexandria, Obama urges Morsi to work with the opposition and to do more to enact democratic reforms.
This bilateral relation seems to follow the same old path, but walking through Tahrir it is clear that something has changed. In 2011 it was hard to find any banner directly criticizing US politics. Now it is very easy. Anti-Americanism comes back as an important ingredient of the last wave of protests.