The hot border
The events at the end of July were a real litmus test for the complex situation in Kosovo.
It began on the night of Monday, July 25th, when the government in Pristina sent special forces to the northern border to assume control over customs in Jarinje and Brnjak, normally presided over by Serb officers, since Kosovo is seen as a Serbian territorial appendix. In that area the ethnic majority is Serbian and everything, from the economy to security, must be approved by the so-called “parallel institutions” financed by Belgrade, such as banks, schools, public offices, currency and police forces.
The reason for the Kosovo police incursion, as explained by the government in Pristina, was that Serbian agents did not respect the ban on importing goods from Belgrade—a measure recently approved by the cabinet as a reprisal for a similar provision approved by Serbia for goods made in Kosovo. The Kosovo provision has been enforced since Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence, which Belgrade has not acknowledged.
When the police officers from Kosovo arrived, the Serbs revolted, building barricades, setting fire to the customs offices in Jarinje and doing everything they could to make sure the policemen sent by Pristina would be unable to complete their operation. Reports spoke of shots fired, Molotov cocktails thrown and other acts of violence. The Kosovo police were obliged to withdraw and now the border is manned by soldiers from KFOR, the peacekeeping force created under the aegis of NATO.
Serbs from the north and Serbs from the south
While the situation at the customs crossings appears to be calm again, the Kosovo context remains quite fragile, mainly due to the structure and balances in Kosovo’s northern municipalities. The area remains strictly controlled by Belgrade, and everything indicates that the Serbs continue to boycott institutions in Pristina, remaining loyal to the fatherland.
The situation is different south of the Ibar, the river marking the ethnic border between Serb majority Kosovo and the rest of the country, where there is a monolithic Albanian presence of two million people. Unlike their compatriots in the north, the roughly 60,000 Serbs who live south of the river seem ready to establish a minimum level of cooperation with the Albanians. Not enjoying the advantages provided by territorial proximity with Serbia, self-isolation had become unsustainable, considering the socio-economic fabric in Kosovo, the poorest country in Europe by far. There are nowadays signs of a schism between the Serbs and Kosovars with some stubbornly resisting and others in search of coexistence.
Divided sovereignty
The chaos at the customs posts reiterates that Pristina is not currently capable of extending its sovereignty to the north. The withdrawal of the police special forces was a bitter defeat, if it is true that real reason for sending them to the border, embargo aside, was, as many experts suspect, to break Belgrade’s monopoly in the north. Now that this initiative has failed, all that remains is to accept the paradoxical essence of a state with restricted sovereignty.
Kosovo’s limited sovereignty is not only a geographical issue but also an institutional one. The presence of an E.U. civilian mission (Eulex), a U.N. civilian contingent (UNMIK) and NATO’s peacekeeping forces, restricts the range of action for Kosovar institutions. These missions are there to assist the country in achieving the status of complete of statehood. In other words, we are faced with a form of protectorate that will last until Kosovar institutions prove they are sufficiently mature.
There is, however, still a great deal to be desired on this front. The many cases of corruption and bad administration of the res publica, added to collusion between the mafia and politics, do not encourage the process of instilling a sense of responsibility in the managerial class, now also affected by the scandal that has hit Prime Minister Hashim Thaci.
According to the European Council, Thaci, the political leader of the UCK, the guerrilla militia that rose up against Serbia in 1998-1999, was the leader of a gang of criminals who removed organs from Serb victims and sold them on the black market. Nothing has been proved, but the doubts expressed in the final report on organ trafficking in Kosovo, presided over by the Swiss politician Dick Marty, affect Thaci’s credibility and that of many UCK veterans who, having abandoned their uniforms, now appear in double-breasted suits.
On top of this, Western annoyance persists regarding the debateable choice to send police to the border, which has shaken the West’s confidence in Thaci. The prime minister has begun to be tired of the West’s inactivity after it sponsored Kosovo’s independence but is short of ideas on how to resolve the problem posed by parallel Serbian institutions.
Europe or Kosovo? The Serbian crossroads
Another reason for reflection that has arisen from events at the border is Serbia’s position regarding Kosovo. At the last presidential elections held on the eve of Kosovo’s independence, the winner Boris Tadic used the slogan “Europe and Kosovo.” Marching toward the E.U., without having Kosovo recognized internationally, while continuing to hold on tight to the north of the country, is a slippery operation.
In recent years Belgrade has made great steps forward as far as European integration is concerned, and its rating has risen since the country handed over war criminals Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic. Faced with Serbia’s commitment, E.U. countries have for the moment decided to leave aside the Kosovo issue and continue the dialogue with Belgrade, which may before the end of the year obtain the official status of a candidate member. It is, however, probable that in the future it will be necessary to leave aside the “Europe and Kosovo” concept, and to instead debate that of “Europe or Kosovo.”
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s recent visit to Belgrade appeared to indicate that the E.U. is working in this direction. Merkel supposedly asked Tadic to normalize relations with the former province. Considering Kosovo’s historical-cultural importance as the heart of the medieval Serbian empire and the centre of the Serb Orthodox faith, the choice may be a difficult one.
Translated by Francesca Simmons
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Matteo Tacconi is a journalist and author of two books about the Balkans, in Italian: Kosovo. La storia, la guerra, il futuro (Castelvecchi 2008) and C’era una volta il muro. Viaggio nell’Europa ex-comunista (Castelvecchi 2009).